-: SJC 12229, Commonwealth v. Nathaniel Brown,
-: Attorney Cusick, take your time.
-: Good morning your Honors.
May it please the court,
Tracey Cusick on behalf of the Commonwealth,
your Honors, the Commonwealth is asking this court
to vacate the allowance of the motion for new trial
that was granted in the matter
of Commonwealth versus Nathaniel Brown.
Mr. Brown was convicted of the first degree murder
of Jordan Baskin, who was 22 years old at the time.
Your Honor, in this case, the Commonwealth's first argument
I'd like to focus on is the motion judge's finding
that counsel had an actual conflicts of interest
that constrained the motion judge to grant the motion
for new trial without a showing of prejudice.
-: We don't have to get there
if we decided on ineffective assistance, right.
-: I believe that is potentially correct, your Honor.
-: The actual conflict is a more complicated issue
given all the colloquies.
-: Yes, your Honor.
And I suggest here with the conflict again,
there were multiple colloquies
by three trial judges who were, again, taking efforts
to make sure that we did not end up here
where there was an argument of a conflict of interest.
-: Do you mind starting with the ineffective assistance?
-: Certainly, your Honor.
Your Honor, with respect
to the ineffective assistance of counsel argument,
I'd suggest here, counsel first did investigate this case
by meeting with the defendant who was not in custody,
who contacted, or a family member of his, contacted her
and I suggest reading through
all of the hearing at the motion for new trial
and all of the paperwork
suggests that the defendant certainly wanted
to get that vehicle back,
that the police had expressed an interest in
and that they had custody of.
There's some lack of clarity in the record
about how the vehicle came to be in-
-: But what happens when the counsel speaks
to a client who lies to her?
And that's what Judge Sullivan finds.
Then they show up at the Milton Police Department
and there's the CPAC DLT
who said, "This is a murder case, your Honor."
If this was a movie, the heavy music would come in.
I mean, this is a big deal
and then she continues to go forward with an interview.
That's the problem.
-: Well, your Honor, I would suggest here,
counsel talked to the defendant about the dangers
and ramifications of speaking with police
and spent hours with him, according to her testimony,
and said that she asked him first about the vehicle,
anything to do with that vehicle,
would that be implicated in anything?
-: She never calls the police department though, right?
-: Other than calls to arrange the logistics of an interview,
no, she doesn't inquire specifically what it's about.
-: Doesn't say, "Hey, my client wants the motor vehicle back.
How does this happen?"
-: Your Honor, it's not entirely clear what was said,
but it's certainly clear from her testimony
that the driving interest here
was the defendant wanted the car back that was used
by his child's mother to drive the child around.
-: Yeah, I mean, given his representations,
everything seems reasonable, I guess.
But then when you get to the meeting itself,
then I think you've got a problem.
-: Well, your Honor, I'd suggest when they get to the meeting
at the police station,
first, the attorney had repeatedly asked the defendant
if he had any issues in Milton, specifically in Milton,
specifically in Quincy or anywhere else
and the defendant continually said,
"No, no, there's no issues."
-: But then the officer tells her,
this is in a murder investigation.
Justice Gaziano: And we're looking at your client's role.
-: Right, so at that point,
one would hope that counsel would pause
and talk to her client again before entering the room.
-: Well, in hindsight, it's I guess, easier to say
that maybe that would've been a good thing to do.
But not doing that,
I suggest does not transform this
into ineffective assistance of counsel.
-: When you go with your client,
you think maybe he's involved in some sort of drug issue,
he's telling me he just wants the car back
and then you hear murder,
you don't think that ordinary counsel would say, "Aha?"
-: I think in here, this attorney was not ineffective
for not doing something different at the police station,
because review of her testimony indicates
she thought the police thought the car was involved
in some kind of drug activity
and she did say that she remained convinced
that the car wasn't involved in any sort of crime
and the defendant had told her it wasn't.
-: But then, but then she hears the M word.
-: And then she hears the M word,
but I suggest it was the M word,
also, it occurred in Milton
and the defendant had indicated no problems in Milton
and the police,
she said she knew the police were investigating something
in Milton, and so-
-: In the light most favorable to her,
she says, "I asked my client,
'Do you got any problems in Milton?"
He says, "Nope, I'm good in Milton."
But then the police says, "There's a murder in Milton,
we wanna talk to your guy about that murder."
That's a different ballgame, isn't it?
It could be that maybe the police are wrong
in a light most favorable to the attorney,
but at that point, there's a duty to inquire
or a duty to get the heck out of there.
-: Well, I suggest counsel already inquired of the defendant
and again, the defendant is also, he's not in custody,
he had counsel of his choosing
and decided that they would go to the police station
and was given Miranda warnings.
-: And then we get those questions
that happen in every murder case.
What's your cell number?
-: And the defendant, well, the first question was,
"Do you know this person who was Jordan Baskin the victim?"
And again, the defendant said he didn't.
And again, that was not something counsel could have known
and the defendant chose to lie in the police interview.
-: But counsel knows he's lying
once they ask about the cell phone, right?
And does she keep allowing him to answer questions
after he lies about the phone?
I know she breaks for a second,
but she keeps allowing him to, she knows he's now lying
and he's lying in a way that's silly.
-: Well, she knows that she had communicated with him
on a cell phone and she recognized one of the numbers.
So there was a break where she spoke to him
and then the interview continued.
But I suggest prior to that-
-: Not only does she know we've gone from drugs to murder,
but we've gone from lying to being caught lying
and she knows it.
I don't know, we're getting dicey, aren't we?
-: Your Honor, in hindsight, we're certainly getting dicey,
but looking at what we knew at the time-
-: Effective assistance is, it's hindsight.
We have to do a little hindsight.
-: Well, if we look at what counsel knew at the time,
she went to the interview with the defendant
and if we also look
at if the ineffective assistance and counsel analysis
and a potential motion to suppress,
I suggest that, I don't know the victim,
that wouldn't have been suppressed
and I suggest that if counsel should have stopped
the interview after the cell phone lie,
those two items I suggest wouldn't have been suppressed
if there had been a motion to suppress.
-: So the harm is the consciousness of guilt evidence
that comes out of the client's mouth?
-: Yes, that he does make these statements,
which I suggest turn out to be,
by inference, they were untrue.
But again, when counsel, if the court were to say
counsel should have stopped the interview
when he lied about the cell phone,
if there were to be a motion suppress,
then perhaps everything after that point
would be suppressed,
but the fact that the defendant lied
about knowing the victim,
lied about being at the victim's home
and lied about the cell phone,
I suggest would not have been suppressed.
-: But the thing is, he shouldn't have been in there
talking to the police in the first place, right?
-: No, your Honor,
I suggested it was his decision to go there.
-: Even after he heard that it was a murder investigation?
-: Again, the defendant was not in custody.
He chose an attorney.
He went there, he made certain statements
and he was allowed to leave after the interview.
-: I guess my point is, what was the attorney's role?
What was his attorney's role
in terms of guiding him, the defendant?
-: She warned him of the dangers
or ramifications of speaking to police
and she said, "If there's anything,
even if you don't wanna tell me what it is,
don't speak to the police."
So there's nothing to support the motion,
Judge's finding that based on what she said to him prior
to going to the interview,
that he made these statements to police,
the motion judge made an inference
that based on counsel's deficient work,
I don't know the exact wording,
that's why he made a statement to police
and I suggest that that's not born out by the record.
-: We said that it's not categorical,
the decision to walk your client into the police station,
that's not categorically ineffective,
but we said it needs to be accompanied by an investigation.
Here we have an investigation
that was solely directed to the client,
but none to the police.
So this is the next case we're talking about.
What is the scope of that investigation, correct?
-: Well, your Honor, I suggest yes.
And here again, it's a non-custodial interview,
this is not someone who is being held
by police in a situation where there's a murder warrant
in some of the cases,
or that the defendant is somehow being told,
maybe you'll get to leave the police station
if you talk to us.
It's not that situation.
They voluntarily went there
and again, here it was, the defendant chose his attorney,
chose what to tell her, chose to be untruthful with her
and chose to go to the police station
to make these statements.
-: What is the record on what the attorney asked the police
when setting up the interview?
-: There's a little bit of inconsistencies in it.
It appears that the attorney was primarily setting up
the logistics, but with the defendant's request to do so.
She said she would never set a meeting up with police
unless her client wanted her to do so.
-: So the record, for example,
did she say, "What do you wanna talk to my client about?"
-: There's nothing in the record to indicate that,
it doesn't appear she made that inquiry.
-: And the findings are contrary to that.
Tracey: Excuse me your Honor?
-: Judge Sullivan's findings are contrary to that.
-: Yes, your Honor.
It appears that it was purely logistical
what the attorney was arranging
and again, it was the defendant was telling her,
"I want this car back."
And it was a big problem
because they didn't have the car
for the child's mother to use.
And again, I suggest that,
oh, maybe the car wasn't part of this offense,
maybe it was just a coincidence that police had that video
and that was what potentially prompted the defendant
to really wanna emphasize getting this car back.
But I suggest he did go to the police station
with counsel who he had, again, lied to
and it's unclear what counsel could have done
prior to going to the police station
and again told it was a murder.
Perhaps that was surprising to counsel,
but again, she had inquired of him if he had any issues
that he didn't wanna tell her about,
don't go to the police.
-: Counsel if she had heard, let's just imagine,
this is not the record we have,
but if she had heard the day before,
she had asked that question,
and she said, "By the way, what is this about?"
And the person on the phone said,
"It's a murder investigation."
Do you think that she would've had a duty
to ob investigate at that point
before bringing her client in the next day?
-: I think it would've been a good idea to investigate.
But whether it would be ineffective for not doing so,
I don't think so, because again,
she's relying on what her client has hired her to do.
-: So you don't think it would be ineffective
to rely on her client's prior denials
that he had done anything wrong in connection with the car,
which it sounds from the record
it was a pretty specific to the car.
He said there's no evidence in the car,
which turned out to be correct.
So you're saying that there would not be ineffectiveness
if she did nothing more
after hearing it was a murder investigation,
after receiving the earlier day
the news from her client
that he didn't think he was worried about the car?
-: Well, your Honor, I suggested it was more than just a car,
was what counsel talked to the defendant about.
She talked to him about any issues.
She talked first about the car,
but she also said, "Are there any issues at all,
even if you don't want to tell me what they are?"
-: And so she would not have had to follow up with him?
It would not be constitutionally ineffective or deficient
for her not to follow up with him
after learning it was a murder investigation,
before walking into the interview?
-: Your Honor, in this case, we also have the affidavit
of the defendant who didn't testify,
but he indicated in a sworn affidavit
that he had heard that the police word was out,
that people were looking for him
in connection to a murder.
-: But the focus is on the counsel's conduct here.
So the question is, if counsel had learned a bit earlier
that this was actually a murder investigation,
would it be deficient of her not to follow up,
at least with the client, and possibly otherwise,
before going into that interview?
-: In the circumstances again, of this record,
I suggest it's not per se, ineffective,
again, it would be a good idea to inquire of the client,
but again, in this case,
we have the defendant is sitting there with his lawyer.
He is hearing what's being said.
-: But akin to what I was getting at,
and I'm sure you're getting that,
is that if she had heard the day before,
I think you say it would've been a good idea
for her to follow up again with her client
and maybe even do other investigation.
As it actually happened here,
she didn't hear until she's at the station,
but at that point she has options available
to her still, does she not?
-: At the station?
Yeah, they could have left.
I mean, they could have turned around and left.
She did ultimately terminate the interview later on
when the officers asked the defendant
to remove the bandage on his hand.
But I suggested it was not ineffective,
even if she had known earlier, it was about a murder,
again, where she had inquired specifically of her client
and told him specifically of the dangers and ramifications
of speaking to police.
-: So let's just say we think it's ineffective.
Is there a substantial likelihood here
of a miscarriage of justice?
-: I would suggest there isn't,
given that there is quite a lot of evidence,
perhaps overwhelming evidence,
of the defendant's guilt in this matter.
-: What do we do with the closing argument, though?
Where the prosecutor really focused,
at least for some part of the closing argument,
on the consciousness of guilt stemming from the interview?
-: I suggest that that's one part
of a fairly comprehensive closing argument
and that there was ample-
-: What's your best analogous case
where we said no substantial likelihood
of miscarriage of justice, where there is this argument
of consciousness of guilt in the closing
and overwhelming evidence of guilt?
-: Your Honor, I apologize, case names aren't coming to mind.
-: Okay, I'll look, thank you though.
-: If there are no further questions,
I would rest on my brief.
-: Okay, thank you.
Okay, attorney Cunha.
-: Good morning, your Honor.
It's John Henry Cunha for Mr. Brown.
Before I begin, reading our brief over the weekend,
I was appalled at some of the typos.
(participants laughing)
And I think, I don't know if you noticed,
but we got the brief in at 11:02 PM
and I thought we had vetted it properly,
but we did not, other than being embarrassing,
there are a couple that I'd like to point out to you.
One is on page 11 where the word told is repeated twice,
and it's a little unclear what I'm talking about
and that is that in fact,
trial counsel called a Milton police detective
and was told by that detective, who was also a woman,
no, pardon me, trial counsel told the police detective,
who was also a woman, the location of the car
and where it could be picked up.
Perhaps more egregiously on page-
-: Is the error, what was the error?
-: It's ambiguous as to,
I use trial counsel who was a woman
and then used her and told us, said twice.
-: I see, okay.
-: So it's a little unclear who told who what.
-: I got you, the pronoun was redundant.
-: Before you fall on your sword some more on typos,
can I shift you to the substance for a second?
John: Sure.
-: So and again, having not been in your shoes,
so you call the police, you're defense counsel,
you call the police, do they tell you
what they're investigating, do they?
John: Unless you ask them!
-: But if you ask them, do they have any kind of obligation?
John: Nope, they don't.
-: So, often you get stiffed, is that right?
-: Well, this is a pretty unusual circumstance, Judge.
I personally, and I know that this court has said
that it isn't per se ineffective to bring your client
to speak to the police, but I would point out to you
what Justice Jackson said in Watts v. Indiana,
which is quoted by this court, and Simon,
and I quote, "Any lawyer worth his salt
will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms
to make no statement to police under any circumstances."
-: I'm just trying to figure out
sort of we've rejected that, though.
-: Well, I'm not so sure you have Judge,
because the word, "Suspect," is important there.
In other words, somebody may not be a suspect
and counsel may say it's appropriate
to speak to the police.
-: But here we have, at least, I guess you could infer,
that they'd say something,
because when I went to the police station,
the lead investigator says, "Here's why we're here."
They didn't just wait to get him in the box
and ask him questions.
-: No, that's right
and they didn't surprise him halfway through the interview.
I will say this too, Judge,
the Commonwealth's argument is premised on the fact
that Mr. Brown lied to trial counsel about being guilty
and I know we have a guilty finding here,
but I don't accept that premise.
The focus was on the car, was on the automobile.
-: Oh, no, the findings as I read them was,
did you do anything in Milton?
John: Right and he says he didn't!
He says he didn't, he still says he didn't.
-: Well, I get you on that one, right.
So either way, he's got a problem
that she's not advising him about.
-: He's got a problem that the police know about
and that she doesn't.
And I know that, frankly,
walking a client into a police station and being told that,
my client is telling me that that there's nothing here,
but I think it's about drugs.
So already she's going there
thinking that she's walking the client in,
even though he's denying any problem.
She's already thinking
that he's got criminal responsibility.
She's done no investigation.
I do not in any way concede that bringing him there
without doing an investigation is acceptable.
It's not and then being told that,
walking in the door and being told,
oh, by the way, this is a murder.
And okay, what do you want to know?
I mean, frankly, the conduct is outrageous.
This is an actual conflict of interest
and the lawyer should-
-: Is that a separate argument?
I mean, let's stick
with the ineffective assistance of counsel for a moment.
Why, assuming we agree with you that this was ineffective,
once she heard it was the murder investigation,
why is there a substantial likelihood
of a miscarriage of justice, given,
although I'm sure your client proclaims his innocence,
there was a lot of evidence
suggesting that he and the victim were planning to meet up,
that they were waiting for each other
minutes before the actual murder, so tell me why,
given the nature of the evidence against him,
this is a substantial likelihood
of a miscarriage of justice?
-: I will reply to that Judge,
but I don't think you can separate the fact,
this is not a situation where one lawyer,
say for instance in Celeste,
there's one lawyer who misconduct is questioned,
but is not the trial lawyer.
You can't separate the fact
that the lawyer who took him to the station
is also the lawyer who was the trial counsel
and it's an actual conflict.
And to answer your question,
and we have spent a lot of paper,
for the first time in my career,
I filed an oversized brief here,
because I felt that the facts
were so important to this court
and I'd suggest
that the evidence against him was not overwhelming
and that no one saw him on the scene.
There is this possibility
that a car that's associated with him was seen
driving into Milton and out of Milton.
Justice Gaziano: He's the last drug deal.
John: He is the last possible drug deal.
-: Right, that's the strongest evidence the government has,
is there's a drug deal gone bad
and he's the last person identifiable by cell phone records,
text messages, et cetera, to engage that drug deal.
-: Well, as a possibility, we don't know that, we don't know.
-: Right. And then there's the fingerprint
on the bag of drugs, there's the palm print on the porch.
-: Right, well, he's been there before.
There's is a relationship, albeit an illegal relationship-
-: I don't think the relationship's illegal.
-: That's based on illegality.
And with respect to the bag, there was testimony from-
-: And his cell phone?
-: There was testimony from people in the car
that they had purchased drugs from him earlier that day.
So the fact that there's a fingerprint on a bag
is consistent with that.
Justice Dewar: But what about the DNA
under the fingernails and the cut?
-: Yep, again, the cut actually,
the government didn't emphasize that.
Although I would agree with you Judge
that it is inculpatory
and that's one of the problems with
bringing him to that interrogation.
Justice Kafker: But the DNA under the fingernails
is really Inculpatory.
-: Well, both the commonwealth expert
and the defense expert
said that it's easily placed under the fingernails
and the defense expert said it could last for weeks.
-: But it's of a prior fight between these two?
-: Well, no one was focusing on that judge.
So I don't know the answer to that.
-: See, I would've thought that you might focus
on the fact that the prosecutor used the interview
as consciousness of guilt to buttress any holes
in what might be considered lots of evidence
that your client and this victim were together
right before he was killed.
Are you not suggesting that?
Are you saying that, that closing argument
was really not the the thing that brought everything in?
-: No, I'm saying that closing argument was very important
and frankly, in addition to the closing argument,
there was a very powerful jury instruction
on consciousness of guilt
that specifically mentioned the lies
that Mr. Brown had told to the police
when he was interviewed.
So no, I definitely think
that the closing argument was very important.
But I'm suggesting, Judge,
that it's not an overwhelming case.
-: So I know why you want to get to conflict,
because then there's no prejudice problem
on an actual conflict.
John: That's correct, judge.
And I don't think you can actually separate them.
-: Right, well, I think you can, but let's get through this.
John: Well, you're the judge!
-: But anyway, so there's two arguments raised,
one's the ineffective assistance,
which requires a showing of prejudice
and the second is potential conflict versus actual conflict.
Actual conflict, you win, no matter what.
I'm just troubled by the multiple colloquies,
including the ones by the DA who say, wait a minute,
we're gonna end up in front of the SJC here,
let's talk to this
and the DA raises this like three times
and judges have various colloquies with your client
to the judges satisfaction.
-: So the prosecutor mentioned it once.
And that was not during the colloquy,
I believe it was in the same hearing
as the colloquy.
-: So there was a conversation then the colloquy follows.
-: Right and the colloquy was all about the Patterson issue.
Any waiver has to be knowing and intelligent,
that's just essential black letter, constitutional.
-: Patterson Issue is that she would be a witness?
John: That's correct.
-: And that's different
from the conflict you're talking about,
which is she doesn't file the motions to suppress
'cause she's gonna look stupid
based on ineffective assistance?
-: Correct, they step around the Patterson issue
by saying, "We agree with the police report."
And the police report, for instance,
doesn't say that she stepped out
to speak to him in the hallway halfway through
and she says, we agree entirely with that,
that's another issue.
-: But I haven't read these, but it's clear in the colloquy
their focus on the fact
that the issue is whether she's gonna have to testify
to contradict the police and what they said,
not that she's going to confirm, "I messed up."
-: That's correct and also, Justice Kafker
the possibility also is that although we agree
with this police report, we don't know,
there may be something that comes out during the trial
where she would have to testify
and he waived that,
he waived anything with respect to the Patterson Issue.
-: I'm just trying to understand the breadth of this.
If every time someone's ineffective
for not filing a motion to suppress, you're limiting it.
The conflict of interest arises when it's your own what?
'Cause we'll often fail to file motions to suppress
and try the cases
and I'm just trying to understand the rule.
This has the potential
to be a giant conflict of interest thing
you're creating here.
I'm just trying to understand it's limitation.
-: I don't think I created this judge,
I think that the trial counsel created it.
But it's her conduct, she could not even evaluate
whether to file a motion to suppress.
This isn't just a motion to suppress
that should have been filed by her,
she could not file a motion to suppress.
-: So I mean, Celeste comes out
and the judge says, "Wait a minute."
John: "Take a look."
-: "Everybody read this and then let's talk."
John: Right and no one does.
So it wasn't like the Celeste issue wasn't raised.
The judge said, "Let's have a reading session."
-: And nobody does!
-: What's result of that discussion?
-: Zip, Celeste's never mentioned again
until the trial judge does.
I think she references it, but neither lawyer,
neither the prosecutor nor nor trial counsel at any time,
the word, "Celeste," never passes either of their lips.
-: Was the timing of Celeste after the last colloquy?
-: Yes, after both, there were two colloquies, not three.
The trial judge mentions the fact that there were colloquies
and opined that they were good colloquies
and I think they were, with respect to the Patterson Issue,
but not with respect to the issue
that was raised by Celeste.
And neither counsel ever mentioned Celeste.
In fact, when asked
at the hearing on the motion for new trial-
-: But I thought the prosecutor mentioned
the possibility of a motion to suppress.
-: That was before Celeste.
Yes, that's what Justice Gaziano just said.
And nobody says anything.
-: Yeah and maybe the colloquy didn't match that comment
and then Celeste comes up,
so there was a second opportunity to get to this.
John: Correct.
-: And your view is
neither of colloquies was sufficient for that.
-: Judge, I think frankly, if you read it,
it's very clear.
They're talking about her testimony.
This all came about
because trial counsel filed,
the government put trial counsel's name on the witness list,
because of the fact that she had been present
during this interview.
She then filed a motion challenging that
and it was in light of that, it was all about her testimony.
It was in light of that motion,
excuse me, putting on the witness list
and then the motion that this came about,
because it was all about Patterson.
-: It was understandable
that they were very focused on that,
given the unusual circumstance
of counsel being a potential witness
and it appears to have blinded everyone
to any other issue.
But just going back into the position of the trial court,
can you respond to the concern
that the trial court
was a little bit between a rock and a hard place,
given the possibility of structural error
if the defendant/client here
was denied counsel of his choice,
where the defendant repeatedly,
despite this extremely unusual circumstance,
implicating a potential client,
over and over again,
said that he wanted to stick with this lawyer.
-: He wanted to stick with this lawyer
because they understood the issue to be Patterson.
They had the police report and the police report,
there was no cavel with it, there was no disputing,
and I think trial counsel said,
"We have no question about that police report at all."
So it was a discreet issue that was dealt with,
with colloquies that went to the discreet issue.
If somebody says, "I want this lawyer,"
and somehow that applies to everything in the world,
then the concept of a knowing and intelligent waiver
is out the window.
-: And we don't know what conversations were had
with your client, with respect to the Celeste issue.
-: We do, because at the hearing,
trial counsel said that her conversations with him,
were about the Patterson Issue.
-: Okay, the hearing in front of Judge Sullivan?
-: Yeah, yes, yes, your Honor.
Yes, yes, yes, yes, I'm sorry.
I wasn't very explicit
-: Pronouns again.
John: Pardon me?
-: Pronouns again, in the articles.
-: Can you identify what you think is the strongest evidence
that counsel was actually laboring under a conflict
and affected by this conflict
as opposed to the conflict just being a potential conflict
where we have to see prejudice as well?
-: I'm not sure exactly how to answer that, Judge,
because having not read Celeste,
that I think that trial counsel was perhaps ignorant
of the problem.
Under federal jurisprudence,
there is no right to counsel at that stage.
It's only under Article 12
that there's the right to counsel.
So I don't know her thought processes,
but certainly, it is inexplicable to me, quite frankly,
that if a prosecutor says
a motion to suppress should have been filed
or could have been filed,
that any defense lawyer in that position
would've said, "Well, let me think about that."
That would make me, so...
-: Can you clarify?
I forget, did the prosecutor say a motion to suppress
should have been filed based upon ineffective assistance?
John: Didn't say should,
they said, "Well, maybe another lawyer
would file a motion to suppress.
-: But was it based upon ineffective assistance?
-: There was no explication of the reason for it.
Yeah, it was just that it was a generic,
maybe another lawyer would file one
or would think about filing one.
I'm over, I welcome any other questions,
but if there are none, I rest on my brief.