-: SJC-12705, Wenda Aquino V
United Property and Casualty Insurance Company.
Man: I forgot about this one.
(man scoffs)
Oh, man.
(chuckling and groaning)
Oh, god.
-: Mr. Hochbaum, good afternoon.
-: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
May it please the court, my name is Seth Hochbaum.
I'm appearing on behalf of Wenda Aquino.
As an innocent co-insured, Miss Aquino is entitled
to coverage and Judge Wilson properly so found.
As the court well knows, chapter 175,
section 99 prescribes the mandatory fire insurance policy
in the Commonwealth and has done so for more than a century.
This court held in Ben Elfman
and the Appeals Court held in Zashell
that there can not be any deviation from
that standard form, nonetheless--
-: I understand that but I may have misread your argument,
but the deviation makes clear, sort of, what the law is.
Which is that if, I mean, if they'd used
the proper language would be the same test, wouldn't it?
Under Cozier that if one of the insured intentionally set
the fire, no one could recover.
So I'm not sure if they'd used the proper language,
wouldn't it have been the same test?
-: Well, the test here is, first of all,
they did not use the correct language.
-: I'm just a little mystified by why it's so important
that they change the language when,
under the statutory language and the case language,
it's the same result.
-: Respectfully, Your Honor, it's not the same result.
-: Well, but it's isn't, again,
if they'd used the proper language,
wouldn't, under Cozier, whatever that case is,
that old case, wouldn't the standard be
that you don't recover?
-: No, because in Cozier, the argument that was made by
the innocent co-insured there is very different than
the argument that I'm making here.
-: But Cozier interprets this statutory language,
the statutory insurance provision
that you say should have been written
to say that you don't recover if you set a fire.
-: Cozier did not interpret the statutory language.
What Cozier did is it--
-: Result certainly did that.
I know you have a fine distinction
but it says that, doesn't it?
-: The language in the Cozier policy did use the words
the insured, but the court in Cozier was presented
with an equitable argument, not the legal argument
that I am making here, and that makes a world of difference.
The equitable argument that the insured in Cozier
was making 81 years ago was that
the court should read into the policy
as their interest may appear.
That is not what I'm arguing here.
What I'm saying here is that the words the insured,
as used in chapter 175, section 99,
as opposed to an insured as used in the UPC policy,
makes a difference.
Because the insured as the statute repeatedly
and exclusively uses throughout means,
only the insured, him or herself who caused the fire,
not the innocent co-insured.
Whereas, an insured, as is used in
this policy. -: Which case says that?
Which case says that?
Which Massachusetts case says that that's the meaning of
the insured under the statutory provision?
-: We have the Gonzalez case
which is Gonzalez versus Liberty Mutual,
which is Judge Lange, the Hall Case, Judge Ferrara.
-: These are Superior court cases.
-: Yes, and then we-- -: Any appellate?
This statute's been in effect for, how many hundred years?
-: It was first enacted, I believe in 1873.
-: But we've got a fair amount of time here.
Any appellate cases say that's the meaning of the insured
'cause Cozier says the exact opposite.
So any appellate cases, I don't care what Justice Lange said
in a Superior Court case, any appellate case?
-: We have those two Superior Court cases
and Judge Woodlock in Shepperson most recently.
-: Is that what he said?
Is that what judge Woodlock said in that case or is,
he makes that point?
-: Judge Woodlock does make that point.
He concurred with Judge Lange and Judge Ferrara in agreeing
that the insured refers solely to the culpable insured.
I'm sorry, no, it's the other way around.
The insured is divisible, separable,
whereas an insured is, I'm sorry,
is potentially both of the insureds,
including the innocent co-insured.
So all three of those judges did grapple with
the language that what the court
is now being affected with. -: They come out to
the opposite conclusion or the same conclusion?
When they sever the, do they say that you can recover?
-: When the word the is used, the innocent co-insured can
and should recover.
Because the insured, as used in the statute repeatedly,
means only the culpable insured not the innocent co-insured.
Where the word an is used, as is used in this policy here,
it means potentially both.
And in fact, the policy itself makes that clear .
If the court looks at volume one, page 38,
which is the policy itself or one of the pages of it,
the policy for the EPC issue makes it clear
that an insured means one or more of the insured.
And that is proscribed by statute.
I would also just comment on Cozier, since it's come up,
that, as Judge Wilson correctly found, Cozier,
though it did briefly reference chapter 175, section 99,
did not do any kind of analysis of that statute whatsoever,
which the court is now being asked to do.
So it's really, I would argue, confined to its facts.
It did not address whether 799 requires broader coverage,
which I respectfully submit to this court it does,
and that's the issue now before this court.
And as the Iowa Supreme Court discussed
in Vance versus Pekin Insurance Company,
it's 457 northwest second, 589,
Cozier is among those older cases where, historically,
a husband and wife were treated as a single entity.
There was no focus as there is today on
the recent trend of cases nationwide on
the effects of imputing the arsonists' conduct on
to the innocent insured.
And also, there was no discussion at
the time Cozier was issued 81 years ago about whether it did
or did not conform with the statute.
Which, again, is the heart of this appeal.
-: There's something which no one in any of
the briefs has discussed, which I'm perplexed by.
In Cozier, the question was the voiding,
the policy shall be void, it was not an exclusion.
It was the voiding of a policy.
And basically it says if one insured defrauds
the company then the policy is void.
And if the policy is void then neither of
the insureds can recover.
Section 99 has a policy about shall be void,
but nobody is discussing whether anyone is claiming that
that provision of the policy was violated.
What do we do with this distinction between
the voiding of a policy versus the exclusion of recovery?
-: Well, here we have, in this case, unlike in Cozier,
and this is, I guess, another distinction between Cozier
in this case because in this case,
as Your Honor is correctly commenting on,
is that the objectionable language
is found in an exclusion which, as the court knows,
is interpreted very narrowly and strictly.
So we have here a non-compliant exclusion
which illegitimately or improperly, I should say,
restricts coverage that is mandated by statute.
If I could just-- -: So, I mean,
the void in, I'm looking at section 99
and I note that United UPS or UPC has not invoked it.
But is there any claim that any of
the insureds here willfully concealed
or misrepresented any material fact
or circumstance regarding the insurance or
the interest of the insured,
or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured?
Do we have any of that, even by the fiance who died here?
-: No, the denial of coverage was premised on the arson,
not on any other misconduct or fraudulent misstatements
or anything of that sort.
So it was strictly the arson, the intentional act committed
by the decedent only.
That was the denial of coverage, nothing else.
And by agreement, I should have comment, of course,
that Miss Aquino was not at all involved
with that, was not complicit
or aware of any of that. -: Right,
I think we understand that.
Can I ask another question?
Relates, I guess to the second issue of
the whether she gets half or gets whole
if she were to get any.
She's attendant in common?
Hochbaum: That's correct.
-: Okay, so let us imagine, in this case,
that the fiance did not set the fire but died in the fire.
What would the check say from the insurance company,
in terms of who would get paid for
the full recovery from the home?
-: It would be Miss Aquino, the legal representative
of the decedent's estate and the mortgagee.
But that is not-- -: Though it would not be
that the estate would not get any part of it?
-: No, if Mr. Pastrana-- -: Let's assume Mr. Pastrana
was blameless in all this.
Let's assume he just died in a fire that somebody else set.
Would she have gotten half and the estate have gotten half
or would it have been a check to each of them,
for each of them to sign?
I'm trying to figure out how that would have worked for
a tenancy in common.
-: Well, I think for this notion that it was
a tenancy in common, if I could just address
that particular point, I think that that is not
the determining factor in terms
of whether she gets half or 100%.
And I make this point repeatedly in my briefs
that we have to look at the insurable interest
of Miss Aquino, not her equity
or ownership interest in the property.
And if we look at the insurable interest
as UPC itself admits, she did have an insurable interest.
Clearly she lived there and received
a benefit from the property and suffered
a loss when it was destroyed.
She also had the use and enjoyment of the entire property,
even if her ownership was half.
It was one half or a fractional interest in
the undivided whole, and she had, as I said,
use and enjoyment of the whole,
and she had an interest in preserving
the whole of the property.
And it was the whole of the property
that was destroyed by fire.
So she lost her entire insurable interest.
So she lost more than just her one half ownership interest,
Miss Aquino lost her entire insurable interest.
And what Judge Wilson's decision does
is improperly sever the recovery by the innocent co-insured,
and in so doing, it completely frustrates
the purpose of fire insurance policies in the Commonwealth
which this court has recognized going
as far back to Wagner in 1891,
which is to provide a personal contract of indemnity,
and as this court also held in Kingsley in 1937,
is the fire insurance policy is intended
to restore the insured to
the position she occupied immediately prior
to the loss and hold her harmless for her loss.
By giving Miss Aquino one-half of the insurance proceeds,
she is restored halfway towards meeting those objectives.
-: Is there any guidance in
the appellate case on this at all?
'Cause Justice Wilson's dealing with a complicated issue
but is there any case law on how you do this?
-: In terms of the halving of
the recovery? -: Yeah.
-: There is nothing from the Commonwealth.
-: There are plenty of cases that I cite in my briefs,
including, just by way of example, the Scindra,
S-C-I-N-D-R-A, Alabama Supreme Court case from 1951.
-: But we have no Massachusetts--
Man: Those cases go both ways already.
-: There are cases that go both ways
and both parties cite them going both ways, but--
-: But we have mass cases that deal with
this kind of division of insurance proceeds?
-: None that I could find, no.
And this is an issue of, in terms of the halving,
this is an issue, I believe, of first impression.
But we do have the guidance, as I said,
of this court's decisions
that go back more than 100 years in terms
of what is the purpose of a fire insurance policy?
And is that purpose gonna be fulfilled if
the innocent insured only gets 50% of the recovery,
and, respectfully, I would submit the answer to that is no.
It doesn't do justice to the innocent insured
to get 50 cents out of 100 when she,
in this case, by agreement, has suffered a total loss.
-: Yeah, but shouldn't it be all or nothing in that
the purpose of insurance, fire insurance is to rebuild?
-: The purpose of fire insurance
is to-- -: Not to halfway rebuild.
-: Right, so she can't build half of a house
and get half of a toilet and so on.
It just leads to a preposterous result
and that's what we have here.
And I would also just observe that somebody
that has a mortgage on a home, just by way of example,
she's jointly and reliable on the mortgage
so she's got to pay 100% of the mortgage
but only gets 50% of the insurance proceeds.
And I think it really just drives home the point
that the result that we have currently,
in this case, just isn't inequitable,
it just doesn't ring true or makes sense.
I see that my time is almost up,
I don't know if the court has any other questions.
-: I have one, it's just it may not
be particularly relevant to anything
but I know fire insurance statutes change over time.
Hochbaum: Yes.
-: When Cozier was decided, is it the same insurance,
fire insurance statutes we have now?
-: The statute changed in 1951.
So about 13 years after Cozier was decided.
But as best I can tell, the words the insured,
which are the operable words in this case,
were in effect, even preceding the 1951.
-: There's no legislative history on this, as to the and an?
-: There are, there's the Appeals Court case,
I've drawn a blank on its name right now,
that talks about the legislative history of it.
But as best we could-- -: I think I wrote that one.
(laughing)
-: I think your owner knows.
-: Well, I don't know it, I just remember it.
I have a vague memory of having written it.
(laughing)
Judge: Okay, thank you.
-: Okay, thank you.
-: Mr. Hassett.
-: Good afternoon Mr. Chief Justice, associate justices.
David Hassett on behalf of UPC
with my colleague, Michael Melville.
If I could just start with the last remark
that my brother made because I think it's really
a misdirection, and under the statutes and under our law,
the mortgagee bank gets paid separately,
it's a separate analysis.
It's actually the subject of some litigation in this case.
But to determine what's equitable and what's fair based on
a mortgage, actually, it's quite to the contrary
that any payout at all that Miss Aquino gets
is gonna be, in part, at least, getting rid of any mortgage.
Because without respect of fault,
the mortgagee would get paid first.
But going back to--
-: But doesn't that, isn't Justice Gaziano's question right
then that we shouldn't be dividing this up?
It's all about insurance proceeds
to rebuild the house, right?
Isn't it all or nothing.
Do you agree that it's an all or nothing?
Lawyer: No, not at all, Judge?
-: Do you accept this idea that you can split this in two?
-: Judge, every jurisdiction that's looked at this,
the majority, the vast majority of jurisdictions,
that have looked at what should the payout be,
if any, is 50%.
Obviously Judge Wilson did it in our case
and limited it to 50% of the policy.
But the vast majority of cases with, maybe,
one or two exceptions throughout the country,
when they indeed payout to the innocent insured,
it's limited to 50%
And the basis for that is policy reason, certainly.
They don't wanna windfall,
to have the innocent co-insured have a windfall.
In this instance-- -: How is that a windfall?
Judge: Yeah.
-: Just how is that a windfall for the innocent insured
who's lost what she had before the fire?
Judge: They made payments.
-: Yes, well, first of all, I think Judge Gants alluded
to this, it's tenancy in common.
So there's no right of survivorship.
So the part of the property that's owned,
she only has half of the property in terms of
the tenancy in common number one, that's number one.
Number two, it's a contractual issue
and there is policy language with limitational liability,
as two, the named insurance interest in the policy.
So the outcome, with respect to if there would be
a payout, what would it be, 50% is the best outcome
because otherwise you run the risk of having
a arsonist who doesn't die in the fire,
either posthumously, if he does die, obviously,
his heirs would get that benefit or, if he doesn't die,
and the money goes into the house and they rebuild,
he has an interest in that property.
And a lot of the cases we cite in our brief address
that very public policy concern.
But if I may go back, briefly, to Cozier,
the Cozier decision is very clear.
-: But we'll get to Cozier in a second.
-: Yes, Your Honor. -: So let's stick
with this issue.
So let me ask you the same question I asked your brother.
First of all, is there anything in the policy
that says this is the tenancy in common
as opposed to a tenancy by the entireties?
Lawyer: I'm sorry, Judge.
-: Does the insurance company know, I mean,
would the insurance company know that it's
a tenancy in common as opposed to
a tenancy by the entireties?
-: No, I think, Your Honor, when my brother alluded
to how would a check draft be issued,
if there's no dispute and you have two named insureds
and there's a complete loss,
what you would expect is that both of
the named insureds would be on the draft
to the policy limit based on whatever examination
of damages there were. -: So if he had died in
the fire and was blameless for it,
you would, first, pay whatever the mortgage,
the amount that it was paid was
first go to pay off the mortgage,
correct? -: Yes.
-: Which the deceased could have been a co-mortgagee on,
co-mortgagor. -: Right.
-: And then with regard to the balance,
it would be paid to Miss Aquino and Mister,
I forgot his name, the fiance,
I'm sorry, if he had died, you're saying it would go
to her alone or would it go to her and the estate?
-: Yes, Judge, I think following that scenario to Pastrana,
Your Honor, he's the one that did die, in fact.
-: Right. -: He's the fiance.
-: Right. -: It would, in theory,
reach ultimately to his heirs
and-or under his estate or representative.
-: What would your check say if he had if he had died
and was blameless?
The balance after
the mortgage is paid. -: Administrator of.
Judge: Sorry?
-: It very well could be administrator
of or executor of the estate of.
-: So we would say Miss Aquino and
the administrator of the estate of and both would have
to sign off-- -: Particularly here,
Your Honor, that's what I would expect.
-: Both would have to sign off on the check.
-: Oh, yeah, and if there's an estate,
whoever the representative was that had been appointed
would sign off on the check.
And I think all the cases
that have looked at this have come down
to the distinction we have seen is whether
it's half of the policy or it's half of
the damages up to the policy.
And in this instance, Judge Wilson found
that it's appropriate for it to be half of the policy.
One of the reasons for that, and I think it's
a critical reason, Your Honor, your honors,
is that if you're going to have
the innocent insured collect against
the case law, against Cozier.
So if you're gonna go against Cozier,
allow an innocent insured to collect,
to do that, you would have to determine
that the is, in fact, several.
In other words, it's not joint, as Cozier determined.
Cozier court determined the means the insureds.
So the idea, contractually, was when
the insurer on one side of the table said I'll agree
to insure this loss at this location, your home,
and you two who live there signed it,
the understanding was neither of you can burn it
to the ground and come back and collect on it.
So if one does it, nobody can collect on the loss.
That's what Cozier says--
-: But Cozier was focusing on the provision of
the policy which says the policy is void.
-: Yes, Judge. -: And you've not,
and I understand that if the policy is void
that nobody collects on it.
-: Correct. -: Because the policy is
a nullity, but you're not claiming that this policy is void.
-: Well, Judge, what we're saying based on
the language in the statute, 175-99,
and in our UPC policy, is that it is an exclusion
that does not permit recovery.
And the way the statute reads is not liable
for damages caused by neglect of the insured
to use all reasonable means to save
and preserve the property.
This company shall not be liable while
the hazard is increased by any means within
the control-- -: I understand, I understand.
But you're not claiming that the policy is a nullity
because of the conduct of Mr. Pastrana,
you're claiming this policy still exists.
That there's an exclusion that prevents him
from receiving any of the money,
or actually prevents her from receiving any of the money.
-: The way the policy is drafted, yes, Your Honor,
that's the language that excludes
the innocent insured from recovery.
-: So but even if we were to say Cozier are still good law,
would it apply only to fraud committed
by an insured which voids the policy?
And you're asking us to extend the meaning of Cozier
to include not merely the voiding of a policy by fraud
but also the exclusion of recovery from an innocent insured.
-: Judge, I am asking the court to look at
the term of the word the as used in Cozier,
and apply it jointly so that the innocent co-insured
is unable to recover when one insured commits arson
and destroys a property.
If I could read from Cozier, we think the policy in question
was joint and that the plaintiff can not recover.
The act of her husband in burning
the insured buildings was an act of the insured,
and as such it was a fraud upon the defendants
which rendered the policies void in accordance
with their terms, as you have said, Judge.
-: Well, of course if the policy is void, there's no policy.
So no one can recover.
But here there is a policy.
-: Here, there's a policy
and it's more narrowly saying that
the innocent co-insured does not collect when the insured
or co-insured intentionally burns down the property.
And, Your Honor, if I may--
-: The intentional burning is the fraud, not any kind
of misrepresentation. -: Yes
It's not the misrepresentation.
It may or may not come under
the umbrella of failing, neglecting the premises,
but I think it's the fraud itself as well
as increasing the hazard.
-: Did the old statutory mandated provision use
the word fraud in it?
Lawyer: Yes, it did.
-: Is that why the court, you focused on this fraud
and nullifying the policy?
Was this more tracking the old statutory language?
-: It's both, Judge.
It's tracking that fraud language
and I would add another provision
that we put in our brief that also supports
the language used in the UPC policy.
It says this company shall not be liable while
the hazard is increased by any means within
the control or knowledge of the insured,
which appears to be a little bit more on point
when the insured intentionally burns down the property.
We are not alleging there was a misstatement or concealment,
and we're certainly not alleging that Aquino was part of it.
We're conceding that she, in fact,
is an innocent co-insured in all of this.
And then, Your Honor, I would add that
the legislative intent here is a very significant issue
when looking to what is going to happen going forward
because the policy and my brother,
the last argument raised it with respect
to a reenactment of a statute.
So this policy, the New York policy
that was adopted in 1951, used the same terminology.
And Judge Kafker was asking my brother about it.
Basically they termed, they used the,
they continued to use the,
knowing in this court needs to be in a position
to adopt a construction of legislative intent,
that the legislator knows what these courts,
any courts have said about definitions,
the legislator adopted the,
knowing that this court had said the is joint so--
-: Except for it wasn't in connection
with this actual statute, right?
I mean, there was no interpretation
of the statute in Cozier.
-: I would qualify this as a subsequent enactment
of the same standard fire policy.
It's a New York fire policy and
the relevant terminology contains the same language, the.
So in terms of it being a separate statute
with no connection, no.
In fact, it follows the previously enacted statute
with some changes in 1951.
And so, by doing that, the legislature knew
that they weren't going to be changing,
limiting, adding anything to this interpretation
because this court had clearly said
if somebody burns down the house that lives in the house
that's a co-insured, nobody's collecting on that.
The legislature knew that 13 years before
the statute was, in fact, enacted,
and they didn't elect to change it to a different word
that would, in fact, protect the co-insured.
So the basic fundamental construction
of legislative intent here supports the understanding
that the legislature knew when it used
the word in term, the,
that an innocent co-insured would not be able to collect,
and there couldn't be any clearer decision in Cozier.
And it's on-point, the couple in our case, they were--
-: I'm confused.
In response to Justice Budd's question
which so was the legislation,
the mandatorily-required insurance provision
was not in place when Cozier was decided here or was it?
Lawyer: Yes, it was.
-: It was? -: Was a different provision.
-: It was the prior statute in place
that then got replaced or re-enacted after they adopted
the New York fire standard policy,
which many states did at the time.
-: Do we have cases that are just limited
to the New York, kind of, statute in determining
what the and an mean?
-: The cases that we've cited relative to the meaning yet,
judge, the-- -: Yes, that's right.
Are they just those involving the New York,
kind of, insurance that we have in Massachusetts?
-: No, they're using the same language as we are now,
obviously, because it's enacted.
But there's no specific other case.
Massachusetts had this decision at the time,
I'm not aware that New York did at that time.
My memory, ugly as it is,
is that there were three different kinds
of basic fire insurance policies in the nation
and that Massachusetts has one of them,
and I think it's the New York kind.
Lawyer: Yes, it is, that's correct, Your Honor.
-: And so the sort of, I think,
now is the field, in terms of interpretation, of statutes.
So if you're gonna look at the and and,
and what it means, I think you just looked at
the New York, sort of, cases, wouldn't you?
-: No, we didn't cite any specific ones, Your Honor.
Judge: All right, okay.
-: So let me, I guess, ask the basic issue.
Your insurance company is innocent, you did nothing wrong.
Mrs. Aquino is innocent, you did nothing wrong.
Who should should suffer?
-: Judge, I think the insurance company,
if they're guilty of anything,
was being very transparent in their language.
-: Well, I mead, actually, there's the separate issue
is they claim you're guilty of not mirroring the policy.
Put the 93A issue aside.
I guess the question is if Mrs. Aquino is innocent,
and isn't insured, why should she suffer
for what her fiance did when
what her fiance did did not void the policy?
-: Because, Judge, it works as an exclusion in that the
the is considered joint in that one action--
-: I know you're referring, I mean,
but the question is, in terms of what the legislature meant
to do, who, in your view, did the legislature mean to,
which innocent party did the legislature mean
to bear the burden here?
You're claiming that the legislature wanted
the innocent co-insured to bear the burden
and not the insurance company to bear
the burden. -: Absolutely Judge,
because there is coextensive in their obligations
to the insurance company.
And the one promise they're making is
the house may get struck by lightning,
somebody else may burglarize it and burn it,
but we, the named insureds, can't burn it down
and then collect on the policy.
-: But you understand that in Cozier,
the court found that that Mr. Cozier burned it down with
the intent to defraud the insurance company?
Lawyer: Yes, Your Honor.
-: And we don't have that here, do we?
-: Judge, we have an intentional act
and that's what we have-- -: An intentional arson
but we don't have any intent
to defraud the insurance company.
-: Judge, I'm not sure if it is that clear.
I want to take that back.
I understand there's fraud but I don't know whether
or not the record in Cozier was developed to say
to fraud just the insurance company.
But I will say in cases where they've been--
-: I mean, I'll read it.
"While the policies were enforced,
"the buildings were damaged or destroyed by fires
"which were sett by the husband with intent
"to defraud the defendant companies."
So in Cozier -: Okay.
-: you have that intent.
I gather you're not claiming,
since you're not claiming that the policy is void,
you're not claiming fraud on behalf of Mr. Pastrana.
-: No, we're not saying fraud in the sense
of intentionally, at that moment, Judge.
And based on the facts of our case,
it wouldn't support, necessarily,
in our case that they would do that.
But a number of other cases dressing
this issue haven't limited either the exclusion
or the limitation of recovery by
the innocent co-insured to whether it
was intentionally fraud or not.
In our case, it appeared to be an angry situation,
it involved a handgun, so that's a separate issue.
I agree, Your Honor.
But in this case, Your Honor, I think,
at the end of the day, what we're looking for
the court to determine is that it's a joint obligation,
relative to the responsibilities of the named insureds
to the contract, and, getting back to the first issue we had
which was what happens to the payout,
I should note or I'd like to note
that this is gonna be a situation where,
even if the innocent co-insured doesn't get a direct check,
the property is there,
that will be owned without any encumbrances based on
the mortgagee being in line to obtain whatever
there was for purposes of a mortgage on the property.
So it's not that nothing is obtained through all this,
it's just that there isn't an affirmative check
for all of the damages which is what my brother would like.
-: Although, pragmatically, depending on
the size of the mortgage,
if she doesn't get enough money from the insurance company
then they'll foreclose on the mortgage.
And the bank will end up owning the property.
-: Depending upon the amount of mortgage, Your Honor.
Judge: Okay, thank you.
Lawyer: Thank you.