-: Chief Justice Ralph Gants,
why don't we first get a roll call,
Justice Lenk had (mumbles)
she'll be be back on momentarily, I just.
So among Justices,
we have,
Justice Gaziano,
(mumbles)
we have Justice Lenk back.
Again, wait a moment for her.
I just emailed her somebody can text her.
(clears throat)
While we're waiting for them,
-: now joining
-: You're live again.
-: Okay, you're back, good.
-: What happened
(tone)
you'd been cut off I'm sorry.
-: It's all right,
on behalf of Mr. Wiener who do we have?
-: Robert Cordy.
-: And on behalf of AG?
-: Assistant Attorney General Juliana Rice, Your Honor,
with me are Anne Sturman and Kendra Kinscherf.
-: Okay, all right.
I will go through the protocol with you,
I believe Connealy has already described,
First Connealy, do we have you on the line?
I trust we do.
-: Yes chief.
-: The protocol is that,
Mr. Cordy will argue first,
he will have in the bowl for about three minutes
to argue without interruption.
If he wishes, invite questions earlier,
he of course may do so by simply inviting.
He will then be asked questions by seniority,
Justice Lenk first, I will be asking questions last.
After I finished my questions,
we will give each of the
Justices a chance to ask follow up questions
if any of them wish.
And of course we will do the same with regard to Miss Rice.
If anybody is on a landline and has a cell phone please,
silence your cell phones and if
any of you are,
not speaking, please mute your phone so that
we don't have any more background noise and it's inevitable.
And with that, Mr. Cordy you may begin.
-: Thank you.
What Cumberland Farms is attempting to do
and it's initiative petition is exactly
what the framers of Article 48,
here special interest would do.
Combining in a single initiative what is popular,
with what was, with what is desired
by their own selfish interest.
The framers would call it log rolling,
shielding those real interests
behind unrelated shiny objects.
A few more beer and wine stores in the neighborhood.
More rigorous identification requirements
to reduce underage purchasing of alcohol
and a beefed up ABCC to enforce alcohol laws.
It has a common purpose here,
it is to enrich Cumberland Farms,
increasing the number of statewide licenses they have,
from seven to say, 200.
To do that, they need to remove or get around the cap,
on the statewide ownership of off-premises alcohol licenses.
But statewide cap addresses
important public policy concerns,
the dangers of concentration of power
in the liquor industry, preventing monopolies,
indiscriminate price cutting, excessive advertising,
preserving the rights of small independent dealers
to do business.
These policy concerns have been the subject of
intense legislative debate and disagreements
for more than 40 years.
Not surprisingly, none of those debates
have ever involved the community population based limits
on licenses relied upon and ratified by communities
since the end of prohibition,
which the petition would also effectively eliminate.
The concerns underlying the population based limits,
are very important and completely unrelated
to those underlining the statewide cap.
And they directly affect the (mumbles)
of our communities and minimize the harm
that flows from increased alcohol store
intensity, density, excuse me.
Increased consumption, increased levels of
assault and homicide, child abuse and neglect,
self inflicted and traffic injuries.
So these two policy cornerstones, the statewide cap,
and the population based community limits,
are related only at the abstract level
of alcohol regulation.
And that is not sufficient.
There is no unified statement of public policy here,
on which a voter can vote yes or no.
The shiny objects used to make more attractive these
unrelated provisions compound the constitutional problems.
What after all, the new identification rules,
have to do with the statewide cap,
and not on the number of licenses that a company can own.
Nothing.
They are neither related to
nor mutually dependent on each other.
The petitioner and the Attorney General contend that,
such provisions can be permissively combined,
not that they are related, to the other provisions,
but because they address the potential consequences
of adding an unlimited number of
food store licenses to our communities,
and they fight the Oberlies case.
However, the decision in Oberlies undercuts that issue.
In Oberlies, the court went out of its way to point out
that the inclusion of limitations
on medical staff reductions,
which was intended to address potential consequences
of the now nurse-patient ratio requirement,
which was the common purpose of that petition,
were permissible only as applied to reductions
triggered by the implementation of the new nurse ratio
and not for any other reason.
That of course is totally inconsistent
with the identification provisions in this petition.
Those provisions are not limited
to addressing the potential consequences triggered
by the new food store licenses have had to apply.
With a few exceptions, wineries,
to all Off-premises Alcohol Beverage Licensees,
which are now governed by the Safe Harbor law,
including the thousands who are
currently licensed under Chapter 138.
Again, having nothing to do with
the statewide ownership cap.
Certainly the funding of staff ratio provisions
for the ABCC, by their very terms,
direct the ABCC to expand the money
and use the staff not only for
implementing the provisions of the initiative petition,
but also for the ongoing administration
and enforcement of the alcohol laws generally.
Again, inconsistent with Oberlies limits,
on including unrelated provisions in anticipation
of the likely consequences.
In some, if but one of included provisions
is not related to, nor mutually dependent on the others,
there is no unified statement of public policy
and the petition fails the Article 48 requirement.
And that is plainly the case here.
Thank you.
-: All right.
I'll turn to Justice Lenk and ask if you have any questions.
Lenk.
They need to unmute.
-: Oh my goodness, I'm sorry.
(mumbles)
I wanted to focus on the related decisions,
to begin with and
I wonder if Mr. Cordy if you were using
the (mumbles) the purposes of the Attorney General
or the, one of the voters in the initial decision,
in your analysis,
the one proposed by the Attorney General of course,
puts restrictions on the number and allocation of licenses.
And of course, the limit proposed by the voter
is taking the initial petition
to establishments with assistance,
enhancing the discretion of licensing authorities
to create off-premises alcohol beverages.
I'm wondering which one you're using?
-: Well, it is interesting that there were
two different views of in fact what the relatedness is.
The AG's common purpose,
which is to lift restrictions on the number
and allocation of licenses for the retail sales
of alcoholic beverage off-premises
actually speaks volumes.
It does two things.
It talks about lifting restriction on the number.
We're talking about community based population limits,
which is a very important policy
and the allocation which is an entirely different policy,
the statewide ownership cap.
So it is talking about two very different public policies
implicated in the same petition.
-: When you say that, impermissible?
-: What?
These are unrelated policies.
-: No, by law, (mumbling)
policy can be unrelated to themselves,
but they are both serving common purpose.
-: I'm sorry, I can't.
-: I'm sorry, can't there be a common purpose,
without explaining the unrelated policies?
-: But what's the common purpose?
Says the common purpose is to lift the restriction
on the number and allocation of licenses.
Well, those implicate two very different public policies
on which a voter would have very different views,
and that's the problem.
The statewide cap has nothing to do with the
population limits that communities live with
and have prohibition.
-: Okay.
Next thing is I'm hoping that,
(mumbles)tend to be specific appropriations
aren't gonna be like,
I am hoping you'll explain to me what appropriations means
under the framers intention.
-: Yes.
-: Its like (mumbles) here was to money in control,
the legislature, or keep the budget cuts
in control of legislature.
I'm not sure what you want, or is both of them?
-: I'm having a very difficult time hearing, I'm sorry.
-: I'm sorry, I'm very sorry about this.
Let me see if I can get, is that better?
I'll just put it
-: Much better.
-: Much better? Okay.
So what I want to get to,
is this specific appropriations argument that you make,
and picking out what the
original purpose of the framers was,
because it seems to me maybe there's,
a tension here between,
was it keeping money in control of legislature,
keeping the budget process in control of the legislature,
I'm wondering if you could comment on that.
-: Well, this is a particularly interesting
budget, in the sense that it takes a stream of revenue
that has always gone directly into the general fund
for the general appropriations
and which is estimated to be
between 90 and 100 million dollars a year,
and designates it into a very specific fund
with very specific purposes to be spent
by very specific agencies.
And in that sense, removes the fund
of the monies that stream,
that always went into the general fund,
removes it into a special fund.
Now, of course, the spending out of that special fund
will be subject to appropriation,
the legislature can decide not to spend all of the money,
100 million dollars and that's in the fund.
And once they can decide
which ABCC functions or gets which amounts of money,
that's first off, the appropriation process.
But the taking of the fund, and
really putting it aside and taking it out of,
what I think, is out of the legislature's ability to say,
"Oh, never mind, we're just gonna
"use it for other things."
Is an important factor here and somewhat unique.
The other piece of this,
which is found, nevermind,
I'm starting to repeat myself.
But the Bates case, which is particularly interesting
and never really been applied by in a situation like this,
which says, "Once there is an initial petition
"that is passed, the legislature must carry it into effect,
"or repeal it,
" in carrying it into effect means they must
"appropriates the money to carry it into effect."
Well, okay, if that's the case,
they must put the money into the fund
and use it for the specified purpose.
So to that extent, we think it's a,
an appropriation,
that would violate Article 48.
-: Okay, thank you. -: Situation, sorry.
-: Is there other question, Justice Lenk?
-: No, (mumbles)
-: Justice Gaziano.
-: Thank you, Mr. Cordy.
It's rather, into your work about,
on specific appropriations.
The legislature of course can decide, how much the ABCC
needs for the various functions, including enforcement.
If we were to invalidate this on the grounds you request,
subject to appropriations.
Would we have to overrule Manzoni and the AME case?
-: Well,
I don't think so.
I don't think so, subject to appropriation.
These are not magic words
that fix every conceivable problem.
Two things.
First of all, this is a different funding stream.
It's very different than those other cases.
And,
secondly,
the Bates case, which really puts the legislature
in the position of having to carry out the purposes
of the petition or repealing it.
Does that mean having to fund a petition,
and whether the petition itself includes
a very specific set aside of general funds,
for very specific purposes?
I think this creates, or at least presents
a very different tax scenario.
-: Thank you.
That's all the questions I have.
-: Justice Lowy.
-: Yes, I ask you about Hensley versus the Attorney General
and I recognize that you've distinguished this by
pressing,
is an industry that's been,
the alcohol industry has been regulated
after prohibition and that
the marijuana, legal marijuana industry is new.
However, if we,
look at,
the purpose of this,
as loosening restrictions,
who could sell
alcohol, certain types of alcohols, and where it may be sold
and reviewed the purposes and overall loosening and then the
ideal technology provisions and the funding provisions,
as you said, that's the consequences of that.
It seems like
this
petition is doing a heck of a lot less than Hensley did.
Could you address that, please?
-: Sure.
Well, in addition, of course,
to the things that you've mentioned,
eliminating the statewide cap on ownership
is a really big (mumbles) here.
But Hensley, the Attorney General in the brief describes
the petitioning in Hensley as one which
comprehensively regulated all aspects of a new industry,
the commercial sale of marijuana in Massachusetts.
Of course, the growing and selling of marijuana
wasn't really a new industry.
It had been illegal for about 100 years
and often run by organized criminal enterprises.
So it's not surprising that from the perspective of a voter,
the voter would, a reasonable voter would wanna know,
before soliciting about legalizing this whole
illegal business, would wanna know,
how it will be regulated and controlled.
That makes perfect sense.
So to the extent that there was an awful lot of,
a large number of provisions testifying,
how it would be regulated, how it would be controlled,
which were directly related and necessary for the voters to
decide yes or no.
And I think that's what distinguishes that case.
This is, an industry which has almost 100 years
of law and structure,
that are designed to protect and ensure a whole range of
different basic interests related to alcohol.
And so that, I think that does make a difference
and when you're trying to sort of change two unrelated...
and then add a few other little different changes to it all.
They gotta be related in some way.
-: So the increase, -: with alcohol,
-: So increasing and then eventually
eliminating the restrictions on the number of licenses,
one entity could have.
And then also making beer and wine is available
in food, grocery stores,
doesn't have a relatedness of trying to make it,
more available to the consumer,
to be able to purchase alcohol?
I know you say that point,
just
that aren't they related?
-: Well,
creating a new beer
and wine license for food stores in communities
has nothing to do at all with,
how many events can be owned,
the statewide cap on the number of licenses.
Now, what this petition does of course is they create,
this new license and says "Oh, by the way,
"it's not governed by any caps at all.
"But we are also going to eliminate the statewide cap
"on off-premises license ownership.
What is that got to do with which grocery stores
aren't gonna get licenses in their communities?
How significant that is? (mumbling)
-: The significant is that is, so,
in Hensley we're dealing with licensing
and regulating the entire industry
and dealing with medical
marijuana centers and legalizing marijuana,
all and I'm not listing everything involved,
all in one petition and here,
we're talking about,
differences in the regulations within an industry,
but not entire regulations in the industry.
Hensley, do we need to rely on your point that
a new industry as opposed to one
that's been regulated since prohibition?
Is that the key distinction?
-: Well, I think the distinction is akin to that.
But what would a voter want?
Or what a voter need to know in order to
make a vote on yes or no.
On Hensley, we have current,
we are legalizing the marijuana industry, one that's
run by organized criminal enterprises for 100 years.
So should, wouldn't a voter want to know,
"How it's going to be regulated?
"How is this going to be controlled?"
That's very different than what we have here.
What is, a voter might be,
wants a few more beer and wine stores,
or what better identification procedures
to keep underage purchases down but
would also not want a Costco.
Or a
one of these international operations to come in
and basically run the liquor industry
by gathering up hundreds of
licenses and exceeding the statewide cap,
which is something that has been critically important
to the regulatory process,
being debated for decades by the legislature.
So that's the difference I think.
-: Thank you, that's all I have to say.
-: Justice Budd.
-: Hi, good morning.
Just along the lines of Justice Lowy's questions,
isn't this just about how broadly we read related subjects?
It seems to me that you can always say,
two things are not related
depending on how narrowly you define related, right?
And
two people could disagree about whether
within a general
area, two subjects within that area are related or not,
as compared to whether
two completely unrelated areas are a sensitive subjects.
I mean, is that fair to say,
"this is what we're trying to figure out,
"how broadly can be related subjects here,"
is that fair?
-: No.
I think that's right.
I mean, there's not a bright line rule here.
You have to sort of get under the hood a little bit.
And,
if you look at these individual pieces,
are they related in the sense
that they all relate to alcohol?
Yes,
and they all relate to alcohol sales, yes.
But there are very different and important
public policies bases behind of these,
that are different.
-: Understood, but what I'm saying that,
and just well, I guess I'm trying to get out is,
whatever evidence do we have,
that we should take a
broad view, which is a narrow view that
we should be looking, not just at the subject matter,
but within that subject.
We should be parsing,
whether the individual items within that
general topic, the general subject here,
alcohol sales need to be parsed any further.
What, where do I look for that evidence?
-: Well, I think it might be interesting, of course,
I didn't get a chance to look at the,
some of the (mumbles)
but if you look at how these issues have been dealt with
separately and differently
over the last 80 years,
or certainly intensely over the last 45,
you can see how the debates are very different.
Yes, this is all related to alcohol but
what goes on in a community and how many licenses
the community can issue based on their population
and worries about impact,
particularly on low income communities?
That density is very critical.
If you look at that,
compared to the statewide cap
which involves a whole set of different issues,
who's gonna be able to dominate?
Somebody may or Costco or Total Wines
or somebody able to come in
and literally dominate the whole alcohol field.
-: And I understand there are policy reasons for and against,
I guess the question that they're looking
to put on the ballot, and I understand that,
and that can be debated.
But what I'm saying is, is there any case log,
I can look at and say, "Oh, okay,
"this is how broad I should consider related subjects."
What that actually means.
-: There are a lot of cases out there that is platonic,
but always in the context of specific,
if you take Carney for example,
you know that they all have,
the attorney general concluded that,
the various pieces of Carney all related to
promoting more humane treatment of dogs.
That's what they were related to.
But the court said, "Well, yeah,
"that's a very interesting and nice, common purpose.
"But Carney's was dog racing,
"and neglect and abuse of dogs,
"under the criminal law
"are two really different things."
Yeah, they all involve dogs and the treatment of dogs,
but they're two different things.
And they raise different issues--
-: Just remind me, they both have to do with dog racing?
No.
-: Did they what?
-: Did they both have to do with dog racing,
or was it--?
-: No, it was not.
-: Yeah, okay.
So yeah, you can read it broadly or not.
It just depends on your,
what you're trying to accomplish, right?
-: Right.
I mean, the Gray case is another example
where the petition was on the one hand the,
sort of had the Common Core standards
and the other to release the comprehensive assessments
every year with respect to Comprehensive Test assessments
every year, and of course it,
yeah, they're both related to education.
They're both controversial public issues
in the domain of Elementary and Secondary Education,
but not enough to make them related.
There's no unified statement of public policy there.
And I think the same can be said here.
There's no uniform statement of public policy.
Some people might want more beer stores,
some people might want, not more beer stores,
but better identification rules.
Others might not want to see
the whole industry dominated by Costco.
So there are really different issues.
And there's no unified policy here embodied there and
that's what I would say.
-: Okay, thank you.
-: Thank you.
-: Justice Cypher.
-: Thank you. (clears throat)
And
my question involves a different image now
of Costco coming in here and taking everything over.
But don't, the licensing would still be
controlled by the state and municipalities,
would they, would still have discretion to limit them?
-: Well, no, not.
-: No discretion?
-: No.
There are two pieces here that
the total statewide cap ownership is that
Costco can only own X number of licenses,
Total Wine and only own Y number of licenses.
The,
at the individual community level,
I should say this,
there's actually two caps at issue here.
They're both dealt with in
Section 15.
One is statewide cap,
you can only own so many of these outlets statewide.
And the other is a local ownership cap,
in addition to the number of licenses
that a community can actually award.
-: Right.
but just because you take off the cap does not mean
that the state or the municipality is going
to automatically just let everybody have whatever they want.
-: That's true,
for sure.
But it's a, just a dynamic because now we're talking
about arbitrary and capricious in every case
is going to involve,
there's no limits anymore.
So you can't say,
"No, the legislature's decided on a limit.
"You can't have any more."
It's, well, "Why can't we have any more?"
The law just says we can't, we're good.
Now we're a big dealer.
Why can't we have any more?
If you're just an arbitrary and capricious, I mean,
then you get into a whole series
of legal battles about the issuance of licenses generally,
both at the local level and then of course,
this, the state doesn't really issue license,
it's all done at the local -: mostly the board.
-: Yeah.
-: One other question.
And that is it said in your brief that
"A voter would be surprised to learn that
"it impacts the sale of spirit in liquor stores,
"including at the point of sale."
And my question is,
if you look at the Attorney General's summary,
and it would be the one, two, three, fourth paragraph,
the proposed law would also change the statewide limits
on the number of licenses to
the sale of alcoholic beverages.
If you just inserted,
including spirit.
Wouldn't that resolve your problem?
-: Well, we made it more accurate.
Just a moment.
Yeah, well, I mean, there's the way this
sort of deals with
stores that sell spirits as well as beer and wine
for some purposes and not for others,
is different and complicated.
But that's the sort of the nature of the (mumbles).
(clears throat)
That might clarify that although I don't
think that changes anything.
-: And I have no furtherquestion, thank you.
-: Justice Kafker.
-: My questions are follow ups and just the following.
So I'm not sure I found the distinction
when we're dealing with, pre existing
regulation and a new regulation,
the marijuana versus the alcohol.
And if the public decide we're gonna
do a whole new regime of alcohol regulation
and put it into a ballot initiative.
Well, surely the legislature can do that.
But the public can't do the same thing.
They can't say, "Okay,
"I want to only deregulate alcohol.
"I want to deregulate number of licenses.
"I'm going to spread it far and wide.
"And that's gonna just to create some ripple effects.
"I'll regulate the ripple effects
"but I don't like a regulated industry.
"I want to have a deregulated one
"and I'll deal with the consequences."
They can't do that.
(shuffling)
-: Well, I don't--
-: in an initiative.
So the question was,
the petition would be the alcohol industry
is hereby deregulated,
anybody can sell whatever they want.
And what else any, I'm gonna, agree with the public thing.
I don't like this fact stores can sell what they want,
I wanna band who can do it much further,
if I wanna be able,
I want public to be able to buy in any grocery store
or Costco or Walmart,
so that you don't have a back store.
So we do one stop shopping.
And I understand that opens us up some,
but I'll allow you to require,
a particular kind of license to look at that.
And I also know that the ABCC needs to be expanded
cause we're going to have many more sales,
we're going to have many more places
and the existing number of people
can't monitor all these stores.
They can't but if it seems like it's a coherent policy.
It may not be a good one.
But it, isn't it coherent?
-: Well,
but not, not exactly,
I mean, the way you described,
it may be coherent.
But if you think of the statewide cap
on the number of licenses that a company can own
and why that's there,
and its history,
you see that there are a whole series
of public policy concerns
that are dealt with in that respect.
You could do this--
-: I'm not saying this is wise,
I'm just saying it's not, it's changing,
you know, go ahead.
Sorry I didn't mean to cut you off.
-: No, that's okay.
I'm cutting you off as well.
This is really complicated.
But the other issue in this case,
of course, is at the local level,
how many licenses can the local communities hand out?
Now if you wanna say,
"We would like to deregulate
"the licensing at the local level and allow
"any grocery store to sell anything at once,"
that actually has nothing to do, I mean,
that would really affect the community.
And they may be a lot of good reasons people
would want it or not want it.
But that has nothing to do
with the statewide cap on ownership.
The number of stores one can own,
which is a very different set of issues.
So that's--
-: I understand there are existing,
best interest and also existing
balancing that was done out there.
But I'm just wondering why you can't recre...
Why an initiative can't say,
"I don't like the system.
"I want to fundamentally change the system,
"and I'm gonna do that and create
"what I consider better system?"
It may not be.
We may all disagree about that,
but that's what the public gets to vote on.
-: The question is whether it's a unified statement
of public policy on which your voter could vote for, or no.
And what I'm saying is, there are
lots of unrelated pieces here except
to the extent they're related to alcohol.
That that a voter might feel,
one way about one piece or another way about another piece,
there's no unified policy here.
Not that unified public policy
that a voter can say yes or no.
-: Isn't there?
Doesn't it go, it's not just about alcohol but it's about
basically making alcohol available
in many more places with less regulation.
-: We're not going to give people control over the licenses
we're gonna basically turn this into
more of a free for all
and more stores
can sell it
and there aren't gonna be caps--
-: On the number of licenses that someone can,
that a company can own?
-: Right.
-: Period?
-: Yeah.
-: Period.
Then there is no ownership ca, no statewide ownership cap
and anyone can sell?
-: That's right?
-: I'm not saying that this is good policy,
but it's a coherent one, yeah.
-: Well, I think that you need to get,
again, you sort of need to get under the hood.
As you know, there was a initiative petition,
I think, 2005, 2006, if I've got that right,
to create a new license of wine and food stores,
which went down to defeat.
This is sort of that broadened
and with a lot of other little things thrown in
to make it more attractive, which is what's going on here.
But the answer is,
the subjects themselves have to be related more than just,
"it's all about alcohol."
And Hensley is so different,
because you're creating a new industry,
one that has been dominated
by criminal organizations
and the notion of a voter needing to know
in order to vote yes or no.
What the policy is gonna be concerning,
how this is going to be regulated and controlled
is really important, one can see that,
that's not really what's going on here.
Thank you.
That's all I have.
-: Chief Justice Gants,
I'm going to give you an alternative initiative.
So give me a moment before you interrupt
(coughing) a question.
Because I agree this is complicated
cause there are no, can't see anybody language.
But imagine that the initiative said,
"this is an initiative to allow people
"to purchase wine and beer at food stores.
"So when they go to Stop and Shop or a Cumberland Farms
to get some groceries, they can also pick up beer and wine.
And because that means that when you check out,
you're gonna be checking out groceries and everything else.
We need additional security.
So if you're going to be buying beer and wine,
we're gonna require the people
at the cashier's office just to,
at the cashier's desk to make sure that they
see an ID regardless of your age,
but that's going to be a requirement given that
you're checking out more than just beer and wine,
but could be checking out many other things.
And, that's going to produce, that's gonna require,
that's gonna open up a lot of
places to sell beer and wine.
And we're not going to limit the number of staff in shops
or the number of store markets around the state.
So we need to drop the cap on the sale of beer and wine.
And because this is going to be generating
that many more establishments,
we're going to put the money aside
that is obtained from the raising of beer,
from the expansion of beer and wine sales
to these supermarkets and other food shops.
And that money is gonna go into a special fund
and the additional,
and that money is going to be devoted to
additional enforcement, running ABCC.
Would that legislation in your view
be sufficiently related to pass muster?
-: Well, in several respects, yes.
Because you're creating a new license,
you're going to bring in a lot of
new licensees, grocery stores now.
So the notion that you would
want to have certainty with respect to ID checks
with regard to those new market, new licensees
that are coming in, makes perfect sense.
The next level of and,
we wanna make sure that in Stop and Shop can have as many
of these licenses as they want across the state.
One might say, "Well, okay, sure."
But what does, what is the policy implicated by that?
By that, if you look, again at the history,
of how that issue has been dealt with,
back and forth and extensively at the legislative level,
what are the issues involved there?
They are enormous and very significant.
And so to say, "Well,
"yeah, a new food license,
"because we want more beer stores and wine stores around,
"we want to be able to buy at different places."
But the statewide cap,
but we are concerned that then one comes in
and buys 200 licenses and then runs the whole shop
and monopolizes it and engages in the conduct
that the statewide cap is designed to ensure
that things get out of control.
I mean, those are two very different things.
And I think that,
that the issue would be raised and
what does the voter need to know?
How to, is a unified statement of public policy here?
That relates both to more stores selling it
and the statewide cap?
That would be the question.
-: Now, the proposed initiative goes beyond my hypo
in that it would permit a Total Wine to be able to own
as many places as it can in the Commonwealth.
Selling not only wine, but liquor,
and it's players would require the package store to
require me to show ID even though
despite my youthful good looks, it's pretty clear I'm 21,
and it would take all the money,
including all the money from excise taxes,
from package stores and put it into
this particular fund.
So is your argument that
this initiative is essentially have provisions
which are needlessly unrelated.
Is there some argument that you're suggesting
that we should look?
Not only, yes to the overall,
initiative, but whether or not it is needlessly expand,
it needlessly goes beyond the scope of
what would be necessary to essentially ask the question,
"Do you wanna be able to allow
food stores to sell beer and wine?
-: I mean, things can be needlessly added.
But if you add something that
involves another public policy issue,
you've got to think a little bit about
the perspective from the voter.
Are they going to be able to,
is there a unified public statement of public policy here?
That they're going to be able to vote yes or no?
Do they want more local stores with beer,
wine and other things?
On one hand,
are they concerned at all?
Or do they have any sense of what the marketplace might look
if, in fact, statewide cap's eliminated
which has nothing to do, by the way with,
the local population, with the number of stores
that a community can agree should be licensed.
If, you really have to get on under the hood
and look at the occupation of these folks
to under, to determine whether they're sufficiently related
under Article 48.
-: I have no--
-: there's no bright line here.
-: I have no further questions.
Is there any Justice who has any further--?
-: I have one more.
-: Yes Justice--
-: Going back to the probation issue.
Mr. Cordy, can you hear me?
-: Yes, I can.
-: Okay, good.
(mumbling)
do you find it's going to be created,
according to the initiative petition would be
under the control of the legislature or not?
-: Under the control of the legislature in the sense that
it would appropriate money out of the fund.
-: Right.
-: Right,
-: but when they would not care,
it would knock the heck out of the budget process,
but not out of keeping money in
the control of the legislature?
-: Correct.
-: Okay, got it, thank you.
-: Is there any other question?
-: I have one last question for Mr. Cordy.
The language in Bates.
It says "A specific appropriation may not be made
"by way of initiative and the insertion of the word
"subject to appropriation excludes any possibility
"that the initiative is
"an impermissible specific appropriation."
Do we have the
correct that?
To adopt your interpretation?
-: No, I don't think so.
I mean that,
the Bates case
it basically said the insertion of the term
"subject to appropriation"
in the Clean Elections law
did not relieve the legislature
of its constitutional duty to in fact,
make appropriations to fund the Clean Elections Funds.
Either they had to do that or they had to repeal it.
So even though it had that language in there,
once enacted the legislature still
has an obligation to appropriate money to fund
the initiative, or they can repeal it,
-: But in that--
-: That's what they said.
-: But isn't that, that's the second part of what they did.
They sort of, did they assume that if you have
the specific appropriation language,
written, you don't, if it's subject to appropriation,
it's not a specific appropriation.
They were just, they sort of assumed that,
as the first step, and then they said,
"Okay, they didn't want this language."
Then they sort of went from there,
but they kind of assumed the issue working prior with,
which is, when you have the subject to appropriation
language, it's not a specific appropriation, right?
-: If that's correct, it's not a specific appropriation.
But the legislature is required to
implement the intention of the initiative petition.
And here the intention is,
that these funds be segregated
and spent on a very specific set of purposes.
So
the legislature still retains the power to say,
"Okay, there's $100 million in here.
"We're gonna appropriate $5 million of that for the ABCC.
"And these are the functions we're going to fund."
But it can't then say,
"But we're really, we're gonna take the rest of the money
"out of the fund and spend it entirely differently."
'Cause that would be exactly
contrary to the intention of the initiative petition.
That's sort of the argument.
And then it says you've gotta,
if you either repeal it,
or you have to adequately carry it out.
It's not (mumbles) (clears throat)
the unrelated issue is in some respects,
a clear issue then, believe it or not,
this isn't the
(sneeze) specific appropriation.
-: Any further questions?
and hearing none, Mr. Cordy, thank you.
-: Thank you.
-: Thank you, Your Honor.
Good morning, and may it please the Court,
the proposal would restructure the Massachusetts
retail liquor market to make beer and wine
more widely available at neighborhood outlets.
Customers might be visiting anyway,
like grocery stores and convenience stores.
They would do this by lifting two numerical caps,
one that restricts the number of food stores
that may be licensed for alcohol sales
in any single city or town,
and the other restricting the number of licenses
that one company may hold statewide.
The other provisions would address consequences of
this increased alcohol availability
by imposing age verification procedures
and ensuring funding for adequate inspection
and regulation of the additional liquor outlets.
Mr. Cordy, in his presentation conceded that there is
a common purpose among these provisions,
and that that common purpose was to enrich Cumberland Farms.
To enrich Cumberland farms and similarly situated companies,
such as ten grocery stores in Massachusetts.
They are a different business sector
in the independent package stores
that have participated in this litigation
through filing amicus briefs,
but they are also a different business sector.
Then Total Wine and Costco, Costco is a warehouse club
would be specifically excluded from
this initiative petition under the definition of
food stores that is incorporated into the proposed law
and Total wine would not be eligible
as it does not, it's not a food store
for applying for this new kind of license.
Massachusetts Liquor Control Act was adopted in 1933
after the end of prohibition,
and it's generally structured the same way
as it was when municipal licensed quota systems
were implemented in the 1960s and 1970s.
The petition sponsors may view this law as antiquated
and non responsive to modern consumer preferences.
Updating the law as proposed,
may benefit some businesses and disadvantage others
and may have community effects viewed by some
as undesirable, but it is not the role of
the Attorney General to search for reasons
to reject a petition on the basis
of policy disagreements.
Article 48 allows proposed laws to
contain multiple subjects,
it requires only that those subjects be related.
As the court has noted,
at some high level of abstraction,
any two legal provisions may be said to be related.
The converse is also true.
Using a small enough lens, those two legal provisions
could ever be said to be related.
If you dismantle any multi part measure
and examine each part separately,
it's easy to overemphasize distinctions among them.
If those distinctions demanded division of this measure
into four or more separate valid questions,
each proposing a separate change in the law.
It would be extremely confusing and burdensome to voters,
expensive to propose, difficult to administer,
and likely to lead, unworkable,
yield, unworkable or unintended legal consequences.
Such as, didn't all pass or didn't all fail,
as long as a common purpose of a proposed law
is of a reasonable scope,
and all provisions of the law implement that common purpose,
is appropriate for the ballot.
Turning briefly to specific appropriation,
this Court has never held that
a proposed law may not direct funds to be used
for a particular purpose.
As long as, the ultimate spending discretion
remains with the legislature.
And this court has specifically noted
that setting aside funds for a specific purpose,
is not an appropriation.
This Court has noted that it is difficult
to imagine how a measure which states,
that it is subject to appropriation, as this one does,
could have been intended to be
an appropriation in and of itself.
The question is, "Would the legislature be powerless to
"appropriate money from the
specified sources to any other use?"
And the answer is, "No."
If this court were to accept the plaintiff's cue,
then initiated laws may not redirect existing revenue,
that would dramatically restrict
the scope of citizen lawmaking.
Noting that my three minutes have elapsed,
I'll invite any questions the Justices may have.
-: Thank you.
Justice Lenk.
-: I will go back to appropriation (mumbles)step on it.
I'm gonna, I would like to know your view on the,
can you hear me by the way?
-: Yes, I can, thank you.
-: Okay.
I'd like to know what your view is as to,
what the original purpose of the framers
was when enacting this specific appropriations requirement,
was to keep money in control of the legislature
or to keep the budget process in control the legislature.
-: I would say it's both, Your Honor.
As we know, the framers at the same time
while they were debating,
what became Amendment Article 48.
They were also,
discussing the implementation of a unified
budgetary system that became Amendment Article 63
adopted at the same election.
So,
it was their concern that
initiated petitions would not be able to
carve out permanently and remove
from legislative discretion, any funds,
but at the same time,
there was a robust debate on whether,
citizens ought to be allowed to propose laws
that would cost money to implement.
And after that robust debate,
the framers concluded that they were not going to
reduce the initiative petition procedure to one of,
merely resolutions or toothless ideas, but then in fact,
the voters should be allowed to implement laws
that may cost money to implement, to enact.
-: Okay, but wouldn't you say that
this initiative petition would disrupt
the legislative control of the budget,
even though it would not prohibit them
from spending, from appropriating funds?
-: I would not, Your Honor, because,
well, the provision would require that money
is set aside in a particular fund,
this Court has held in the Manzoni and in other cases,
that, that does not.
That is not an excluded specific appropriation,
and that that money would not be permanently
removed from the budgetary process.
In the two cases in which this Court has concluded that,
proposed measures should have been excluded from
the initial petition process as specific appropriations,
the 1937 opinion of the Justices' case
and the Truman case in 1988.
What was important to the court
in both of those situations was the fact that the,
legislative would have been powerless
to amend the subject fund,
to appropriate the subject fund for any other use.
In this case, the legislature is granted the discretion
through the inclusion of the
subject to appropriation language,
to appropriate the funds as it sees fit
and appropriate leftover funds in that
specialized fund for any other use.
So I would say no,
it would not disrupt the budget process.
-: It wouldn't, okay.
So, Mr. Cordy's view of Bates is incorrect?
That we're, the legislative would not be required
in some fashion to
do the will of the voter, to do bidding of the voters,
in connection with appropriating funds
with specific purpose?
-: Excuse me Your Honor,
I agree with Mr. Cordy's representation of Bates,
to the extent he states, that Article 48
requires a legislature, the legislature
to either fund or repeal any law
enacted through an initiative petition.
But this was decided 10 years after AME and Gilligan,
that have remained on to serve to this day stating that,
"It is not, a measure cannot be excluded
"for specific appropriation if in fact,
"the legislature's spending power
"remains subject to appropriation."
The situation in Bates was of course not a
question of whether the proposed law
should have been certified.
The proposed law had already been certified and enacted.
The court was wrestling with what
that enacted law required the legislature to do,
and upon, including that, the inclusion of the words
"subject to appropriation"
in the Clean Elections law were not required,
had been added solely for the purpose
of avoiding a challenge to the initiative petition on
specific appropriation grounds.
The court measured those words against the
intent of the statute taken as a whole,
and concluded that the framers did not intend
that law to be, the enactment of that law to be
purely optional with the legislature.
And there was no Clean Elections law prior
to the enactment of that law.
So if the legislature did not appropriate funds
to implement it, it would not be implemented.
And by the time the Bates case came before this court,
certain candidates at least one
and I think in the course of litigation,
another had qualified for funds
under the Clean Elections law.
So it was clear exactly how much money would need to be
appropriated to enact that law
with respect to those candidates.
I would agree with Mr. Cordy's assertion that this law,
if enacted, would require the legislature to fund the ABCC
sufficiently to enact it but I do disagree,
that it would be required,
to spend any particular amount of money.
-: Okay, thank you.
-: Thank you.
-: Justice Gaziano.
-: No questions, thank you.
-: Justice Lowy.
-: Sure, so, there's just as that alluded to,
you can take almost any situation
and find relatedness at certain level.
And perhaps the relatedness here is that
people are really busy or they're lazy
and they just want to go, one place,
be able to get beer or wine.
Just like some people,
they want to be able to vote for options we are
and how they get their new state.
What if that person who
really just wants to be able to buy beer and wine
wherever he or she may be,
really doesn't like the idea of,
having this concentration of business in a few hands,
or doesn't like go to the local
liquor store when they also sell food,
doesn't want to
every single day stand in line in front of the
people that he or she sees every day and show their ID.
Don't you have a situation where,
you've got a voter who, yes, on a level,
you've got relatedness
as it relates to how the alcohol industry is regulated,
but you've at least two other things
that are really gonna bother voters,
and they don't know how to vote.
They don't want to vote yes.
And they don't want to vote no.
-: Yes, Your Honor.
Anytime you have a multi part petition,
which is expressly allowed under Article 48,
you may have some voters who feel one way about part of it
and another way about another part of it,
as this court concluded in Hensley,
just as we do when we choose candidates,
we need to wrestle with what we like and don't like
about any particular measure that's before us.
The relatedness requirement is not intended to
reduce the need to think consciously
about how you feel about a measure,
but is rather intended to ensure that voters are tasked
unfairly to engage in that wrestling process,
as this court concluded in Dan,
a petitioner can use multiple paths
to get to a similar place.
In this case, that's what the measure does.
It both expands availability
by both lifting the statewide cap and introducing
a new form of license that would not be subject
to the local quotas.
So we can speculate until the election,
what might motivate one voter and not another voter,
but there is nothing in Article 48 that
precludes voters having to review the materials
that are before them and make a decision overall,
how they feel about a particular question.
-: Well, I guess it's, just what would say,
where the line is, if you look at
Carney here, he has achieved,
this petition seems to be protecting not the dogs,
because you don't have a permit of dog racing anymore.
And the penalties included are increased.
But we found no relatedness there.
So,
the question is,
"What's the principle,
"the core principle that you would point
"for us to be able to find that line?"
-: The way, Your Honor, that I find it easiest to,
evaluate these provisions and to harmonize this court cases,
is to think about these petitions in terms of scope.
And if you can conceive of a scope that
will include all provisions of the proposed law
and is not unduly broad, then,
that is one way of arriving at a conclusion
that the relatedness requirement is met.
In Carney, the court concluded that protection of dogs
was simply too broad and abstract.
In Gray, the court concluded that education
was simply too broad and related only abstractly.
In MCA, the court concluded that state
and local taxation is sufficiently narrow.
And in Hensley, the court concluded that
the marijuana, the comprehensive scheme to
regulate medical and recreational marijuana
was sufficiently narrow.
In Hensley we talked about, the provision there,
dealt with multiple sectors of a retail market
both vertically in terms of
cultivation, testing and distribution,
as well as horizontally in terms of,
on-premises and off-premises,
retail sales and recreational sales and medical sales.
And the court concluded that was not a scope
that was overly broad.
Certainly this petition that deals with one
sector of the off-premises alcohol market,
or one sector of the retail alcohol market
is narrower than that.
-: Thank you, no further questions.
-: Justice Budd.
-: I have no questions.
Thank you.
-: Justice Cypher.
-: I just would like to go back for a minute
to your answer regarding the appropriation question.
And,
the requirement in the petition,
that there be money,
set aside, correct me, set aside
but then you say that the legislature wouldn't,
would have to spend something
but wouldn't necessarily have to spend all of it.
Can you explain?
Maybe I just don't understand your answer to that.
-: Yeah, yes Your Honor,
in the Manzoni case and in other cases,
the court has wrestled with the argument
about whether setting money aside in a particular fund
constitutes an appropriation for purposes
of the Article 48 exclusion.
And the court is consistently held that, "No, it does not."
The court has not concluded that a measure
contains a prohibited specific
appropriation except where the legislature
would be powerless to use
(coughing) that money for anything else.
In the 1937 opinion,
the money would have gone to the legislature without,
I mean, to the executive branch without any
action by the legislature and
in the law at issue in Slama,
the money would have been
distributed to municipalities automatically
and without further appropriation.
So the subject to appropriation language as this Court has
developed this jurisprudence in this area means
that the legislature retains
full spending authority,
though there under Manzoni and other cases,
it is just simply not the case that
assigning money to a particular fund removes
it from the control of the legislature.
It doesn't.
So while it is true that the legislature
would need to either sufficiently fund
this initiative petition to implement it
or choose to repeal it,
it would not be required to spend any particular
amount of money to do that.
-: Okay, thank you.
No more questions.
-: Justice Kafker,
-: So I just want to make sure it is,
are these the subject of appropriation as I mean,
are subject to appropriation magic words then?
As long as they're included, our analysis ends?
-: Ah,
I would not call them magic words.
Because I think that is,
making light of a very serious--
-: we can quibble over the terminology, but it, are you,
I wouldn't, I'd want to I'd like to understand,
if that language is included, does our analysis end?
-: Unless this court were to,
reverse its positions in AME and Gilligan and Manzoni,
Yes.
-: Okay, so that's the end,
we can stop worrying about that one in your view.
The second plan.
It's raises Justice Budd's question about
just sort of relatedness,
and I'm struggling with the Gray case, particularly.
So in Gray we have, it's the course,
we created for subject matter petition,
but then we don't allow testing on it because we decide
that's unrelated but isn't that almost
exactly like what we're doing here, which is,
we're opening up
the number of licenses,
but we're saying, "Okay,
"but that means we've got to have better identification
"at the checkout counter."
Is just,
I don't understand how we can reconcile Gray with this case.
-: Well, as Your Honor knows,
I certainly made arguments in favor of
a conclusion that the petitioner issue in Gray was related.
But in fact, this court disagreed.
And I think this Court's ruling there
does not compel a different result here.
The court in Gray concluded that there
was no operational relatedness
between the AME cast question release provision
and the other provisions in the law that would have
ended the common core requirements and
provided a path for adopting new curriculum frameworks.
Because the
(clears throat)
AME cast question release would occur
regardless of what frameworks were in place.
In Oberlies,
and I think as well as in here,
the petition that was certified by the Attorney General
and that certification was upheld by this court,
concluded, the court concluded that
the provisions were operationally related, where the,
patient-nurse ratios were to be implemented in
a particular way that would
preclude certain employment from being terminated.
Here as well, if I own a chain of grocery stores
and I currently am unable to apply for a license
in my particular town, either because of,
the quota for Section 15 licenses has been reached,
or because I already hold nine licenses statewide.
And this law is enacted and I am permitted to
apply for that license
and I'm lucky enough to receive that license.
The other provisions of this law
will govern how that license is implemented,
both in terms of IV requirements and
hiring and funding the ABCC inspectors
who are gonna come in and inspect my business.
So every provision of this proposed law
is operationally related.
That was not the case in Gray as this court concluded.
-: Okay, I'm all set.
Thank you.
-: (chuckles) Justice Cypher just,
with regard to the fun that is created,
is this the first case in which we've ever created,
which initiative has created a fund which pulls
money from the general fund and puts it into a
new fund as opposed to simply saying
the initiative generate new revenues,
which will be placed in a special fund?
-: I believe in Manzoni.
There were new revenues,
but there were also redirection of existing revenues.
So it is, it may be the first time that
the redirection of revenue is not coupled
with the creation of new revenue.
But the setting aside of the revenue,
should not under this Court's precedent,
make a difference in terms of
specific appropriation question.
-: Okay, but aside,
I'm not troubled by whether it's a specific appropriation
the question, I guess is, whether or not
this goes to the issue of whether it's related.
What do you, so they put funding,
let's assume this passes.
90 to 100 million dollars of excise taxes
that come out of, that come from the sale of alcohol,
which right now are going into the general fund
would go into this special fund,
let's assume the legislature appropriates
only $20 million to ABCC.
But let's also assume, which I think we can certainly assume
that the legislature is going to be strapped for money,
next fiscal year.
And he's gonna say,
"We want to spend this money on school food."
So we've appropriated billion dollars to schools.
And we're just gonna direct Treasurer to take,
the rest of the money, aid from this fund
and spend it on schools.
Can that be done without special legislative act?
And then can the treasurer simply say,
"I'm gonna take some money from the general fund,
"I'm gonna take some money from this fund,"
or does the treasurer need,
special legislation in order to do that?
-: The treasurer doesn't need special legislation,
Your Honor, but the legislature would have to make
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act,
or a Special Appropriations Act.
Just like with any other kind of revenue.
-: Meaning that it would have to say,
that the X dollars out of this particular fund
are to be going to schools.
-: Correct, Your Honor.
There are--
-: I'm sorry.
-: I was going to say there are certain funds listed in
General Law Chapter 29.
That the executive can access without
independent legislative action.
They say right in the tax without further appropriation,
these funds will be available.
If this proposed law had proposed the funds,
worded that way, I would agree that it would be
an illegal specific appropriation under Article 48.
But that's not what this does.
-: What is the practical consequence of having this fund?
Sounds like there's none according to you.
-: Under the Manzoni and other cases,
it's really just a bookkeeping mechanism.
-: Without practical consequence?
-: Without, there's practical consequences in the sense that,
that is how the money is tracked and we will then know.
But because the proposed, the law as written,
leaves the budgetary discretion with the legislature.
That doesn't restrict the legislature's discretion at all.
-: Okay, lets turn to another question.
You heard my (mumbles)
And I think, agree that would certainly if you agree that
this passes muster, you would agree that would
that that initiative would pass muster.
-: Yes, Your Honor.
-: And you said that this,
this will affect the Total Wine because Total Wine now,
which may be limited to that number of
stores (mumbles) for the sale of liquor,
not only beer and wine,
will now be able to open up
however many stores it wishes to,
to sell liquor, correct?
-: Well
subject to the grant of licenses by localities, yes.
-: Okay.
Does the state limitation on the Total Wine,
I don't mean to pick them,
(coughs) but they are just to be gone,
-: correct Your Honor,
-: with regard to the sale of liquor.
-: Correct, Your Honor.
-: And how is that related to
allowing food stores to sell beer and wine?
-: It's related, Your Honor, because the,
as in done, the drafters here,
chose two paths to get to the same result,
which was increased availability of beer and wine at
grocery stores and convenience stores.
It is within the drafters prerogative
to conclude that it would be administratively difficult
and maybe somewhat dissonant to
lift the statewide cap only for Total Wine,
I mean, only for excluding Total Wines,
from the lifting of the statewide cap.
In fact, they may have been drafting
with a view toward some type of equal protection
challenge to the law if it's enacted down the line.
So the fact that the statewide cap
would no longer apply to Total Wine,
it would mean that yes, that an entity like that,
that sells only alcohol
would have the benefit.
But the growth would not necessarily be as fast
as growth for these new licenses,
these grocery stores and convenience stores
that would have the benefit of,
the availability of licenses outside the local quota system.
The Total Wine situate, the Total Wine
model would still be subject to the local quota system.
-: Okay, so certainly you're not saying
that the initiative could not have said,
"We're going to drop the statewide cap sale
"of beer and wine, but we're not touching
"the state statewide cap on the sales liquor."
-: As a certification matter under Article 48,
no, that would not be problematic.
-: And similarly with regard to the ID,
I understand why you'd want to be ensure
that the showing of an ID at a food store.
But, is it related that they're now requiring
tech stores to have IDs where before that was not done?
How is that related to the addition
of food store selling beer and wine?
-: Well, Your Honor, I think that it is again
within the drafters prerogative,
to not choose to propose a law
that would set up differing
enforcement requirements at different types of
outlets for the sale of alcoholic beverages and to
impose, right now I think many people might be
surprised to know that there actually
is no requirement that anyone show
an ID when purchasing alcohol.
The framers here might have concluded
that that is somewhat of an outdated
mechanism and not sufficient to keep up
with increased availability.
The amicus briefs filed by Cumberland Farms and
the Trade Organization made reference to a 2017
task force report that the ABCC or the treasurer ,
had convened and increased,
or standardizing ID requirements,
including with the use of technology was
one of the recommendations of that taskforce report.
It's not unreasonable for the drafters here,
to conclude that it will be an easier administration
of the new law to have those requirements
apply across the board.
And there is nothing in Article 48 that requires
the creation of either multiple enforcement entities
or multiple standards in the enforcement of Chapter 138.
-: Now, you earlier used the term unduly broad,
with regard to the relatedness issues.
When does
the scope of the initiative in terms of reaching beyond
the sale of beer and wine
at food stores become unduly broad?
I mean, Mr. Cordy has said,
"Well, if it's unduly broad
"and that it goes beyond our means that
"tech stores must check ID,
"it's unduly broad in that it,
"it now means there's no cap down with liquor?
"It's unduly broad and that it
"is now putting all alcohol excise taxes into
"a separate fund?"
When, why is this not really broad
given that a narrower scope is certainly possible?
-: A narrow scope is certainly possible,
Your Honor and a broader scope would be possible as well.
If this proposal were to,
I think it would still fall
within this court cases on a legitimately
related a narrow scope if this law were to propose changes
in the entire alcohol distribution scheme,
under Chapter 138, the sale of alcohol
both in restaurants and in,
for off-premises consumption is
certainly not broader than the law
that was approved by the court in Hensley.
I think the limit for what is too broad a scope
has got to be someplace in between
education, as in Gray and
state and local taxation as in MTA.
But I think you could completely revamp Chapter 138,
with respect to the sale of alcoholic beverages without
creating a scope that's unduly broad under this court case.
-: I have no further questions.
Are there any additional questions from
my Justice colleagues?
-: No, thank you.
And being none.
That will close this session.
I thank counsel.
And I thank my fellow Justices.
Thank you.
-: Thank you very much.