-: Justice Lowey is participating,
we're having visual problems with cameras so,
he is participating as well as
Chief Justice Gants is with us
virtually and will participate in the.
(mumbles)
So with that I would ask clerk to call the case.
Narrator: SJC-12891, Liz D'allessandro
and others, the Lennar Hingam Holdings, LLC and others.
-: Mr Weld.
-: Good morning, your honors.
My name is Christopher Weld.
I represent the Lennar defendants in the
United States district court case.
The answer to the special question, is governed by,
the language of chapter two 60, section two B
and a legislative intent behind it.
In the stern's case, decided just last year this court,
made clear that the language of the statute is clear
and unambiguous and is conclusive as to legislative intent.
The clear legislative intent is to protect
construction professionals by limiting their liability
for design and construction defects to six years
after completion of an improvement to real property.
Chapter two 60 section two B, bars claim sounding in tort
for the design and construction
of an improvement to real property after six years
from the earlier of the opening of the improvement to use
or substantial completion and taking possession
of the improvement.
The term improvement to real property
is not defined in the statute.
However, in the Mulligan and Dighton cases
this court has adopted the Webster's dictionary definition
of an improvement.
In this case, there are three standalone buildings
built in phase one of a condominium project.
The second phase encompassed two standalone buildings
and the sixth building that was the subject
of the underlying motion is one building
in phase three of the underlying condominium.
There were 24 phases and 28 buildings.
For each of the six buildings in question,
the architect issued a separate certificate
of substantial completion
and the town issued a certificate of occupancy.
These buildings were thereafter occupied
while construction continued.
The master deed provides that the developer
had no obligation to construct any further elements
of the condominium past initial phase one.
And the additional phases were done
by individual amendments,
usually on a building by building basis.
When we apply the Webster's definition of improvement
that the court has adopted to these improvements
or these elements, if you will structures, it is clear
that each individual building in certainly each phase
is in and of itself an improvement.
There are five elements in the definition.
First, these buildings were clearly permanent structured.
Second, they certainly enhanced the capital value
of the real property as each contained a number
of condominium units.
They certainly require the expenditure of
labor and money to complete and they were designed
to make the property more valuable.
They certainly were not ordinary repairs.
Accordingly, it is clear that each individual building
by the definition adopted by the court,
is in fact an individual improvement.
This is consistent with the legislative intent
because under this formulation or frankly just--
-: Excuse me Mr. Weld, I have a question, Mr. Weld.
The question I have first is what happens though
it seems to me that the certified question
is quite fact dependent here.
What happens though when the facts change in this case
of course, it's a matter of the same developer,
the same seems like the same architects
the same contractors who are involved
with the entire, all the multi phases.
What happens if the, what happens
if that's not so,
suppose there's a different developer,
suppose there's a different architect.
So how do we, how does this work?
-: The definition that was set forth
in the statute in sterns does not focus
on who the actor was, who actually performed the work.
It focuses on whether there's an improvement
and whether it has been substantially complete
and ready for occupancy.
In fact in 1984, the legislature amended statute of repose
to go away from a standard that was based on
who was performing the work
and whether they had completed their work.
And instead it changed the trigger
to the status of the actual improvement.
In other words, whether it was substantially complete
and ready for occupancy.
So in fact who the actual developer was
and who the contractor was
is irrelevant to the analysis under this statute.
-: Well though it seems to be certainly part
of this re certified question, doesn't it?
-: Well, I think that the court, actually the district court,
indicated in her opinion that a factor she considered
was that there was continuity in this case
of the developer and contractor.
And I suggest to this court
that that was error, under your previous decisions
and under your interpretation of improvement to real estate.
And in fact, the cases that are cited by the court
which are primarily New Jersey cases,
Ohio, North Carolina, that were also
in the briefs of the trust, they use the standard
of focusing on whether there was continuous performance
and the trigger event for the statute is in fact
when the contractor or developer completes it's performance.
It's not triggered by status of the physical construction.
And again, that was amended in 1984.
So I believe, our position is that the district court
was in error in using that type of analysis
and it should be rejected.
-: Okay, let me ask you another question.
How does it work when
for example, I understand how you're saying
that these are these independent buildings
and you want it to be building by building.
What happens for example, if in a phased development
in a place where you have to have well water,
it doesn't affect the, there's nothing to complain about
with the first phase.
So until you get to phase 14 or something
that the well water is really a problem
because the water table is altered
by the continuing development
of the, what would you say to that?
-: I would say that where there are elements
of the development that are interdependent
with other improvements, in this case, other buildings
that that in and of itself is an improvement
and the cases per case law supports that conclusion.
-: I'm sorry, what's the improvement?
What is the improvement?
The interdependent thing or where...
I'm asking you what happens?
How does a unit owner complain,
when is the unit owner able to complain about this?
-: The, well obviously the statute of repose
sets the outer limit in this case, the unit owner--
(mumbles)
-: My point is that, you only get six hours, six days,
six years for the statute of repose,
suppose that the well water doesn't get changed
until year eight of the development.
What happens then?
-: I believe that the well water system,
which would presumably be distributing
the water that would be interconnected
with the entire development.
-: Yes, exactly right.
-: So that improvement would not be substantially complete
and ready for its intended use
which its intended use is for all of the project,
that improvement would not be substantially complete
and ready for its intended use until the entire
project was complete,
when all buildings could have access to it.
So each one of these things, is in and out itself
an improvement, we must look to what its intended use is
and how that use is activated to determine the trigger event
for the statute of repose.
-: Okay, let me continue on, did I ask you about,
how do you respond to the contention
that your approach encourages piecemeal litigation?
-: Well, I think primarily that's a
legislative decision that the
legislature made clear what the trigger event was
and what an improvement is.
And particularly this court's determination
and stern makes that clear.
Further, the statue reposes the outer limit
of when a lawsuit can be brought.
And I would suggest to you that in a multi building complex
if you have a systemic problem,
you're going to start to see it early on.
And therefore you're going to do an investigation.
The first building that shows a concrete problem
a window problem, a water infiltration problem,
that's going to allow you to then
do an investigation.
Further, even to the extent,
there were multiple lawsuits filed
they certainly would be consolidated.
And presumably meant if people had to be added,
or they were additional claims,
it could be done via amendment.
So these are all things that can be procedurally addressed
by the current tools available to the court.
-: Okay, now you mentioned legislation,
there is pending legislation that
could change all of this, isn't there?
Hello? -: I didn't hear the question.
-: I'm sorry.
There's pending legislation right?
-: No, there was a legislative change in 1984.
-: No I meant there's pending legislation now isn't there?
Isn't there pending legislation now
that would change the statute of repose?
-: I'm not aware of it.
-: Oh, okay, not aware of the legislature
as July 16th 2020 housing grossing an acting bill
was 4,605 and act relative
to construction defect claims by pro condominium owner?
You're not aware of that?
-: No your honor, I'm not aware of it.
-: Okay, all right, well,
I'm gonna turn it over to my colleagues then.
-: Let me ask you Weld that the same answer you gave
to the question posed by Justice Lenk regarding well water,
how would that apply to common buildings?
Defects in the clubhouse, for instance
it's supposed to serve the entire condominium.
-: The defect to the clubhouse would be,
the statute of repose would run from the time of its
completion which presumably would include,
when it could be actually used by somebody.
-: By someone, it wouldn't be
that the clubhouse was supposed to serve the entirety
of the condominium project?
-: I think that would be also a reasonable interpretation
to say that in the context of a clubhouse or a pool
or those instances that that is integrally connected
to the entire condominium project.
So therefore the statute could run
from the completion of the entire project
because that's when it could be used
for its intended purpose but the individual buildings
are already occupied and used for their intended purpose.
-: Justice Kafker.
-: It's a follow up to the same questions
that Justice Lenk and Justice Gaziano asked.
So I've got a two building entity
and they build the first building and it's got,
the foundation's not proper, but it worked.
We don't find that out until
the second building shifts the land on it.
And that happens more after the statute of repose
on the first building expires,
how would this work with, how would the people
in the first building be protected in that context?
-: They wouldn't be.
-: So they would be left with,
so their building starts tilt like the leaning tower of Pisa
and it has nothing to do
with the fault of the second building.
It's just that the first building was done improperly
and they wouldn't have any means of recovery at that point.
-: No, I think that once they have a
certificate of occupancy
and a certificate of substantial completion
under this, the plain language of the statute
and the Stern's decision, the statute of repose
begins to run at that point.
They have a six year limit if they discovered the defect
after the six years, the legislative determination is
that the six years is a proper balance
and that they're out of luck.
And I think that's essentially
what the Stern's decision says,
Bridgewood says and many of your prior rulings.
Justice Kafker: Thank you.
-: Could I ask another question?
-: [Justcice Gaziano] Certainly.
-: Okay, going on along with those
the same lines there that you've just discussed.
Supposedly I think that Justice Kafker's a point was that
the defect didn't really happen until year seven.
And you're still saying that there's nothing
that the unitary can do at that point?
-: I'm not sure what I understand the defect is.
-: Okay, the defect, the things doesn't get moved
until the land underneath the, unit one doesn't get moved
until unit two is completed.
And unit two is not completed until,
seven years after unit one is completed.
Is that not your question Justice Kafker?
-: Well, I was gonna pose it in two ways,
but the first thing was I thought there was a defect
in building one upfront
but no one discovers it for six years
because it's fine until they start moving the foundation
in building two, I was gonna reverse the question
and say, okay, building one is fine for six years
and the real problem is that
building two was miss constructed
but it ends up causing damage to building one.
I'm just trying to understand both scenarios,
but it sounds like.
-: I think that if there is a, if there is a action
by contractor on building two,
that causes damage to building one that
that would not be an action arising,
out of the improvement real property that is building one.
So it would not be precluded
by the statute or would not be precluded by the passage
of the six years because this is a new event,
related to a different improvement.
-: Yeah but, what I was in my first hypothetical
I was contemplating that there was a defect in building one,
that doesn't show up for six or seven years
until building two starts moving the foundation.
And it's the same developer, but you're saying building one
the owners of building one are out of luck in that context.
-: I believe that's the correct
interpretation of the statute.
-: So may I ask another question?
Justice Gaziano: Throw away.
-: How reliant are you on the certificate of occupancy
to determine substantial completion?
-: Well, I think in this case
the facts are that there is both
a certificate of substantial completion
and a certificate of occupancy.
-: Okay, that's here
but I mean, how reliant are you on this theoretically?
-: I think under the statute you have a two prong.
-: They're alternatives right?
-: Yeah, it's an alternative it's the earlier of,
the opening of the improvement to use or
substantial completion and the taking
possession of occupants.
So it's an either or in the earlier governance.
-: All right, how do you prove number one?
-: I think that would primarily relate to
a common building.
-: A common building.
-: Where you're not gonna have technical occupancy
for example a pool, the clubhouse example
but whether it's open to use, that would be the trigger.
And I think that could be evidenced
by a number of things, including a
certificate of substantial completion,
a formal opening by the condominium association,
a certificate of occupancy.
All those things might bear on whether the improvement is
open to use.
-: Okay, thank you.
-: Thank you Mr. Weld.
[Mr. Weld] Thank you.
-: Mr. Gorman.
-: May it please the court, good morning.
My name is Hugh Gorman.
I represent the board of trustees
of the Hewitts Landing Condominium trust.
They are the elected group of unit owners
who are responsible for the management and control
of the common areas and limited common areas
of the Hewitts Landing Condominium.
The trustees are the plaintiffs, in the federal court
and the appellees in this matter.
Your honors, the resolution of the certified question
that judge Tolwani has sent to you,
hinges on the word improvement and how that is defined
or how it is interpreted, relative to the statute of repose.
I suggest that judge Tolwani, has submitted a very narrow
and discrete question to be answered
based on the various specific set of facts
in this case.
The Lennar entities are sophisticated.
They are one of the largest home builders
in the United States.
Between November of 2009 and June of 2015 Lennar,
in accordance with its master deed and wearing multiple hats
and the multiple hats that it wore were,
owner, developer, construction manager, general contractor
and trustee of the condominium trust, acquired,
planned marketed and built the condominium.
Lennar's counsel referenced the master deed
that Lennar recorded in connection with,
to basically create this Hewitts Landing Condominium.
That master deed was recorded on October 25, 2010.
It serves as both the condominium's birth certificate
and the roadmap as to how Lennar plan to
and in fact did build the Hewitts Landing Condominium.
That master deed your honors, which appears
at the record appendix two at page seven.
In that master deed Lennar created a single condominium.
It didn't create 28 separate condominium buildings.
It didn't create 150 separate condominium units.
It created by that document, a legal entity pursuant
the condominium statute, chapter one 83 A, a condominium.
It states Lennar's intention to build the condominium.
Not a series of buildings, not a series
of units, the condominium in phases.
Each of which will be part of the condominium.
Equally important for the analysis, is that that master deed
grants a pertinent right to all of the unit owners.
-: But the master deed is not what
the statue refers to is it?
-: Your honor, you're correct.
It doesn't re...
The statute doesn't refer to the master deed
but the master deed is instructive
with respect to the analysis of these very specific facts
in a phased condominium relative to the statute of repose.
-: Are you saying we're not supposed
to answer this more generally?
-: I am your honor.
-: This very limited question, is very limited facts
that's all we're supposed to do.
-: Yes your honor.
These limited facts where you have a,
owner, developer, general contractor, that serves,
where's all the hats and builds one unitary development,
start to finish cradle to grave.
-: But the statute does not define improvement
to real property.
That's really what this is all about, isn't it?
(mumbles)
-: I'm sorry, your honor you're correct.
There is no definition
in the statute of the term improvement
and your honor, the cases that were cited
the Dighton case and the Milligan case,
confirmed that there's no definition of improvement.
They also state in their reasoning that,
the legislative history of the statute of repose
provides a dearth of information as to,
for reference, to indicate what the term improvement means.
And in general, your court has held that,
the Webster's dictionary definition of improvement
can be used to assist in interpreting,
what the term improvement means.
-: I think Justice Kafker has a question.
-: Sure, thank you
Justice Kafker: Mr. Gorman, I don't wanna cut you off
but Justice Lenk are you done?
Justice Lenk: I am.
-: Okay, I don't understand your argument
Mr. Gorman very well.
We've gotta interpret this statute.
So I am reading, precludes recovery against those
within its purview for any injury that occurs
more than six years after the earlier of the days.
The opening of the improvement to use,
substantial completion of the improvement
and the taking of possession.
We gotta building that's open for use
and there's not even a requirement
that there's gonna be another building none the less,
we still don't find that this is triggered at that point.
I don't get it.
-: Let me try to explain my position, your honor.
With respect that this is not a building,
this is a condominium.
-: The word is whether it's an improvement right?
It doesn't say the word building,
it says improvement, right?
-: But your honor, Lennar set its own guidelines
and road map as to what it was building out there.
The improvement is the condominium development
in total, not a single building.
And if you would let me expound on that.
With respect to condominiums and the condominium master deed
when you buy it, when you're a buyer of a condominium unit
you buy a unit at a time certain and at that time certain
you also get a percentage interest
in the appurtenant rights of the condominiums
of the common areas of the entirety of the condominium.
-: But Mr. Gorman, we live in, we're dealing with
sophisticated real estate transactions, right?
It can be 20 years before parts of these things are built
30 years, right?
Real estate goes up and down you're...
And the condominium owner who's
in a building is not worried about building three, right?
They're worried about their own building,
unless building three,
starts screwing up their own building.
That's a whole separate problem that I'm worried about
but it just seems like there's no requirement.
And not necessarily even an expectation
that we're gonna have 25 buildings here, is there?
-: No, your honor, I respectfully suggest you're incorrect.
If you look at the master deed,
the master deed states that,
it's going to be built in phases.
That is going to be multiple buildings
that it can be up to 150 units
and the master deed itself your honor gives Lennar 15 years
to complete construction of the condominium that it formed.
So your honor, with respect to a period of years
Lennar certainly gave itself 15 years to build
the Hewitts Landing Condominium in its master deed.
It didn't avail itself of those 15 years.
It only took them between 2010 and 2015
to build the entire development
-: I'm just trying to understand so,
'cause again, we were not,
a district court we're ruling sort of on
our ruling's gonna control lots of different
construction projects but you're saying
that we're gonna define improvement
by the master deeds every time or the particular contract
-: That's not what I'm saying at all your honor.
What I'm saying is the master deed provides reference
for the factual context
by which the court arrives at the conclusion
that the improvement is the entire condominium development.
I'm not saying that master deeds need to be referenced
and nor am I saying and again--
-: But bear with me for a second, Mr. Gorman
'cause we don't decide just specific cases here.
We're deciding what the statute means.
Are you telling us that the meaning of improvement
on the statute is going to be defined by each one
of these master deeds or construction contracts?
It's all gonna be dependent on
the particular language in these contracts.
Is that what you're saying?
-: I believe what I'm saying, your honor is,
it's dependent on the facts of each circumstance.
This is a condominium.
This was built as a phase condominium.
It's a single condominium.
It's not a series of condominiums.
Lennar made its bed when it filed the master deed
in this scenario and defined what it was creating
and what it was going to build.
It set all the limitations in it
as to what it could and couldn't build,
how long it was gonna take to build it.
It also reserved the right
for itself to stop building the phases
at any point in time that it's so determined
and it could have relinquished
the rights to build additional phases.
-: May I bring you back to one thing you said
in answer to Justice Kafker's question.
Go back to the master deed.
However, the question that's been certified to us,
calls it, the construction of a single condominium
development, comprising multiple buildings or phases.
Isn't that slightly different than just calling it
a single condominium?
-: Justice Cypher, I don't believe that it's different.
I think what Judge Tolani has concluded is that
Lennar built this project from cradle to grave.
It formed the condominium
as a single standalone condominium under the one 83 A--
-: But the word development has been there.
So that doesn't modify it at all.
You're saying that just as it is in the statute.
-: I believe your honor, that what the court was referring to
when they say condominium development,
in layman's parlance, when you say condominium development
I think development is an amplifying word,
but I think that what it means is condominium
and there is no dispute, that there is one condominium
down on Ingam Bay, that's the Hewitts Landing Condominium.
Justice Cypher: Okay
-: Justice Lowy has a question.
Justice Lowy: Sure, thank you, Mr.Gorman
I recognize that we don't have a certified question
concerning subcontractors but Justice Kafker's point
about that, despite the factual vacuum,
we are talking about broad points and I'm concerned.
What about the situation where
the subcontractor finishes the work completely in 2020,
in building two but building five's not done till 2026?
How do we address this
specific issue here without commenting on a lot
of possible factual differences, such as subcontractors?
-: Thank you, Justice Lowey.
I think when you're asking me is,
can different entities have different statutes of repose?
And my answer is yes, they can.
With respect to the Lennar entities here,
they built one unitary project start to finish,
serving as developer, owner, general contractor
and as the trustee and the board of trustees.
They did the whole project from 2009 through 2015.
In the scenario where you have a subcontractor,
that was only on the first building at Hewitts Landing
and did not work on further buildings,
that subcontractor, for the purpose of that subcontractor,
the only improvement that it worked on
was that single building.
Now, if that same sub contractor built
and worked on all 28 buildings
the analysis would be the same with respect
as to the analysis I've given with respect to Lennar.
But in the limited factual context where you've got,
subcontractors that work only on a specific building,
then their work starts and finishes.
And I would argue that with respect to them,
they're working on that specific building.
But with respect to an entity that works
on the entirety of the project,
from start to finish, plans it develops it and builds it.
The improvement is not a building.
The improvement is the condominium.
Which is the entirety of the project here.
And one other thing that,
a point that I did not finish earlier.
I was talking about the fact of how important it is
that we specify or acknowledge
that we're dealing with a condominium here,
not a single family home, not a commercial building,
not a series of buildings, we're dealing with a condominium.
The condominium itself is a legal entity.
And I was talking about unit owners
and what they buy when they buy a condominium.
I may buy a unit
in the very first building that was built out here.
But when I buy that unit, I own that unit myself.
What I also own, as a tenant in common
with everybody else that buys a unit,
in my condominium building in other condominium building
in the project is an a pertinent right
in all of the common areas throughout the entirety
of the condominium, whether they're finished
at the time of my purchase or whether they're not finished
for years later, as we have here
when the last building at the condominium
was not completed until June of 2015.
And the condo association here is prosecuting a claim
with respect to defects in the common areas
throughout the entirety of the Hewitts Landing Condominium.
Not just in one specific building throughout the buildings.
And therefore my ownership interest
as a condo owner of one unit, doesn't become completed
until the very last item
of all the construction at this condominium is completed.
And at that point in time, I own as a common owner
with the rest of my unit owner.
-: But that's not what the statute says.
You're referring to things that the statute does not
refer to aren't you?
-: Judge I won't argue that the statute cites that.
You can't ignore these facts and apply the statute.
-: First, we have to figure out what the statute means,
don't we?
-: Well, again we need to know what improvement means.
In my position judges, the improvement is the entire
condominium project.
-: I know that's your position.
I wanna know when you think
that the statute of repose begins to run here?
Is it on the last day of the,
this is with the last operative,
was it substantially complete and taken for active and see
or open to use?
When is that statute of limitations
problems begin to run here.
Is the last certificate of occupancy?
-: I would argue on the certificate of occupancy
for the very last building constructed governs,
when the statute of reposed runs.
And that would be a certificate of occupancy
that issued from the very last building constructed
at the Hewitts Landing Condominium in June of 2015.
It's been referenced to certificates
of substantial completion, that architects issue.
Well that's all well and good and again
that is evidence, but until a town--
-: They only have this certificate of occupancy,
adds to each of these unit buildings?
-: Yes, you do, your honor.
-: So you're saying it's to be the last one
for the entire complex?
-: Correct, because--
-: And how do you know when that's gonna be?
How do you know when that's gonna be?
I mean, we are firm in unit one and there's no unit two
there's no building number two
until seven years down the road.
How do I know when that's gonna be?
How do I know where the list certificate documents,
if there's gonna be another phase?
-: Why do you need to know it?
When I buy in a development, that's proposed to be
a phase development, I know as a consumer
and it was suggested earlier
we're dealing with sophisticated parties.
The only sophisticated party here is Lennar.
The unit owners at Hewitts Landing Condominium, yeah.
They may be successful people.
They may be sophisticated.
They're not developers.
They're not contractors.
They're consumers.
They go out in the world,
they're told this is gonna be a first rate condominium.
-: Under your view, all those contractors.
I mean, they remain liable.
If you've got some giant project
those contractors are gonna remain liable
for a hundred years, right?
'Cause there isn't gonna be any repose for
those little guys that you're worried about forever, right?
They're gonna have to worry, say you're building
over 25 year period or a 30 year period.
We have developments all the time that are huge, right?
Those individual contractors are gonna be on the hook
when their grandkids are around.
-: Are those individual contractors building every building
in the unit, in the condominium like Lennar?
-: But you define improvement as the entire development?
If you are correct, they're on the hook
until their grandkids, graduate college.
So there's gotta be some more measured
way of defining improvement, isn't there?
-: I disagree that that's my definition.
I define improvement with respect
to an entity that builds something
start to start to finish.
First of all, an entity that forms a condominium
a single condominium.
-: You're right, we're so divorced from the statute,
you're not helping us any more.
-: I'm not divorced from the statute.
The statute doesn't define improvement.
It's up to us to define it
and I believe that in this fact scenario,
I have a reasonable definition of it.
I'm not divorced at all.
The statute is in fact ambiguous
on the issue of improvement, there is--
-: Are you aware of the legislation
that I was referring to before?
-: I am not your honor.
-: Because on July 16th, 2020
the house in gross to be enacted house bill 46 0 five
and act relative to construction defect claims
by condominium owner.
Bill would amend this two 60 section two B,
to provide condominium developments
with different treatments than other improvements
under the statute of repose,
specifically needed the statute of limitations,
nor the statute of repose would begin to
run into a lot of delays when condominium unit owners
assume control over the condominium.
That is essentially what you're arguing, isn't it?
-: No, it's not, your honor.
I am familiar with that statute.
What that statute that proposed amendment is dealing with,
is when you have a scenario where a developer builder,
also controls the condominium board of trustees,
the condominium association,
that the statute of repose should be told from running
until such time as the condominium association
board of unit owners takes over from the developer.
The reason for that,
for that argument is that in a situation where you have a
developer that also controls the condominium association
it may not want to commence litigation
against one of its own entities
or any of its own subcontractors during the time period
that it is out there building a condominium project.
It's a different issue
than the issue that is before the court today,
which hinges on, whether or not the term improvement here
as Judge Tolani ruled, is the entirety of
the condominium project that Lennar created
and Lennar built from 2009 to 2015.
If I may go back to the question relative to subcontractors
could be on the hook for a hundred years.
I don't agree with that.
Again, Lennar said here,
it had 15 years to build this project.
It took six, but Lennar certainly when it filed its
condo documents and created it,
knew that it could have up to 15 years to build it
and tack on six years thereafter for a statute
of repose upon substantial completion, that's 21 years.
That's Lennar's own decision.
That's Lennar making its own roadmap
of how it's gonna build this project.
That's no outside force, no outside entity.
It's not unfair.
Likewise, Lennar here contracted with all the subcontractors
the suppliers, the architect and everyone else.
Lennar controls it's contractual relationships
and its rights and remedies, vis-a-vis those entities.
With respect to a subcontractor, as I stated earlier,
that works on one or two buildings
of a phase development and works on no more of them,
then that subcontractor once its work is completed,
the statute of repose can run as to that subcontractor.
I don't believe that a decision upholding judge Tolwani's
ruling on these limited facts, is going to reverberate
and impact anybody else other than an entity
such as Lennar, that serves as an owner developer contractor
and general contractor, in a single condominium project.
One other aspect of that is--
Mr. Gorman, you're well over your time
let me ask if the justices have any further questions
of Mr. Gorman.
-: All right. Thank you, Mr. Gorman.
-: Thank you, your honor.
Thank you, your honors.