Bailiff: SJC 12902,
Maureen Blake v. Hometown America Communities, Inc.
-: We have Mr. Kraus first.
-: Yes, yes Justice.
Justice Gaziano: We'll hear from you.
-: Thank you.
May it please the court, Robert Kraus
for Hometown America Communities, Inc.
and Hometown Oakhill, LLC, the appellants.
Your honor, Justices, we believe that Justice Edwards,
without citation and without a standard,
misinterpreted the language
of General Law, Chapter 140, 32L, subsection 2,
in the words, "change of rent for manufactured
home residents of a similar class."
We ask that you overturn that summary judgment decision
or remand it back with respect to the matters
of the rebuttable presumption,
or issues of fairness associated with the statute.
Our argument is essentially
this one of statutory interpretation.
And this court has particularly looked at different elements
and I quote Justice Kafker in his Dorrian v. LVNV Funding,
words of the legislature,
legislative history and agency interpretation.
"In this matter," justice says, "you cannot
"treat a prospective resident, an applicant,
"the same as someone who is a resident
"and afforded all the protections
"of GL Chapter 140 and the regulations."
It's unreasonable, it's not common sensible, it's absurd.
It's not the plain language.
Those are all standards enunciated very clearly
by this court, whether it was Justice Lenk,
who wrote in Commonwealth v. Morgan
about having a harmonious interpretation,
that common sense should lead the way.
And particularly what Justice Budd wrote
in Kerry v. Commonwealth, where a challenge
to an agency interpretation has a formidable burden.
The legislative history is not clear.
The legislation with respect to manufactured housing
started in '39, has been amended eight times
with a variety of different matters,
but this section has not been amended.
What you can see consistently
throughout the legislation and the changes is fairness,
fairness to the owners, fairness to the tenants.
And the statute provides and the regulations provide
that fair market value is what controls when someone enters.
Not a prospective, not a tire kicker,
not someone who's looking to come in,
but who is a tenant, a resident.
The agency interpretation here is a very important element
and I ask that you pay careful attention to it.
The AG since '93 has had the ability under 32S,
section 32S of this chapter,
to promulgate regulations interpreting Chapter 140
and it also provides a guide.
The latest iteration is 2017.
It's called the Green Book, it's sort of a Talmud
of learned people's interpretations of cases
and the regulations in the statute.
There's also a letter, amicus curiae letter,
from Assistant Attorney General Daniel Less,
which was dated August 18th,
which I think you should pay careful attention to.
And lastly, as I've made reference to,
the Chelmsford Mobile Home master lease.
Why is that so important?
It's a 30 year master lease that was crafted
by the attorney general James Shannon 30 years ago.
It's going to expire this December.
And what it does in Section 11A is hit directly,
point on, an interpretation of what those words mean
that we contest that Judge Edwards got wrong.
Because when someone in that manufactured housing community
would go to sell, the Section 11A,
which is entitled Lot Vacancy Rent Increases,
says that a new tenant shall be regarded
as a member of a dissimilar class
for the purposes of GL 140, Section 32L(2).
Now you will hear, "Well, that was a settlement."
-: Mr. Kraus, I think Justice Kafker has a question.
-: Justice Kafker.
-: Mr, Kraus, I'm trying to understand
how we're going to have any uniformity if,
I mean, obviously there's going to be turnover
in these manufactured home communities, right?
There's going to be different people
arriving at different times.
Does that mean once we've got one change,
everything is subject to the latest purchaser of a lot?
-: Well, Justice Kafker, the statute
and the regulations provide
that fair market value would be controlling.
So that is defined in 10.01, the definitions,
is what literally a willing lessee
and a willing lessor would agree to.
And they're afforded an opportunity
for a minimum of five year lease under the statute.
Yes, there can be tiered rents within the community, why?
-: Isn't there gonna be, everybody...
If, if once someone new comes,
you can change the lease terms,
what does it mean for any rule or change in rent
which does not apply uniformly
to all manufactured home residents of a similar class
shall create a rebuttable presumption.
Don't they want uniformity throughout this?
I'm just trying to understand
if whenever the time changes, the amount can change,
isn't there no uniformity whatsoever?
-: Well, and I'll point your attention
to the concept of vacancy decontrol,
which was a large point in why rent control expired in '94,
except for manufactured housing.
Market conditions control what you and I enter into
by way of a lease or a purchase of a home.
The fact of the matter is that
someone who bought 20 years ago
is not going to have the same rental conditions
as someone who buys 20 years later
is part of market conditions.
If, as you take it, in 2006,
when Hometown America purchased this community,
the rents for the preexisting tenants were $292.
They did an analysis of market conditions
then determined that the market at that moment in time
when they purchased was $388.
They could have raised everyone's rent up to $388,
but they didn't because they didn't think it was fair.
And there would have been no prohibition
against them doing it.
There's no rent control, there's no prohibition.
The direction, the standard, is what is the market rent.
The uniformity I suggest to you is, for instance,
if someone comes in, a change of rule is an easy example.
There's a dog rule and someone,
one of the tenants, is treated differently
with respect to their neighbor about the dog.
But the change in rent is a different story
because that is really dictated by the time,
the point of entry, where you enter
into the manufactured housing community.
Landlord tenant law is based upon contract and agreement.
And as you'll see in the amicus briefs
of the MHI, the MMHA, time is a critical factor
when you determine what the rent is.
-: Mr, Kraus, I'm going to ask one more question,
'cause I know my colleagues want to jump in,
but the classes the judge created,
the five different classes,
I don't understand why your ownership interest
in the home as opposed to the lot matters.
Why would it matter whether I own half of that,
you know, I own half of that manufactured home or not?
The issue is whether I have a contract
about the lot, isn't it?
Why is the ownership interest of the trailer
or the manufactured home matter at all?
-: Well, Justice Kafker, if I own the home,
the manufactured home, and I rent it to you,
for instance, and I get a substantial return
over and above what the rent is charged for the lot rent,
why should you be treated as a resident
for the purposes of the statute?
The statute and the regulations very clearly define
what a resident is and what a tenant is.
A resident is someone who typically lives
in a manufactured home.
A tenant is someone who lives in a manufactured home
in the community who has an occupancy agreement.
There's no consideration if I'm an investor
and I own 10 of these homes,
there should be no consideration
of whether I am a resident,
because I'm not, under the statute and the regulations.
-: Yeah, but the issue
is who has rented the lot, right?
It just, I just don't understand why we're caught up
in the relationships between the people
who own the manufactured homes,
'cause it's really all
it's you've rented the lot.
It just doesn't seem to me meaningful
whether I have a half-interest
in that manufactured home or not,
'cause the only thing that's being rented is the lot.
-: Well, then you have to make a factual inquiry,
Justice Kafker, as to who's paying the rent
and whether that amount of money is in excess
of what the lot rent is.
-: I just need to know who leased the lot, don't I?
-: Well, if take your for instance,
someone owns it but doesn't live in it
and rents it to a third party.
What we're saying, and the court Judge Edwards agreed,
those people are in a different situation
as it pertains to the statute
because the resident is paying the lot rent.
The owner may get far in excess of that,
but that's not the issue.
The issue is the lot rent.
And what you're talking about is someone, an owner,
profiting in excess of the lot rent.
That was the critical issue here
in the evidentiary hearing on 93A.
-: That's all I have (voice fades in audio interference).
Justice Cypher: I have a question.
Justice Gaziano: Justice Cypher?
-: When I look at that statute,
it's rampant resident runs through it,
but they never use the term owner,
they never use the term lessee, it's always resident.
What impact does that have on this argument?
-: Your Honor, I think it's the crux of it, Justice Cypher.
Resident is a defined term in 940 CMR, 10.01.
And as I indicated, it's the one who typically
lives in a manufactured housing community.
A prospective tenant, as these plaintiffs were,
after January 2006.
-: No, no, no they're prospective residents, aren't they?
There's a difference, even between a tenant and a resident?
-: Yes, the regulation defines the difference
between a resident and a tenant as someone who has
actually a written contract.
A resident, 10.01, it says someone
who typically lives in a manufactured home.
A tenant is someone who has a contract.
In fact, if you look at 32L(3), the next section,
it talks about choice of dealers
in purchasing a manufactured home by prospective resident.
There's a significant difference.
You cannot treat someone who visits the park
and does not become a resident.
If you look at the amicus brief
and the motion for reconsideration,
where the expert opinions of Webster Collins
about time of entry and Dr. St. John,
once you're in a park, you're a captive audience,
you have a contract, you live by rules and regulations,
there are restrictions.
There is an entire body of law
that pertains to someone who's a resident
that does not apply to non-residents, applicants.
It is a simple, significant difference.
And to otherwise interpret it that way
would be making an absurd result of the statute,
as Justice Lenk wrote in Commonwealth v. Morgan,
the court wants to avoid absurd results.
And in fact, you try to build a consensus
of a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
And that's what I think would require
in overturning the interpretation of Justice Edwards.
Question?
-: Any further questions?
You can sum up, Mr. Kraus, if you wish.
-: Yes, Justice Gaziano, as I've indicated,
I think that, based upon statutory interpretation
which this case falls under,
that this court has consistently,
consistently as a full bench,
and I point your attention to Lazlo v. Commonwealth.
What you're trying to do is understand the legislation
as a whole, to make it make sense.
You cannot treat applicants as residents.
You cannot otherwise treat them
as though they live in the park.
And if you look at that master lease, some would argue,
"Well, that was based upon a settlement agreement."
I suggest to the court very strongly that the interpretation
that was drawn in Section 11A is right on point.
It is a dissimilar class when someone
under that master lease came in
two years after its inception.
What the settlement was, is how much the rent
could go up and how many times it could increase
for that particular lot.
That was the terms of the settlement,
as provided in Section 11A.
It could go up 10% and it could change eight times,
eight times over the course of the 30 year master lease,
which by, incidentally, is expiring this December 31st.
It is clear, it is very clear that Judge Edwards
without any guidance, without any foundation,
without any standard interpreted the statute
in a way that just does not make sense.
And it is inconsistent with the regulations,
it's inconsistent with the findings of the Attorney General.
I commend you to read the letter of Daniel Less,
the assistant attorney general, who indicated yes,
it is absolutely, positively possible
that new residents would pay a higher rent.
Why, justice Kafker?
Because they came in at a different time,
under different circumstances,
with different market conditions.
The fact is if you're under your theory, Justice Kafker,
(stammering) your, your question,
someone who would came in 20 years later
would be paying the same amount as someone
who came in 20 years earlier,
it doesn't get it give any consideration
to increased costs, time of entry, CPI,
all the expenses that are associated and bundled
with a landlord-tenant relationship.
And I ask that you-
-: Can I ask one more question, Justice Gaziano?
Justice Gaziano: Certainly.
-: You have five year leases here, right?
You're required to enter into five year leases, Mr. Kraus?
-: At minimum, Justice Kafker, yes.
-: I take it, you could, 'cause I agree with you
that this is supposed to be fair
both to the owners of the community
as well as the owners of the units in the community,
but could they raise rents?
You enter into a five year lease,
but there's a progression in the amounts
that people have to pay over the,
you know, five year period,
and at the end of the five year period,
it's going to be renegotiated,
is that a way to providing an ability
to have a uniform increase in rents that apply
or is that prohibited somehow?
-: No, no, unless you're in a rent controlled community
and the rent control statutes,
there's usually six considerations,
all of which are based on time, except one.
Five consideration.
So for instance-
-: I understand time changes matters,
but I'm trying to make sense of both
the statute that requires uniformity
and your point about time.
And I could see then that the leases,
because they have to be five years,
would provide for increases during those five year periods.
And if you came in on the fourth year,
you'd start at that higher amount.
It just seems to me that there's no uniformity
when you can just, as soon as one person changes,
then everything is a free-for-all.
-: But Justice Kafker, I would commend you
to read that statute as a whole, because the language.
-: Yeah, I will do that.
-: Because remember it says that it creates
a rebuttable presumption that such rule
a change of rent is unfair.
And the court, the lower court, never reached
that consideration about fairness,
as you indicated, both to the landlord and to the tenant.
We are required under the statute
every time we amend, alter, renew our occupancy agreements
to offer at least a five-year tenancy
and that is based on a fair market rental rate,
which is, as the regulations indicate,
what a willing renter and a willing landlord enter into.
It's not confined by past numbers,
it's done by fairness and by market conditions.
And as you'll see in the declaration of Stephen Braun,
who is the co-president of Hometown America,
which is a nationally recognized and superlative operator,
they did a market analysis.
They determined that at that moment in time,
January 27th, 2006, when they purchased this community,
the rent should be $388, under market.
They could have raised everyone.
So the consequences of what you might interpret,
Justice Kafker, is that the rents will go up,
that they won't be stable, that everyone will not
get the benefit of the bargain of their time of entry,
and that, perhaps, may be the unfairest point of all.
-: Thank you, Mr. Kraus.
Mr. Kraus: Thank you, Justices.
-: Is it Takapi?
I'm sorry, I butchered your name, I apologize.
You have to unmute yourself then you can correct me.
(chuckling) I'm sorry, you have to unmute your microphone.
And the first thing you can do
is correct my mispronunciation of your name.
I apologize.
-: Good morning, Justice Gaziano, attorney Peter Tekippe
on behalf of the plaintiff and may it please the court.
This matter does involve the proper interpretation
of 140 32L(2) and the amount of damages
to be awarded under 93A.
The lower court properly interpreted 32L(2)
finding rent within a manufactured housing community
must be changed uniformly
amongst all residents of a similar class,
unless the park owner rebuts the presumption of unfairness.
Now the plaintiff's move for summary judgment
on the uniformity, similar class,
and rebuttable presumption issues,
arguing the $96 change in rent applied to the plaintiffs
violated the law, Hometown conceded
that all residents had similar lot sizes and services.
And their argument was that
the change of unit ownership alone
established a different class of residents.
They deliberately waived the rebuttal presumption issue,
arguing they did not need to rebut it.
The lower court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs,
finding that a change of ownership alone
did not establish a different class of residents.
Failing to address the burden-shifting
was a tactical error on the part of Hometown,
but after realizing the error moved for reconsideration.
They sought to provide new evidence,
not newly discovered evidence,
motion was opposed, heard, and denied by a written decision.
The court did not abuse its discretion.
What is an error of law is how the court awarded damages.
The plaintiffs were certified as a single class
and must remain a single class for the award of damages.
The violation of 32L(2) is a per se violation of 93A.
93A(9) allows any person injured
by Hometown's violation of law
to bring the action (speaking muffled).
The amount of damages is the additional rent paid
to Hometown, either 32L(2) or 93A
limits the recovery to a resident alone.
93A(9) further allows any person to bring the action
on behalf of themselves and other similarly injured persons.
Though in this case, each plaintiff represents
the interests of all the homeowners, residents, tenants,
and subtenants of a particular unit,
which must result in awarding damages on a per unit basis,
reducing damages by creating five subclasses
was an abuse of discretion in clear error of the law,
which will require remand.
On remand, damages must be recalculated on a per unit basis,
as Hometown continues to collect
the excess lot rent from the plaintiffs.
The order of the attorney's fees and costs
was required by 93A, the court did not abuse
its discretion in making that award.
And since this is an appeal under 93A,
the plaintiffs are further requesting
their appellate attorney fees and costs.
-: Can I ask how does, I mean, time matters,
so how does, someone who entered into a lease
four years afterwards is in a different position.
How do they, how does the owner
of the community itself adjust
for costs over time in your view?
What do they do?
'Cause they can't be frozen in time forever, right?
Or is that your argument that the initial amount
you pick is what you're stuck with forever?
-: Absolutely not, and I certainly agree
that there is a mechanism under 32L(2)
to raise rents over time,
and that's exactly what Hometown did here.
Now they bought the property in January of 2006,
but in June of 2006, they raised the rent park-wide,
for everyone in the park by $15.
And they've increased the rents every year
on June 1st through now.
What the difference is, is they found that
when they had a new owner come in,
that they charge this premium rent
you know, this extra $96, too.
They had a procedure in place were they were able
to increase rents over time for the existing residents
within the community at a fair and uniform level.
This was just something that they did
in addition to their annual increases in rent.
-: So your view is that's the way they increase
and take into account time is by these additional amounts
per year in the lease itself.
And that works, even though you've got five year leases
that are starting at different times?
It's not a problem?
-: Well, that's a interesting point
and 32P does require the park owner
to offer a five year lease at fair market,
but it doesn't require the resident to accept that offer.
They may have a situation where you have someone
that is under an existing five-year lease,
and maybe that's the consideration
for them having a different level of rent,
which brings in line with the ability
to rebut the presumption.
Now, the legislature gave the rebuttable presumption
to the park owner, so if you have, you know,
certain conditions in a park that apply,
and they can certainly use that
to rebut their presumption of unfairness
and demonstrate that it was something
that was done in accordance with 32L(2).
(microphones feedback)
Mr. Tekippe: Go ahead.
-: Oh, thank you.
On the issue of similar,
are the only two factors that really are at play
are services that are offered
and square footage of the lot?
-: Well, those are the two that were outlined
in the guide and two that were brought up
by Judge Edwards on his opinion below.
I don't think that the guide or Judge Edwards
or the Attorney General's letter limits it
to those two alone.
-: I'm curious as to what else would,
how else we would find similar,
so could you expand on that if possible?
-: Well, for instance, if there was, you know,
'cause this was a purchase of a park in 2006,
and obviously Hometown acquired all
of these residents from the previous owner.
So if there was a contract
with the previous owner for a certain amount of lot rent,
and they were contractually bound
to those one or several tenants,
that might be enough to put those
in a similar class of resident.
And again, bringing back in the rebuttable presumption,
if that were the case, then that is how Hometown
would be able to demonstrate that
they are in a dissimilar class, right?
They have something that they don't share
in common with the remainder of the group.
I think that the Attorney General's letter is
very clear that it does apply to new and existing residents.
And it's a fact specifically agreed that principally relates
to the lot sizes and the services received,
but I don't think it forecloses the ability
for a park owner to try and demonstrate
a dissimilar class by some of them.
-: There were other expenses, right.
that have to be exactly,
if they're capital improvements,
those have to be uniformly distributed, right?
Equally, right?
They can't be different amounts
for different tenants, right?
-: That is correct.
-: So there's other parts of the community have to be exactly
the same, other costs incurred by the community
have to be exactly the same,
besides (microphones interfere)?
-: That is correct.
-: Can you address the issue of the word resident?
Because it seems to complicate this class discussion,
because it would be simple, I guess,
if the statute said, you know, the lessor of the lot,
but it doesn't, it says the resident.
So does that justify what Judge Edwards,
the distinctions he drew,
because some of the people who rented the lot
are not residing in the manufactured home, right?
-: That's correct.
And so the term resident is not defined
in A through S inclusive, and without the benefit
of this definition, it should be its plain meaning.
But under 32A, the rest inclusive,
the words homeowner, resident, and tenant
have been used somewhat interchangeably.
And I would point to 32J which deals with summary process,
which uses the term homeowner, or person holding under him,
to describe who a part owner may evict.
And the final paragraph of 32J says a resident
who has been evicted from a manufactured housing community
shall have 120 days after such eviction
in which to sell the resident's manufactured home.
So it clearly uses the term resident in the context
of the homeowner or the person that's ultimately bound
to the park owner for the payment of lot rent.
You now have you correctly identified, in this case,
the issue of damages as it relates to residents,
I don't read 32L(2) to require that the resident
be the one that's awarded damages,
you have to have a resident for a violation of the law,
but 93A(9) allows any person to bring that claim forward
as long as they suffered actual damages.
So you look in the case of Mr. Harris,
who bought the manufactured home in Oakhill for his son,
did not charge his son rent, always paid the lot rent
to Hometown directly, and the court found
that he was entitled to damages.
Clearly he's not a resident under the CMR definition,
but he's ultimately the one that's bound to Hometown
for the payment of lot rent and he should be the one
that receives the benefit of the award.
-: Only people who have privity of contract, right,
are those who sign the agreement for the lot?
I'm just trying to understand how somebody else can sue.
They have no contractual relationship with the owner
of the community, right?
-: I agree and that's part of the argument
put forth in the brief is that the only person
that's contractually bound to be the person
that signed the occupancy agreement with Hometown,
the one that would be subject to an eviction under 32,
and so again, you have the term resident used
essentially to mean the person that's contractually bound
to Hometown for the payment of the lot rent.
-: And what is the precise, statutory language we're looking
at to determine who's entitled to damages?
What is the language in the manufactured home statute
that we should be reading?
-: So 32L(2) under 32L(7) is a per se violation
of 93A, so I-
-: Well, I get the 93A part.
I'm trying to understand how we interpret the word.
Is resident built into the statute for damage purposes.
Just, I'm confused by who the victim is here,
who the statute entitles payment,
because the person who owns the home may not be
the same person who rents the lot.
The person who rents the lot may not be
the same person who resides in the home.
So it's confusing and I'm trying to figure out
what the statute says on that particular point.
Now in 93A says, but what the manufactured home statute,
the language we're interpreting on that.
-: And again, I would point to the sections
that used, you know, resident, tenant,
and homeowner somewhat interchangeably.
Specifically 32J is one instance where,
it is used almost exclusively to represent
that the homeowner is the one that the park could evict
and that the resident is the one that
would have 120 days in which to sell resident's home.
So, you know, you have a specific example
where the term resident used basically
to describe the contractual relationship
with the park operator and who is ultimately bound
for the payment of lot rent.
-: So let's just do this for a second.
So I own the manufactured home,
but I'm letting my child, my adult child,
lives in that manufactured home,
who gets the damages here?
-: Well, it would be who's Hometown
collecting the lot rent from,
which is certainly easy to determine, right?
So if it's not a family relationship.
So it's Justice Cypher rented the lot
and she sublet it to me.
Even though I'm the one who's getting kicked out of here,
she's the one entitled to the damages, is that right?
-: As long as she's the one that was paying
the lot rent directly to Hometown.
I think that there's a subtenancy agreement-
-: Even though she's not a resident
by any normal meaning of the word, I'm the resident.
-: Correct, yeah.
So if Justice Cypher is the one
that's contractually bound to the payment of lot rent,
again, this is a violation of 32L(2),
which is a violation of 93A,
so if the violation is found,
Hometown discharges the liability by paying the damages
to the person that came forward
and it's up to that person to distribute the money.
You know, 'cause we're talking about rent
that was illegally collected over and above
what should have been.
-: But again, if Justice Gaziano owns the manufactured home,
he leases the manufactured home to Justice Cypher,
who then subleases it to me, in your view,
Justice Cypher is the only one who gets damages here.
And that's why, and Judge Edwards' division
of this into the three of us
was confusing and improper under the statute,
even though the statute uses the word resident,
-: I think it's confusing and improper
because under 93A, right?
And this was a 93A case where we sent out notice
to one person, that person represents the interest,
in this case Justice Gaziano would represent the interest
in Justice Cipher and Justice Kafker.
And if the award ultimately goes to Justice Gaziano,
it's for him to distribute
between Justice Cypher and Kafker if he chooses.
Justice Kafker: 93A can't determine who's,
who is responsible under this manufacturing home.
We've got to figure out who is owed damages
under the manufactured home statute, not under 93A.
93A is just because you violated this, I think, but again-
-: It's the actual damages, right?
And so finding the person that was obligated
to Hometown for the payment of lot rent
is the real, you know, consideration that needs to be made.
Once you have that determination made of
who was obligated to Hometown for the payment of lot rent,
then the award of damages should be on a per unit basis.
I don't think the sub classing,
which was done here specifically to, you know,
homeowners and people that, you know,
one person came forward, but they might've had a spouse.
I mean, I think it's particularly egregious
in those cases where, you know, you clearly
have one person that's coming forward representing
the interests of the entire home,
-: I have a question.
(Justice Gaziano acknowledges)
-: Yes, what was the,
do we know anything about the legislative purpose
of the statute that the
manufactured housing community law,
do we have anything in terms of legislative history
or anything about who was that they intended
to protect, the legislature intended to protect.
-: No direct legislative history,
very little case law on the subject, 32 A through S
have always been interpreted to provide comprehensive
and substantial rights to owners of manufactured homes.
That's cited by Danusis v. Longo from 1999
and the unique nature of housing
where the homeowner owns the unit
and rents the land upon which it rests.
And then you have the Layes v. RHP case
and between the Greenfield Estates says
both the legislature and the courts have interpreted
manufactured housing to provide a viable,
affordable housing option.
Many elderly persons, families of low and moderate income,
who are often lacking in resources,
deserving of legal protection,
but for actual statutory interpretation arguments,
as far as legislative history, there is very little.
-: All right, so we don't really know, then you're saying,
that whom the legislature intended to protect,
the residents, the owners, the lessors, the sublessees,
who did they intend to protect?
I mean, who's likely
to be the low income person here, the resident, right?
-: That's correct.
-: So this is intended to protect the resident,
and yet you say damages wouldn't go to the resident.
The damages would go to the owner.
-: Ultimately, the one that's responsible
for the payment of the lot rent.
And I think that's how residents should be interpreted
as part of the general reading of 32L(2),
and the use in A through S inclusive,
the terms resident, tenant, and homeowner
being used interchangeably.
-: Okay, thanks.
-: Right, thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Tekippe: Thank you, Your Honor.