Mr. Kenneally, if you'd call the fourth case please.
SJC-12961, Robert Malloy and another
v. Department of Corrections.
Thank you, and Ms. Greenberg.
Please, the court, I'm looking for Justice Kafka here
because he asked the right questions when I was here
in Buckman vs. Department of Corrections last year.
The reason people aren't being released
on day 66 is a practical matter
is because the Department is not preparing
the medical parole plans.
If medical parole plans were prepared,
the Department could release on the 66th day.
They're just not doing their job
and that brings us the problem that we have here.
In no case is the Department doing it.
And they're just not doing it.
Last year I said, I expressed my good faith
that if this court were to require the Department to do it,
the Department would.
The Department doesn't.
So that's why Mr. Malloy and Mr. Vinnie
were held past the 66 days.
There was really nowhere yet planned for them to go.
Now, what the Department is basically arguing here
is two things.
First they're saying that there is actually
no statutory limit on the time
that a person can be kept in custody
following a grant of medical parole.
That seems impossible.
I mean the whole medical parole statute
is explicitly time bound.
There's a calendar, day one to day 66.
The total contingent parole plan
is supposed to be done by day 21.
I'm in complete agreement with the Parole Board
who joins me on this.
It's supposed to be done.
Then they're supposed to check it
in-between day 22 to day whatever.
And after that time,
parole conditions are supposed to be set.
And the only-
Can I ask you a question about just procedurally?
So are you saying that the Commissioner
granted medical parole without a parole plan,
a medical parole plan being in place?
Yes.
Okay, well, so isn't that the problem?
I mean why were they granted parole
If there was no provisions for them, for their care
or for where they would stay?
I don't get that.
Because the Department has the obligation
to make the plan.
No, I understand that.
So how could the Commissioner make a decision
without having a plan?
It's just really foggy on all these cases.
I mean, some of the cases that I have on 24094 now,
the superior court sends it back to the Department
to make plans for in Jerry Adrey's case
which I appended the record to the reply.
The court sent it back to the Department
for plans four times.
In Abercrombie vs. Department of Corrections,
Judge Pasquale just sent it back
for the Department to make a plan.
In Prendergast vs. DOC,
they sent it back to the Department to make a plan.
That's because when the judges order release
they need to have a place to release to.
Would you just remind me were these cases
that happened pre-Buckman,
so that the Commissioner didn't or the DOC didn't do it
they didn't realize they were supposed to do it?
I have to veer a little bit off the record.
Buckman was decided January 20-some.
At that time, I had people with petitions pending
and also people who had already been denied.
And I reminded the Department that BucKman existed
and the Department took the position that they would not
prepare medical parole plans for people
whose petitions had already been acted on.
I filed new petitions
in order to have medical parole plans created.
But the medical parole plans that are created
by the Department say things like the guy
might wanna live with his sister.
They're not fleshed-out, medical parole plans.
And what the Department is saying is, basically,
what the Department is doing in the grants,
when it's granted, is they're basically shifting
to the Parole Department at the close
the obligation to find, set, confirm that, then
and they're holding onto the prisoner
until parole does the job that the Department
was supposed to do between zero and 21.
So then parole-
Well, according to Buckman, I'm sorry,
according to Buckman, isn't it supposed to be
a collaborative process where the DOC works
with the people who are assigned to the facility
and along with people like yourself
and a prisoner's family members to put together a plan?
I mean they may not always be the ones
with the most information about
what's available to the prisoner.
Judge, it's supposed to be, to this day not.
I'm sorry.
Oh, okay, so it's supposed to be collaborative,
that's what you're saying?
It's supposed to be collaborative
but the Department declines to collaborate.
And in this case, again,
with these two people here in this case,
were they granted the medical parole before
or after Buckman?
After.
Okay.
The Department of Corrections lists a whole,
I'm sorry, lists a whole litany of reasons
why they can't plan ahead of time.
But they're basically arguing.
I mean, my argument is two parts.
First of all, they have to
but what they're saying is, first, they don't have to.
And second of all, if they did have to they just can't,
because it's too hard to do.
Well, isn't it true or is it true that some places
that have beds won't say yes until the person
is granted medical parole, is that true?
Judge, some might, but many do.
And in fact, Farren Health Center,
which is one of those referenced does.
And so that's why, I think, we didn't receive any facts.
The Department is trying to argue these difficulties
by affidavit filed with it's brief.
If the court is going to decide that the Department
is excused from its job
because the job is just too hard to do,
then it needs to be set before a special master
or a single justice for an evidentiary hearing
on that topic.
They can't just say too hard to do, here's my affidavit.
Because we can test all those facts
and I made a motion to strike them.
Certainly for Mr. Vinnie and for Mr. Malloy,
where the Department is arguing
that there can't be an application
for out-of-state parole made until after
a defendant is granted medical parole.
That's simply untrue.
It's simply untrue in Mr. Vinnie's case
that there were outstanding warrants.
It's untrue that the Farren Health Center
won't evaluate you before a release date is granted.
In Mr. Adrey's case where I appended the record.
I'm sorry, I think I did or I'm happy to,
the Department spent five months
and a social worker for CPS did it in 72 hours,
found a place.
In Mr. Vasquez's case,
which the court can take judicial notice,
the Department spent four months
and made four phone calls during that time.
Can I pose a hypothetical view?
Remind me of the different timeframes,
'cause this was a very short, compressed time period,
what the Commissioner has to do
and what the Parole Board has to do
and it's within 66 days.
Go ahead, tell me quickly.
And then I'm gonna pose a question.
It's beautifully laid out
in the Parole Department brief.
The department makes a plan between zero and day 21,
and they must make a plan and you ordered them to do it.
It's a statute.
It's common law.
And what a plan is, is laid out
and it includes a home plan and includes,
and they have to make really contingent plans
because I know nobody knows where they're going.
So they could make three plans,
so that the guy can be ready on day 66.
Then parole takes over the plan-
So on day-
Parole checks the plan and sets the conditions.
So everything is ready to drop on day 66.
Okay, but the world doesn't,
I mean I'm familiar with the fact of these, too,
'cause I was a single justice and it's complicated.
But let me just talk you through a second.
So the critical factors are
we need this person to have a safe place to go,
'cause these are deathly ill people,
they need a place where they're gonna get
appropriate medical treatment
and a place to stay, right?
Right.
So they need healthcare, MassHealth needs to do
what it needs to do, right?
Right.
MassHealth needs to do something
and somebody needs to accept this person, right?
What happens if everyone does the best they possibly can
and those two things aren't in place, do we order them home?
What do we do?
'Cause we're concerned. I understand he's been found
no longer dangerous, no longer a safety issue,
but he's a danger to himself
if he's not properly cared for and protected.
So if things don't work out, what do we do?
Do we leave him with you?
Let me give you a variety of answers.
Well, but I'd like you to accept the hypothetical
that sometimes we do the best we can and we don't succeed.
Okay, I've accepted-
So what's gonna happen on day 66 if that happened?
Several possibilities.
Okay, one is in a case where the defendant
did not want to be released
because of a risk to himself,
there exists the possibility of waiver.
Second, as in the brief filed by PLS on this question
the state hospital could take somebody,
they're obligated to under the statute.
It's a great brief by PLS.
So that's an option for us.
So if, again, we do the best we can and we don't succeed,
we can just order the person to the state hospital?
Yes, in the interim, it wouldn't release,
I mean what the Department is trying to do here,
basically, is not do its job because the department
could set up contingency plans.
Just like a person would for their father.
If he's this sick, he'll go to Aunt Rachel in Riverdale.
If he's sicker than that, he'll go to the Hebrew Home.
Ms. Greenberg, Ms. Greenberg,
having dealt with this myself, it's not easy.
I know that, but I do wanna say that last year,
last year, the Department argued.
I mean this is what's called in British media,
reversed ferret arguing.
The department argued last year
that this was so easy that the blind and deaf could do it
without the ability to make collect phone calls.
It's not that hard.
And when you do contingent planning,
that's what I'm trying to express, it's less hard.
So that where the department has passed regulations
which are entirely ultra vires saying
that the Department can just wait as long as they want to
while, parole gets around to applying
for out-of-state parole.
The default position is custody.
That's not doing their job.
The default position is a plan in Massachusetts
while waiting for out-of-state parole.
The default plan is not he's safe.
You know he's fine, he's qualified,
but we're just gonna keep him in prison
an extra month and a half,
because we don't wanna make a four week plan
and the three month plan, they have to make two plans.
That's what you do for your dad
and it's what they should be doing for the prisoners.
Two plans, maybe even three plans.
'Cause what we're seeing is the Department
is applying to places one at a time.
We don't do that for college.
So what I'm saying and we're not seeing collaboration
even now on cases where the Department has ordered
to create a real parole plan by the superior courts,
the Department is refusing to collaborate.
So we're not seeing it.
We're just, in practice, the Department
has to be held to its duty by day 21.
And then we have to fix mistakes of fact
between day 21 and day 66, they have to work with us
and then we could.
They can't just say that the default position
for a person entitled to release is prison.
It's not what the legislature said.
The legislature said, get to work and find them somebody.
And I'm going to echo back again,
it's tremendously expensive.
It's $300,000 for a very sick prisoner to be maintained
in the Department of Corrections.
There's no private-paying nursing home that costs that.
They could have a contingent release to first available,
MassHealth rest home and the public fisc-
Ms. Greenberg, again, actually it seems like Farren,
everyone keeps coming back to Farren.
How many, you know you've been doing this,
how many of the nursing homes are taking people like this?
'Cause it seems like we don't have
a unlimited number of options.
We have very few of these places
that are willing to take sex offenders
and first degree murderers.
It's not correct.
This is-
Okay what is your, based on the record
what is your record that we turn to
for how many options there are like that?
Just in generalities,
I find this thing much easier
than when we actually look at facts here.
So tell me in the record how many places
take first degree murderers and repeat sex offenders
like we're dealing with here?
Judge, the House of Hope in New Bedford,
accepted Mr. Audrey within 72 hours.
And he is, what was-
He's a second degree murderer.
They have expressed their willingness
to accept Terry Abercrombie who is a sex offender,
following a manslaughter conviction
and they have expressed their willingness to do that.
The House of Hope has accepted parolees
till way before I heard them.
Parole is intimately familiar with the organization.
That's only one.
For Mr. Adrey, who has convicted a second-degree murder,
we found four places within three days.
Can I quick, could you clarify something
for me, Ms. Greenberg?
Yeah.
You had mentioned the state hospital.
So you're referring to the non-secure section
of Shattuck, correct?
I am.
The Department, I'm sorry, Prisoners' Legal services
has briefed DPH as a last resort,
but certainly the Shattuck for hospitalized patients,
a hospitalized patient can go
to the free side of the Shattuck, yeah.
And your position is even in a situation of last resort,
there's always that possibility other than jail?
I can't testify with certainty
as to bed availability at the Shattuck.
Right, I was gonna ask you that about the capacity,
but that might be outside- I can't.
These are fact-bound questions.
I wouldn't expect this court at this time
without a fact basis to say this job is too hard
for the Department of Corrections to do.
Which is why you urge a master or some type of remand.
Right, but frankly, I don't think that's the problem
because with more money they could do it.
Are you, are you- Go ahead.
Are you also asking us to rule
that 66 days is 66 days, that they are out?
Yes.
Even though we have all this factual uncertainty
out there, 66 days being 66 days
and they go, no matter what?
That's your position, right?
Absent a waiver, because they can always go
to a DPH facility under the statute, briefed by PLS.
There is nobody with nowhere to go.
They can go to DPH.
The statute provides for that when a person is sick.
I'm sorry for not immediately coming to the number,
please look at the PLS brief.
Or they can go, if they were taken out,
a hospitalized person and wheeled to the Brigham,
the Brigham would be obliged to accept them.
And then they could die free at the Brigham.
All they need is outpatient MassHealth.
They could just trundle them over,
the Brigham would be obliged to take them
and the Commonwealth would not be obligated to pay
for four armed guards-
I'm confused by that.
They're gonna take them to the emergency room at Brigham
and say, here, he's your problem.
Is that really a solution?
Is that really what you want to have happen
that we're gonna drop them at the teaching hospitals,
just at their front door and put them in the emergency room.
That can't be what-
Judge, I'm not suggesting that's optimum.
I'm suggesting that the Department do its job.
Do its job as the statute requires them to do
and from which the court can't excuse them
on the argument that they're finding it a little tricky.
They have $800,000 in their budget for reentry planning.
Every hospital in Massachusetts does reentry planning.
Every nursing home does reentry planning
and somehow they manage it.
The only people who can't manage reentry planning
is the Department of Corrections
and that's because they don't want to.
Thank you Ms. Greenberg, any further questions?
All right, thank you.
Mr. Gaskill.
Thank you, Your honor, Your Honors.
Good morning. I'm here with Darcy Curry,
who is my co-counsel on this
and I just wanted to take a moment to thank her
for all her efforts in the brief
and in helping me prepare for this oral argument.
What we have here, just as we had before,
are two distinct questions irrespective
of any individual inmate
and they're not about the extent
of the Commissioner's discretion
and they're not about who was eligible for medical parole.
They're about what happens after that becomes a certainty.
After the Commissioner has agreed
that this person is entitled to medical parole,
is eligible for medical parole.
And in answering the first question,
I would say that the statute is silent as to who is required
to find the suitable home placement
and silent as to the timing of such efforts.
Wait a minute, can I ask you a question?
I understand what the statute says,
but if you keep Buckman if you take that into consideration,
is it not true that the DOC
is supposed to work collaboratively with people
who are assigned to the facility and with the prisoner
and the prisoner's counsel and all of that
to put together a plan?
Absolutely.
Including a place to live?
Including a place to live
and that is a plan and it's a proposal plan.
But as everyone who's ever made plans know,
plans don't always come to fruition the way
that they thought that they would.
There's no denial here that the Department is responsible
for submitting a proposed home placement,
but that home placement is proposed and not finalized.
And I think that's the distinction here
that needs to be made.
There's a difference between securing a home plan,
finalizing a home plan and proposing a home plan.
And 17.09 of the control in EOPSS regulation
does provide a mechanism where a decision looks likely
that the Commissioner will grant a medical parole.
She refers the petition,
including the Superintendent's recommendation
and the proposed home plan
and proposed overall medical plan to the Parole Board
for further investigation
and to set the terms and conditions of parole.
17.11 also allows the Commissioner
to set separate conditions
before the release on medical parole.
And that is where the authority here is to say
we would grant this inmate medical parole,
the Commissioner has determined him
eligible for medical parole
but he simply doesn't have a place to go at the moment.
The Commissioner will grant grant medical parole
and allow for medical parole release to occur
upon the securement of a home plan.
And that is the best plan or the best operation
of how to satisfy the legislative intent.
The legislative intent would absolutely not be
for the Commissioner to say he's otherwise eligible
but he doesn't have anywhere to go.
So he's denied medical parole.
That is- But shouldn't
the Commissioner be monitoring the entire system
for availability ahead of time?
I'm confused by this idea that, I mean obviously,
the legislature wants these people released
so that they can die at home or die out of prison.
It doesn't seem to make sense to me
that we're waiting to the tail end of this
went it's a system-wide problem.
I mean, just dealing with Ms. Greenberg's clients
there's a flow of them continuously
going through the system.
Shouldn't there be continuous monitoring
of openings out there so when this actually happens
okay, this is a bed that will accept sex offenders.
This is a bed that will accept murderers
so that we don't start over on day 59.
I mean, we don't start the actual MassHealth process.
Maybe that's more complicated,
but we don't at least look for the bed
after everything's decided.
No, absolutely, Your Honor.
And it's not that we don't look for the bed,
but as reported on our brief and from information received,
a majority of facilities will not even begin
to consider whether somebody was acceptable for that bed
that you just discussed, before there has been
a grant of medical parole.
So it's a chicken and the egg situation.
Why is that?
Why isn't it a criteria-based decision whether someone,
I mean is it a necessarily individualized decision?
And that's why it's not a criteria-based decision.
This is a person who needs intensive care
and as a sex offender or this is a person who is a murderer
and needs 24 hour monitoring.
I'm just confused by that.
I think it's both.
It's both a criteria, as we have had facilities report
certain classes of former inmates
and based on certain convictions will not be allowed
to be admitted regardless, that's a blanket ban,
But then it also is an absolutely,
individualized evaluation process.
And most of the time from what we've heard from facilities
is they won't even begin that evaluation
until a grant of medical parole has occurred.
So again, we could propose the Farren Center
and the Farren Center is where a number of inmates
have gone, but it's a proposal
and the Farren Center will only start considering
after a grant of medical parole.
And I'd just like to speak to your earlier question.
It's not that we're waiting until the last,
you know, day 59, day 60.
The regulation does allow for when
or does require the Commissioner to transmit
the entirety of the petition,
including any proposed home plans to the Parole Board
within 30 days of receipt
from the Superintendent's recommendation.
And so that would allow the Commissioner
to have had an initial look at it.
She determined that release looks likely
and she wants to begin the process as soon as possible.
And that kind of jumps into the second question here
that the statutory and regulatory scheme in this case
don't prescribe that the 66 days applies to release.
The 66 days-
Can I talk to you here?
I've heard a lot about the regulatory scheme here
and I would like to know 'cause I'm a little confused
about this.
Was the regulatory scheme one that was in place
at the time of Buckman?
Have we ever ruled on this regulatory scheme?
Is this regulatory scheme that you're relying upon
something that we are to review in the context
of this litigation or, because I hear Ms. Greenberg
referring to this as ultra vires regulation.
And I'm just curious about the dates
and whether or not we've passed on it
and whether or not it's up for review
because as ultra vires, now?
So the regulatory scheme was adjusted
following the Buckman decision, it has been promulgated.
The specific regulations related to this procedure
in terms of release and the transfer to the Parole Board
were not part of the sections that were deemed invalid
in the Buckman decision.
So those are the-
Had they been addressed in Buckman?
They weren't specifically addressed in Buckman, no.
Okay, so they've never been addressed by us,
in other words.
You're saying in an encompassing way they must've been,
because we didn't say anything about them in Buckman,
but that's sort of a negative implication.
We've never really, in fact, addressed them.
Absolutely, and these regulations,
there's nothing in the regulation that specifically says
the Commissioner may hold indefinitely and the Commissioner
and the Department as a whole understands
the legislative intent here was very much influenced
by the speed in which the inmate would be released.
Obviously, the timeline was set in an effort
to get them released as soon as possible,
but more important than the speed here
is the legislative intent.
And, Justice Kafker, you brought it up
that the legislative intent for the medical care
for these inmates and for the public safety and welfare,
because it doesn't serve the public safety
or welfare to release them to the street,
especially, when given the fact
that they've been granted medical parole,
they have significant medical concerns
and it certainly doesn't serve their interest
in being released to the street.
Well, wait-wait-wait a minute,
I don't think she's saying
that she's gonna release them to the street.
I don't think that that's the alternative at all
that she's suggesting is the possibility.
But there's always the possibility of some other place,
it may not be ideal, but it's not the streets.
I would argue that in some inmates cases
there's not a possibility of another place.
What about the state hospital?
The state hospitals,
so the regulation relied on there is Chapter 151,
Section One or sorry, Chapter 127, Section 151.
In reading the statute the language is clear that
that obligation only kicks in
at the expiration of a sentence.
And the expiration of a sentence is not as discussed
in the previous matter is not while somebody
still is on medical parole,
the sentence has not expired.
And for those who have been convicted of life sentences,
their sentence essentially it never expires.
As a further matter, this was not brought up,
raised by any party here.
Obviously PLS has raised it, but we can't speak for DPH.
DPH is not a party to this case and-
But you're saying, you are affirmatively saying
that the streets are the alternative.
You're affirmatively saying something aren't you?
You're not saying just that this subject is verboten,
it's outside of our...
You're saying something that is, in fact,
factually determinable, right?
I apologize, if I misspoke.
I didn't mean to say that the answer
is actually the streets.
I more meant to say that the alternative
would potentially be homelessness for some inmates
who haven't been able to find placement
but we do place within the DPH system.
The DPH system has accepted one inmate
and it's on a case by case basis.
And even that's, the statute of Section 151,
at most, I think that would require DPH to consider
these inmates on a case to case basis.
Because again, they might not be the best facility to allow
for them to allow for the treatment of that inmate.
And I do just wanna briefly address
beyond the two questions that were reported here,
Justice Kafka requested a series of factual information.
I do apologize, but the clock seems to have left my screen.
Oh, I see it now.
Thank you.
You're overtime, so sum up.
Okay, so very quickly a number of inmates
have been released.
And if you look at the statistical average
of the inmates outside of a few outliers,
this is a process that is working similar to that of parole.
And I would just hope that the brief is
and the statistics that were provided by the reentry efforts
were duly considered and the fact that this is working.
It's just some inmates take longer than others.
Thank you, Your Honors.
Thank you, Mr. Gaskill.
Mr. Ravitz.
Thank you, Randall Ravitz for the parole board.
The medical parole statute and regulation
should be construed in a way that furthers
the various goals of the legislature
and is consistent with reason and common sense.
While the scheme presents substantial challenges
the Parole Board is committed to fulfilling
its own obligations within the process.
In answer to the reported questions,
the scheme contemplates that officials will identify
and investigate placement options within the 66 days
leading up to the deadline for the Commissioner's decision.
It assigns certain tasks, Parole Board
prior to that deadline, but no role for the Parole Board
in finding a placement after that deadline.
Of course, there may be some cases
where despite best efforts locating a suitable placement
simply proves impossible.
And in those cases, the DOC Commissioner
could rationally conclude that she cannot find
the statutory standard met.
But if the Commissioner does determine
that the standard is met,
then officials should generally act
with reasonable promptness to affect the prisoner's release.
That is after a short period of time
for the statutory notification process.
After all, expedition was clearly
one of the legislature's goals
as this court recognized in Buckman.
At the same time, expedition was not
the legislature's only goal,
there were clearly others.
Among them were furthering the health and safety interests
of the prisoner and the public,
ensuring adequate financial coverage,
ensuring that released prisoners will comply with the law
and be adequately supervised in compassion.
And in circumstances where expedition
would not further the legislature's goals
and may even be in derogation of certain goals,
a reasonable postponement of release
should not be entirely foreclosed.
To be clear, we are not arguing
that release could be postponed infinitely,
as has been suggested or simply at the whim of DOC.
We are largely just encouraging the court
not to adopt a rule providing the DOC
must release someone immediately in every case,
even if it would be in derogation of the legislator's goals.
So I can entertain any questions from the court.
And if there are none, then we will rest on our brief.
I think Justice Kafka has a question.
He's unmuting now.
And I'm on unmute, too.
So go ahead.
I'm trying and that sounds great in the abstract,
what you just said.
I'm just trying to understand though, what it means.
What potential justifications would there be
for going beyond the 66 days?
That the placement hasn't been identified?
That it's not a good placement?
I'm just trying to get a sense of that
Right, let's say that the 66 day deadline is approaching
and we just have no idea.
I should say DOC just has no idea
where this person is going to go.
DOC, the Commissioner would certainly be
within its discretion exercising its discretion
appropriately to deny release
if the Commissioner can't reasonably
find the statutory standard to be met.
But let's say we're approaching the 66 day deadline
and everything seems to be in place.
We're just waiting on one little detail
to be dealt with.
We're waiting on, let's say a form to be signed.
Let's say that detail is that the best place
it's the Farren Center
but they wanna do an individualized determination.
And they're not sure they're gonna have a bed.
They may have a bed.
DPH isn't a great solution.
So can you just keep them there for months
or how does it work?
You know I'm just, again, I understand hard and fast rules
present problems in something this complex,
but I'm just trying to get a sense
of how we put teeth and meaningful standards in place
that both sides can live with.
Well, if DOC is essentially saying
we can't release this person until this qualification is met
because it would be contrary to the public interest
and contrary to the safety and the health of this prisoner,
then the question becomes so then how can
the statutory standard be found met?
And if the statutory standard is found met
then release should be affected,
as we say, with reasonable promptness.
Now let's say though that something happens,
the placement is lined up,
the facility, everything is in place
and then the facility closes its doors,
goes out of business.
Then the statute read literally, would would still say
that the person needs to be released,
but it would seem to be in derogation
of the legislature's goals
for the person to be released immediately
where it would endanger them,
maybe endanger the public.
So there it would be consistent
with the legislature's intent for there to be
a reasonable postponement.
But the trouble is the reasonableness
is in the eye of the beholder, isn't it?
Yes, I mean, quite honestly
adopting a reasonableness standard I think has benefits,
because all these situations are unique,
they're unusual, the statute is still new.
But, yeah, it's the kind of thing
where it's gonna result in challenges
and we're all going to have to figure out
what reasonableness means,
but that's true with any reasonableness standard in the law.
And it's applied in other situations
and it's just something that-
Where did the 66 come from?
I'm sorry?
Where did the number 66 come from?
It seems like a particularly unusual number.
Right, right.
It results from the addition of, excuse me,
21 and, I'm sorry, 21 and 45.
So it's the 21 days between the petition
and the Superintendent or sheriff sending a recommendation
and the other materials to the Commissioner
and the 45 days after the Commissioner receives a petition
from the Superintendent or sheriff
and then has to issue a decision.
So that's how we get the 66.
Mr. Ravitz, is it too simplistic
to have a fail-safe in that if everything goes haywire
and the plans don't go right the person could get released
to the non-secure side of Shattuck
or have some other place to go,
other than the street or being held
and continue to be held in custody?
Well, the brings to mind the argument
that's put forth by Prisoners' Legal Services
that some people have have referred to
and that the statute there, Chapter 127,
Section 151 it's tempting
and it looks like it provides a solution,
but there's some questions there about
whether it would really apply,
because it begins with the words
when a prisoner at the expiration of his sentence as-
No, I'm not talking about the statute.
I know there's a statute and that could be disputed.
But if, we say 66 days being 66 days
and the person has to be released, is it too simplistic?
Or is it desirable to have some type of fail-safe
to say rather than keep the person in prison
or kick them out on the front steps of Cedar Junction,
you can go to the Shattuck or some other place.
That would be a solution.
And that would seem to be consistent
with what the legislature intended.
As opposed to having it be the continuation of custody
as the before position.
Right.
How many beds are at Shattuck?
How many beds are we talking about?
I'm sorry I don't know the answer to that.
Okay, 'cause you know the idea
that there's a fail-safe-
Right, and that's why I asked if it was too simplistic
and perhaps counsel could supplement
the record with this information.
If a-
That's the danger of simplistic solutions sometimes
I guess, but maybe you'll tell us otherwise.
Okay, if there are no other questions from the court?
Thank you, Mr. Ravitz.
Thank you.
Again, we'll take five minutes.
We'll set up the next case, please.