Moderator: This is SJC-12981,
Commonwealth v. Douglas Steeves, Jr.
-: Thank you.
Attorney Maidman, we're ready for you.
-: Okay. thank you.
Good morning and may it please the court,
Steven Maidman for Defendant Douglas Steeves, Jr.
I'd like to use my time to address the primary issue
in the case involving the doctrine of verbal completeness.
And to the extent that there's remaining time
for your questions,
I'll be happy to address those issues as well.
This case is all about the doctrine of verbal completeness.
The defendant gave a statement to the police
when he walked into the police station.
And then he gave a 40-minute interview
with the police afterwards.
The defendant was attempting to get the portions
of the recorded interview into evidence.
The judge declined.
And the Commonwealth obviously knew that
this was an important piece.
It potentially established a manslaughter defense.
And the Commonwealth used the rules of evidence
to keep that evidence out.
And they were successful.
-: Counsel, I gotta call you on that.
They didn't do anything but object
according to our rules of evidence.
And the trial judge applied our existing rule
on the rule of completeness.
So it's not as if they didn't do anything
that they're allowed to do
and the judge didn't make a decision that is consonant
with our rules of evidence and what we've said before.
So the question I have to you is:
Are you conceding that this was a proper application
of the way the rule is now?
And are you saying we need to just abandon that rule
and embrace the federal rule?
-: Yes to the extent that the trial judge
and the Commonwealth argued
that it was a single conversation.
The argument can be made
that it was a single conversation
because the recorded interview occurred three hours later
and it involved the same subject matter.
But yes, I would argue that the court
needs to update its rules of evidence
involving the doctrine of verbal completeness.
That certainly in this particular case,
applying the Massachusetts rules, which have been around
for many years and are well established,
resulted in the defendant being forced to testify
and I would argue in violation
of his Fifth Amendment rights.
There were due process issues there,
and there's the denial of a meaningful opportunity
to present a complete defense.
I would absolutely agree with you, Justice.
-: Do the rules of evidence apply to defense?
-: Do the rules of evidence apply to the feds?
Sure, the federal rules of evidence apply to the feds.
-: No, to the defense?
-: Sure, yes.
-: Okay, in that case,
since you answered Justice Gaziano's question, right.
Justice Gaziano, you don't have anything else.
Can you explain to me what benefit your client would get
if we dropped all our rules of evidence, or just this one,
and applied the federal rule?
-: Yes.
For one thing, if that statement hadn't been admissible,
at least there,
the argument that he was compelled
to testify probably would've evaporated.
Because evidence would've come in.
It was a conversation three hours later,
same subject matter, used to elaborate, contextualize,
whatever word you'd like to use,
what he said to the police when he walked
into the police station and said,
"I just killed my wife."
-: What limits are there on the federal rule
with regard to the timeframe?
-: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
Could you repeat that? I didn't hear you.
-: Sure.
What limits are there with regard to the federal...
They must put some limit on the timeframe.
Or is it just any time you talk about the same thing?
-: Well, there's one case that I cite in my brief
that said that the conversation occurred three weeks later.
So I don't think they put a timeline on it.
What they do is they say,
"in fairness ought to be admitted."
It's a fairness issue. -: What case was that?
Counsel, which case was that?
-: It was United States versus Giles, Seventh Circuit.
It's on my brief at page 44.
-: [Justice Wendlandt] Thank you.
-: Mr. Maidman, don't we already have an exception
for extraordinary circumstances for hearsay?
-: Well, not that I'm familiar with.
But I'm sure that an argument can be made if it...
-: Justice Georges is gonna give us the number
of the Mass rule, I think.
So we have an exception. Was that argued at trial?
-: No.
No, that didn't come up.
The entire discussion involved the doctrine
of verbal completeness.
And there was separate discussions
about whether it should be admitted,
as admissions of whether the defendant's recorded statement
could be admitted by the defendant
as an admission of a party opponent.
But then there were some other things which were less...
Yes?
-: Counsel, to Justice Gaziano's point,
both the feds and Massachusetts
have a residual hearsay clause.
And the reason why this is important is you mentioned
all of these constitutionally implicated rights
if he were not able to get that statement in.
And these are the types of instances
that 807 under the feds, or here,
these are the types of instances where that is used,
where you say: I've got this constitutional right
to present a defense.
And there's no other rule that somehow fits here.
And therefore, you should let this in
because it's really, really important
to my presentation of my defense.
That wasn't argued here.
But the fundamental part that I have the problem with is
even under the cognate provisions
of 106 in the federal side,
it's still subject to whether or not the trial judge finds
that in fairness this other statement ought to come in.
So even if we had recognized this,
didn't Judge Lang make it clear
that he didn't think that it was fair
to allow these portions of this recorded statement later on
that were completely self-serving to the defendant,
that he already made a threshold finding
that it wouldn't be fair to admit this in any event.
Not only was it not part of the initial conversation,
but it wouldn't be fair to admit this in any event.
-: Your Honor, I don't recall that being in the record.
There was certainly nothing about the residual exception
to the hearsay rule. That I'm sure of.
Otherwise, I would've addressed it in my brief.
And I don't recall a discussion
about whether it would be self-serving.
I know the Commonwealth raised that in their brief,
but I don't recall that either.
This was strictly
a doctrine of verbal completeness discussion
and a discussion about whether it could come in
as admission of a party opponent.
That's my recollection, Your Honor.
-: Mr. Maidman, doesn't this happen all the time
in self defense cases where we...
You know, the defendant doesn't have to testify
to get self defense.
It's any evidence.
And sometimes there's surrounding factors
which will give you the self defense instruction.
But oftentimes, when people are alone in rooms,
the only way it's gonna come in
is if the defendant gets on the witness stand.
So why is this case extraordinary?
-: Justice Gaziano, the evidence to establish
a manslaughter defense would not have come in
unless he testified.
-: But take a hypothetical.
You know, it's a self defense claim.
Two people alone in a room, and the defendant wants to say,
"Well, he came at me and I get self defense."
Sometimes when there are witnesses
and we've had cases where, you know,
there's surrounding circumstances, you get self defense.
And the defendant doesn't have
to take the risk of testifying.
But oftentimes, when there's no other witnesses,
if you want self defense,
you gotta get on the witness stand.
I don't know how this is extraordinary.
-: Well, for one thing, it forced him to testify.
And that's the extraordinary part.
And if you take a look at that-
-: Same as my hypothetical.
You're forced to testify to get self defense.
-: If you examine the Commonwealth's
evidentiary presentation, they were very, very brief
about what he said at the police station.
It certainly was none of the material
that explained what this was all about.
He literally walked into the police station and said,
"I murdered my wife."
-: But that's kind of what he did though.
I agree it was incredibly tactical by the Commonwealth,
that they didn't have to put anything
other than that statement in.
I agree with you that they used the rules of evidence
to their advantage as would any defense attorney.
-: Yes, but that also raises the constitutional question
about whether this denied him,
whether it forced him to testify.
This was exculpatory evidence.
-: Right, and you got it in discovery, right?
-: Oh yes, yes, yes, yes, I have the video.
But it was exculpatory evidence.
And to deny the defendant the opportunity
to present exculpatory evidence to a jury,
that raises due process concerns.
And let me add one other point.
Talk about arbitrary mechanicalistically using-
-: Can you tell me a case other than discovery
where this court or any court has said
the defendant has an absolute right
to present exculpatory evidence to the jury,
notwithstanding the rules of evidence?
-: No, certainly not off the top of my head, I can't.
On the other hand, it certainly would seem to raise
a due process issue.
And, I understand what you're saying, Your Honor.
But nonetheless,
in terms of the totality of the circumstances,
this was exculpatory evidence
that would not have reached the jury
but for the fact the defendant testified.
And this was an arbitrary use of the rules of evidence.
It's clear that that's what the law in Massachusetts
has been for many years.
And this was the same evidence
that was good enough for the Commonwealth,
was basically not available to the defendant.
And that, I would suggest,
raises due process concerns,
certainly fairness concerns.
-: Well, Counsel, you just used the word
and I just wanna make sure that we're on the same page.
Is the test arbitrary and capricious?
Or is the test abuse of discretion?
Because you just said it was an arbitrary use
of the rules of evidence.
And it seems to me it was a proper application.
And is our aperture
just an abuse of discretion by the trial judge?
Or is it something different?
-: I think it's something well beyond an abuse of discretion.
It raises a constitutional issue.
And what I was referring to was a rule of evidence
that was applied arbitrarily,
particularly where the same evidence
that was good enough for the government
could not be used by the defendant.
I don't think-
-: With respect to the brief citation
that you did on the federal side,
do you have any state court case
out from our jurisdiction's authority
that would say that this is all the same conversation?
-: No, I don't.
I don't. And I looked for it.
I looked.
I did basically a nationwide search on all this,
and I gave you all the cases that I could find.
There isn't any.
And I asked myself that question.
And the only explanation I could come up with
was the typical case that arises that we've seen
is the government introduces a confession.
The defendant wants other parts
of the confession introduced.
That's the typical case.
That's not what happened here.
This was essentially the same issue,
the same subject matter,
what happened when he strangled his wife.
That was kept out.
But no, you're right.
There are no cases on that.
I looked.
And I don't think the Commonwealth cited any either.
-: This idea of the same subject matter test
that you're positing is not supported by the case law
is what you're saying.
-: Well, it is, but it has to be the same conversation,
quote unquote, same conversation.
-: Yeah, so a different conversation in a different room
by two different detectives doesn't meet that definition.
-: That's what the judge essentially ruled.
-: It's also consistent with the case law?
-: Yes, to the extent there are no cases.
-: But you haven't found anything otherwise?
-: No, Your Honor, I looked and I couldn't.
And I don't think the Commonwealth cited anything either.
So I don't think you're gonna find that in their brief.
And I did look.
-: [Justice Wendlandt] Thank you.
-: Well, unless there are any other questions,
let me briefly touch on my other issues
in my remaining time.
Jury impanelment issues, very briefly on those.
There were two of 'em.
The defendant asked for a preliminary instruction
to the jury venire
to say that there were mitigating circumstances.
The judge exercised his discretion and denied it.
That should have happened under these particular cases,
particular situation.
There could have been people in the venire
who absolutely refused to accept mitigating circumstances,
just like self defense or lack of criminal responsibility.
And the judge denied that.
The second impanelment issue, I thought was very unusual.
The defendant asked a potential juror:
"What was your college degree in?"
And the judge let him ask the question.
And the defendant accepted the juror.
And then afterwards, the judge is basically warning him,
"Don't ask that question again."
The question was completely innocuous.
And the judge also said, "The purpose of attorney voir dire
"is not to help you in formulating peremptory challenges."
And there's at least one Supreme Court case that says
there are two purposes to jury voir dire:
number one, to weed out bias;
number two, to assist attorneys in-
-: Counselor, what's the connection
between having a bachelor's degree and bias?
-: I'm not sure there is one.
But it certainly does provides background
in terms of informing a lawyer about the potential juror.
Certainly, there was nothing in terms of
arguing the facts of the case or anything like that.
-: Mr. Maidman, I think I agree with you
that, you know, that the purpose of gathering information
is to help with peremptory challenges.
I'm on board with that.
But could this be because we have attorney voir dire,
the judge is basically saying let's move on.
We're not gonna get into what newspapers do you read?
What's the degree in?
Were you a Russian literature versus a pottery major?
You know, let's move this on.
-: Justice Gaziano, I understand what you're saying,
but I think this was more than that.
And if you take a look at the transcript, you'll see.
He was very serious.
He basically said you can only ask questions
that affect implicit bias, okay.
Nothing about informative.
That's why the legislature created attorney voir dire.
-: Well, I don't know about that.
But the civil bar created attorney voir dire.
(chuckles) But anyway, putting that aside,
is that reversible though?
If the judge was wrong about the purposes of voir dire,
does that make this a reversible error?
-: Well, it certainly chilled the jury voir dire
for the rest of the impanelment.
And I'll leave it at that.
-: Can you give me a flavor of how robust
the attorney voir dire was thereafter or not?
-: I would think it's certainly not compared to a civil case.
And I think it really chilled the whole thing,
quite frankly.
If you take a look at the transcript,
you'll see Attorney Buso, who I'm sure some of you know,
he was taken aback by this.
I was when I read the transcript, and I think you will, too.
It was very unusual.
Let's put it like that.
Let me briefly address the other two issues in the case:
the text messages to the defendant's girlfriend
and a letter three years later to the girlfriend.
That one, the judge, again,
this was one where it was an abuse of discretion issue.
He let in the text messages, which were rather salacious.
They were embarrassing, and yet very hard pressed
to say what they had to do with what the defendant
was thinking at the moment he killed his wife.
But they came in.
And I would argue the probative value certainly
was a lot less than the prejudice to the defendant.
It clearly affected the tenor of the case.
And the letter that was written,
I think it's in both appendices.
Or at least it was in mine anyway.
It was basically a very angry letter
to his former girlfriend.
And it was at least his thinking three years later
about who made the phone call.
Okay, it was three years later.
I mean, how that is relevant
to what he was thinking at the time,
his state of mind at the time he strangled her
is certainly questionable.
Finally, the improper cross examination by the prosecutor.
All three questions you'll see in my brief
were objected to, was outright harassment.
It didn't add any value to the case
about whether he's a hypocrite or not,
especially whether he was a hypocrite in his dating,
you know, before the murder.
Let me just use my last few seconds to say that
this is a case that needs to be examined under 33E.
This was a manslaughter case from the beginning.
Because the defendant was forced to testify,
everything else came in.
And let me just add, I didn't say this before.
The argument is: Could the defendant
have repaired the damage by not letting it in?
There's a big difference between watching a videotape
and what would be considered the defendant's
quote unquote self-serving statements made
I think when you examine it.
So with all that, I would ask the court
to carefully examine the case under extraordinary powers.
And I would ask that the verdict be reversed,
that the verdict be reduced to manslaughter,
or in the alternative, order a new trial.
And with that, I rest on my brief.
Thank you.
-: Thank you.
Attorney Mello.
-: Thank you.
May it please the court,
Emily Mello on behalf of the Commonwealth.
I'd like to start with the same issue
that Attorney Maidman began with,
the doctrine of verbal completeness.
I would point the court to Commonwealth v. Clark,
which says that, "The doctrine of verbal completeness
"allows admission of other relevant portions
"of the same statement or writing which serve
"to clarify the context of the admitted portion."
-: Attorney Mello, should we look at this under 33E
as to whether or not this is a proper
use of the residual clause,
or that this would've been a candidate for admission
had the residual clause been argued?
-: I don't believe so.
I think as an initial matter, the residual clause
is not formally recognized in Massachusetts.
-: I think it is. (chuckles)
-: Commonwealth v. Drayton, I believe they say
they do cut out an extremely, extremely narrow exception.
And no, I don't believe so.
I think that this is a case where
the defendant obviously killed his wife.
He didn't have any other course of action
to really say that it wasn't him.
The only defense that he could bring really
was a manslaughter defense.
And a lot of times, defendants find themselves
in that situation same as they do with self defense.
It's clear that they have killed the victim.
And they can really only defend
on a mitigating circumstances.
And in many, in almost all of those cases,
the defendant testifies.
The defendant was not compelled to testify here.
He didn't have to.
He was allowed to bring in the evidence
that he wanted to bring in.
He was just not allowed to bring it in
in the way that he wanted to
or in the way that he felt would've been best for him,
which is free from the adversarial process.
And that's not the process
that we have here in Massachusetts.
It's not the process that we have in the federal courts.
He wanted to bring in his mitigating circumstances.
And having that testimony, there's really no factual basis
for concluding that he wouldn't have testified anyways.
In the recorded interview, he did make some statements
that could have been construed as mitigating.
He talked about the fight between him and his wife.
He said that that she poked him in the chest
and grabbed his mouth.
And certainly, that could be a basis
for a mitigating circumstances on reasonable provocation.
But really, the testimony that he gave was much more robust.
And he explained the entire circumstances
leading up into that night.
And there's really no factual basis for concluding
that he wouldn't have testified in any event.
Like I said, certainly he was precluded
under the rules of evidence, properly,
from bringing in the statements that he wanted to
free from the adversarial process.
But that's not the process that we have.
-: Well, Counsel, if I could just go back to, again,
to Justice Gaziano's point.
Because the night of the murder is the part under 33
that I find troubling.
Understandably, we haven't necessarily adopted
the residual 807 that the feds do,
but the rationale is in our case law, right?
That the same considerations that underpin 807 on the feds
are the ones that we've looked to and said:
Is this something that's really critical
and has the guarantees of trustworthiness
and all this other stuff?
He's at dinner with the family that night.
He's at dinner with them.
They invite him in.
He's homeless at that point.
The family's there.
So the idea that premeditated murder
in light of the context a few hours before,
why isn't this one that we would look to and say:
You know, under our 33E analyses that this is something
that perhaps should have been allowed in.
-: I don't think that the evidence of premeditation
was as focused on that night as you are suggesting.
The real evidence of premeditation was,
I mean, certainly it could be inferred
from the evidence that night.
But I think the bulk of the evidence of premeditation
was the text messages between the defendant and his daughter
in the weeks and months leading up to the murder
where he was accusing her of slutting around
and saying that she was a whore
and that her days were numbered
and I'm ready to go to jail.
I think that that was the strong evidence
of the premeditation.
Even the defendant's own testimony
and the recorded interview,
the evidence of
reasonable provocation was very weak.
He said in the recorded interview and in his own testimony
that the phone call upset him and set him over the edge.
And as the court knows,
the provocation has to come from the victim.
He didn't really suggest that there was provocation
from the victim.
It was kind of a stretch to say, "We were fighting,"
and then add to that the fact that words alone
cannot be reasonable provocation.
So he needed, "We're fighting and she poked me in the chest
"and grabbed my mouth."
He's a huge man. She was a small woman.
The jury could have seen that.
The evidence of reasonable provocation, sure,
it was really the only defense that he had.
And he had to go that route.
'Cause he didn't really have any other choice
under the circumstances where he went to the police
and said, "I killed my wife."
But that wasn't the crux of the premeditation here.
And that certainly wasn't the crux
of the Commonwealth's argument.
And that kind of goes into why the text messages
and why the letter and why all of that
was such important probative evidence.
Because when you're looking at a reasonable provocation,
you're saying: Would a reasonable person have been overcome?
And was he subjectively sort of overcome in the moment?
And this happens a lot in intimate relationship murders.
All of that past information was really the premeditation,
and the state of mind, and the leading up to it.
And that's the fact that he's carrying on this relationship
with Miss (indistinct),
sorry if I pronounced that wrong.
And at the same time, he is saying to his daughter,
"Your mother's days are numbered.
"She's a whore."
You know, "She was sleeping with this other guy.
"I'm gonna go to jail." -: I understand, Counsel,
why the contemporaneous text messages
with the new girlfriend might come in.
But what about that letter three years later?
What is the relevance of that?
And why isn't that not more prejudicial
than probative of anything?
-: So I would say the letter three years later,
certainly lapse in time.
There are certainly other cases
and I've cited several in my brief where, you know,
one up to 13 years where evidence came in.
And this evidence was actually extremely important
to the Commonwealth
as the defendant suggested in his opening
that he received this phone call.
And at the time, he believed that it was someone
telling him to stay away from his wife.
And that all went to that reasonable provocation.
He gets the phone call.
The phone call can't be the provocation.
He thinks that the phone call is telling him
to stay away from his wife.
He gets in a fight with his wife about it.
She pokes him, and he kills her.
And this was really important evidence that he did not think
that that phone call was about his wife.
He thought the phone call was about Jean.
He thought that it came from Miss (indistinct) ex-boyfriend.
He never even believed that it was about his wife.
He was just mad at his wife
because she was sleeping with other men.
She wanted a divorce.
She didn't wanna be with him.
And he strangled her to death.
-: Counsel, can I ask you about the voir dire?
Attorney Mello: Yes.
-: We have certain categories of defenses and/or topics
we allow or we mandate in voir dire:
insanity, interracial murders, (indistinct).
Is it idiosyncratic to say that mitigation
doesn't belong in this list?
I mean, what distinguishes mitigation
from those other topics
where we mandate voir dire questions?
-: Well, I think that there have been several cases
where they've considered extending and they have not.
They've really narrowed it down to insanity defense
and self defense.
And I think that those two are
really kind of unique
and take a special sort of consideration.
I don't feel like mitigation falls into that category.
Mitigation is really very often a defense.
And there's no really extraneous issues
or there isn't any reason to believe that a jury
would not accept those legal principles.
And the judge doesn't have to go out of his way to ask that.
And what he does ask here, which was completely appropriate,
is he explains what the case is.
And then he says, as judges do in impanelment:
"Is there anything about the nature of the case that would,
"that you believe would make you feel impartial?"
And I don't really see why...
I'm sorry,
"that you would not be able to be impartial."
And I don't think that the judge needs to go beyond that.
If someone hears that, you know, a man killed his wife
and for them that is a particular issue,
that is why we have individual voir dire
to address those issues.
-: Well, speaking of that, was the judge wrong
when he said the only purpose of voir dire
is to ferret out bias as opposed to gain information
so one can exercise an intelligent peremptory challenge?
-: I don't think he was wrong.
I think under the Superior Court rules under 6C3,
they lay out what the attorney voir dire is for.
And it really is to see if there is bias.
I guess not just bias, but to see if there is bias
to see if a juror will not be able
to accept the legal principles,
to see if there's any reason
that a juror will not be impartial,
to see if there's anything about the facts
that is particularly-
-: I get the point that we don't want,
we're not gonna allow any of the lawyers
to start asking about what their favorite TV shows are,
or what they thought about this pop culture reference
or whatever.
But Mr. Maidman's point,
which I think has a lot of merit to it,
is all of the information that an attorney gains
during voir dire is really geared towards the exercise
of an intelligent peremptory challenge.
That's why when we have attorney voir dire,
a lot of judges, myself included, in trial court said
this is great because we're going to get
better peremptory challenges.
And we're gonna get less peremptory challenges
because they're gonna be more intelligently made.
So my point is: Does a judge make a mistake
by saying to the lawyers: Don't ask all these questions
'cause you're only using that for a peremptory challenge.
-: No, I don't think so.
And I would point the court to Commonwealth v. Prunty
which is, and I apologize if I'm pronouncing that wrong,
462 Mass. 295.
And in that case, they say that, you know,
peremptory challenges are not without limit.
And I think that the question here and the standard here is
was it an abuse of discretion for Judge Lang
to not allow the attorneys
to ask about the nature of a juror's bachelor degree.
And I think that-
-: I don't think there's any...
Well, I think that the better point for you in that
we're not gonna allow, again, you know:
Did you take pottery versus Russian literature?
The second part of it, though, is his reason for doing that.
That's the only quibble I have.
-: Sure, and I think that
he actually explained that really well.
And he said, "I'm not gonna let you ask random questions
"simply to inform your peremptories.
"If you have a reason to ask a question."
And he did actually say, you know,
"If you have a question about a bachelor's degree
"for a reason..."
For instance, you have a concern about whether
it's a hard science or a liberal arts sort of thing,
because you're concerned about whether jurors
might accept certain forensic evidence,
then okay, bring that to my attention.
But I'm not gonna just let you ask random questions.
And I don't think that that is an abuse of discretion.
Certainly, you're asking questions to,
to see if there's any bias
and perhaps to inform your peremptories to an extent,
but attorney conducted voir dire is narrow.
And the judge would've been within his discretion
to say ahead of time: I want you to tell me the questions
that you're going to ask.
That's all part of the rule.
And he didn't do that.
He said, "Is there any follow up?"
And he allowed the attorneys
to ask follow up if they had any.
But he did not feel that that particular follow up
was appropriate.
And that was certainly not an abuse of discretion.
And the defense doesn't posit any reason for that question
or any potential bias or prejudice from not being able
to ask jurors about their bachelor's degree.
It's kind of, as I believe Attorney Maidman said, innocuous.
Was it an innocuous question? Sure.
But it didn't need to be asked
and it wasn't relevant at all.
And it certainly didn't affect the propriety of
the impaneled jury.
Like I said, there was no abuse of discretion
in not allowing that question.
If the court has no other questions about that,
I would turn to the cross-examination issue,
which I believe is the only issue
that we have not addressed.
As to the cross examination of the defendant,
I think that all of the questions asked by the prosecutor
were appropriate.
Some of the questions were difficult.
Some of the questions were not favorable to the defense.
And that's what happens when a defendant takes the stand.
He takes the stand and he is able to tell
his side of the story.
And he got up there and he said, "I was a loving husband.
"I wanted to get back together with my wife.
"I thought that's what she wanted.
"We got in this horrible argument and I was just overcome."
And then the prosecutor is certainly within his right
to get up and poke holes in that story.
And that's exactly what he did here to impeach that witness.
And all of the questions that were
challenged by the defense were
to that purpose,
were to impeach his story of loving husband, loving father,
who just wants to get back together with his wife
and, you know, kills her in a heat of passion.
Oh, go ahead.
-: No, I was gonna say: Are there any other questions
or do you have anything else?
If there are no other questions, I would rest on my brief.