Clerk: SJC-13026, Cassouto-Noff & Company v. Amy Diamond.
-: Hi, Mr. Valicenti.
-: Good morning, judge, thank you.
David Valicenti on behalf
of the appellant, Amy Diamond.
I'd like to start by discussing the question
of whether in the second paragraph
of the Recognition Act,
whether there's a service of process requirement.
And we have argued that there is
because the language of the statute
includes the words personal jurisdiction,
and personal jurisdiction, as it's understood,
certainly in Massachusetts and generally,
includes a couple of components.
First, it includes the component
of a basis for jurisdiction,
but it also includes the component
of acquisition of jurisdiction.
And acquisition of jurisdiction
requires service of process.
The way that it was stated
in the Wang versus Niakaros case
was in the reverse,
but essentially, that personal jurisdiction
over a defendant cannot exist
without proper service of process
or an appropriate substitute.
And that's the reason that the law
that we applied to this set of facts
started with the Wang case,
and the lower court held that
there's no rule for service of process
requirement in the statute.
However, what Wang said-
-: Isn't that correct?
Isn't that right though?
It has its own notice provision, the statute,
and we tend to associate notice
with due process and jurisdiction.
So isn't the trial judge right on this?
The motion judge right?
-: It's correct, judge,
that the statute does not indicate
that Rule 4 needs to be applied,
but if we accept that personal jurisdiction
includes acquisition of jurisdiction,
my argument is that either
service of process under Rule 4
or a reason why you didn't serve under Rule 4,
which are based generally-
-: The Israeli court found
there was adequate service, correct?
-: The Israeli court found that...
Oh, the Israeli court indicated
that that could be serviced by mail,
which didn't happen.
And the Israeli court ultimately indicated
that there was evasion of service.
I believe that was the reason
that they decided that service was not needed,
and I would say that that's consistent
with the Wang decision.
Wang would say that if you had knowledge
and you evaded, we would give you,
that we would consider that
a justification for non-service.
-: But didn't the Massachusetts-
Justice Georges: Don't we have that here?
-: Sorry, Justice Georges, go ahead.
-: I apologize Justice Kafker,
don't we have that here?
Where there is notice in arguably evasion?
-: We have a finding of notice,
which I will deal with,
the finding of knowledge,
but the lower court found no evasion.
The lower court found very specifically
that there was no evasion
and indicated that at page 36 of the record
that he believed that she had knowledge
of the suit, which I will discuss,
but that she was right,
that the defendant was right,
that she did not have to go
upon receiving a phone call from the sheriff
and asking for the sheriff to meet with her,
that she had no obligation to go
and meet with the sheriff.
And so-
-: Are we skipping a step though?
Don't we have to start out,
putting the due process issue aside for a moment,
don't we have to start out
by determining whether the law of Israel
or the law of Massachusetts applies
as it relates to personal jurisdiction?
-: That we can start there.
-: I'm just say asking.
I wanna make sure that I'm in the right place.
Before we get into the details
of what's required for personal jurisdiction
and what the impact is of the Israeli judge's,
magistrate's findings, don't we have to do
an initial step as to what law applies?
-: In the initial step of what law applies,
I would say in this instance, your honor,
either test that you would apply
whether you adopt the test
that you would apply both laws,
or you adopt the test that
you apply Massachusetts law,
I think in this case,
the court should be applying
Massachusetts law, ultimately,
and that's the way we approached it.
And so, this court may decide
that it's going to adopt one test,
or the other, or some other approach,
but ultimately, I don't think
there's any disagreement that
the trial court in the end,
needs to apply the law of the recognizing jurisdiction
in order to decide if personal jurisdiction was met.
-: But isn't it obvious
that even under our choice of law,
if we're applying our choice of law,
we're gonna end up with Israeli law here.
All the action takes place in Israel.
I mean, Massachusetts has...
She's chosen to do...
Your client's chosen to do business in Israel.
She actually appears for the litigation.
Why would we not find Israel
the appropriate jurisdiction?
-: Because the way the case law has developed
around the Recognition Act, and I will say,
there's not a lot in Massachusetts,
but typically, a choice of law analysis,
I think, the type to what your honor
is referring is not employed.
Instead what the court says
is in Evans Cabinet and other cases,
we will apply the law of the foreign jurisdiction
to see if there was jurisdiction,
and then we will apply the law of Massachusetts
as a check to make sure that that's sufficient.
So I don't think you'd land up, your honor,
with one or the other.
-: Is that right or we apply,
we do a bit, it's not exactly
the same choice of law analysis,
but we look at to see whether under
what's the appropriate jurisdiction
under the Uniform Judgment Act,
and then we do a constitutional due process
analysis consistent with how we do it here,
but we do that to double-check
but I don't think we're applying
Massachusetts law to that.
We're applying sort of principles
that do a choice of law analysis upfront,
as Justice Lowy was talking about.
-: The decision we've taken is that
the court should apply Massachusetts law
but I would suggest that even if the approach
that your honor is suggesting is correct,
that that's how the court ultimately goes,
that when you get to the question of due process
under Massachusetts law, you effectively
are looking at what the Wang case lays out, right?
I mean, because the question of due process,
while it may not require Rule 4,
Rule 4 is a part of due process,
it certainly illustrates at least
one way in which due process is satisfied.
So you may think of all these concepts
are important but in the end,
what the court, lower court, I believe,
should have been checking to see,
was there service of process,
or was there a good reason
why there wasn't service of process?
-: Do you agree, counsel, that your client
had at least the minimum contacts required
under the traditional constitutional analysis
for personal jurisdiction?
-: Yes, we have not contested.
-: But your issue is really only
whether or not service was sufficient?
-: Absolutely correct, we are not contesting-
-: So I guess, given that you're not contesting
that there was minimum contacts
for purposes of assessing personal jurisdiction
under our constitution,
meaning the U.S. Constitution,
and or Massachusetts Constitution,
and why don't we then apply the due process
notice requirements of Section 23A,
which just requires that your client
receive notice of the proceedings
in sufficient time to enable her to defend?
-: So first, justice, I would say,
when you look at how the minimum contacts
rules are applied, you notice that
even in the lower court decision,
they applied the long-arm statute.
They do look for an authorizing statute
under Massachusetts law,
and then turns to the constitutional requirement.
And I think the same thing
should be done as it relates
to service of process.
But to answer your question about why
not just the notice provision in the statute,
the notice provision is not the provision
that governs service of process.
And the reason why I say that is that-
-: I know, but the statute
doesn't require service of process.
The statute just requires that
there be personal jurisdiction.
And then in terms of notice,
it requires what I quoted before.
-: It says that, but the Model Act,
on which this is based, right,
has the same language at for,
what we have in paragraph two,
which is personal jurisdiction.
It then has the same language
in our paragraph three,
which is the notice provision.
However, in the Model Act,
and the drafters of that third group,
including the notice provision was non-mandatory.
It was discretionary.
In fact, the way it read
was a foreign judgment need not be recognized.
And so, in the drafting of the Model Act,
if the notice provision was discretionary,
that means that the way that they laid it out
meant that service of process
must be somewhere else
or else the statute wouldn't
have required any notice, right?
Now, I understand that except-
-: I'm confused about what...
You need to be more specific.
What third, what are you talking about?
I have no idea what you're talking about at this point.
-: Oh, so the Model Act has the same paragraph
as the third paragraph in the Massachusetts Act,
which starts with a foreign judgment
shall not be recognized if-
-: [Justice Wendlandt] Yeah.
-: Defendant did not receive notice.
The way the Model Act was drafted,
it said a foreign judgment need not be recognized.
It was non-mandatory.
The way the Model Act was-
-: All right, and so what are you suggesting that means?
-: I'm suggesting that that means that
the language of the statute
and the notice provision,
if it was non-mandatory,
that that does not cover service of process.
That service of process must be somewhere else.
There must be some other notice that's required,
and that would fall under personal jurisdiction,
or else you wouldn't have a notice
requirement in the statute.
-: [Justice Wendlandt] Except two.
-: If there were another notice requirement,
wouldn't that be spelled out somewhere,
like what it was?
-: It's not spelled out.
-: Right, but doesn't that
suggest there's nothing else?
-: I don't think that it suggests
there's nothing else, your honor,
because of the fact that personal jurisdiction
and the way that we have generally
interpreted, it includes it.
And that's fairly common.
-: Is there anything other than Wang
for that proposition that personal jurisdiction
in the way we've interpreted
requires this service of process
in the way you're suggesting Rule 4 requires?
-: Well, I-
-: Because usually, I mean, back to law school,
right, personal jurisdiction is just all
about minimum contacts with the particular jurisdiction.
Now, you're overlaying on that,
a due process requirement
about being notified about the proceedings,
but that usually in law school,
is separate and apart from personal jurisdiction.
-: I think there is support for the concept,
not only in Wang, but in the decisions
of this court and in other courts,
that personal jurisdiction consists
of the second step that I'm suggesting,
which is that it's acquisition of personal jurisdiction
that acquisition of-
-: So personal jurisdiction requires
acquisition of personal jurisdiction?
-: [Counsel Valicenti] Yes.
-: That's your proposition?
-: [Counsel Valicenti] It is.
-: Okay. -: It is.
That there's a basis for jurisdiction,
and there's acquisition of personal-
-: I don't understand why,
even if we think we're bound by Wang,
which we're not, but Wang is a case,
it's a Massachusetts case,
it's a pure Massachusetts case.
It says you need service of process
to have personal jurisdiction.
We've got a totally different kinda case here.
There is service of process.
It's done in accordance with Israeli law.
So even in this case,
it's consistent with Wang
in the sense that, okay,
you need to satisfy service of process
according to the appropriate forum,
it's done here in accordance with Israeli law,
and Wang is a case
where in a pure Massachusetts case,
you need service of process
according to Massachusetts law
but this isn't a pure Massachusetts case.
You're just putting a lot of weight
on a little, you know.
I just don't see why we're bound by this,
and it's clearly distinguishable to me.
-: Well, I'd like to spend some time then,
if I may, judge, on the facts of the case,
which are that-
-: I'm sorry to interrupt.
I'd love to hear any answer to Justice Kafker's point
because if we merge service of process
into personal jurisdiction and the statute,
the whole point of the statute
is that a foreign country is supposed
to be treated like a sister state,
and you don't expect, if you want
to enforce a judgment that you have to know
the idiosyncrasies of 50 different states,
as it might relate to service of process
and long-arm statutes.
So it's sort of hard to, I mean,
I understand we've...
Maybe it's we've got a robust repugnancy clause,
we have a due process overlay,
but let's not just skip Justice Kafker's point.
We don't have anything that says, in this context,
that we are weaving in, fusing service of process
into a personal jurisdiction analysis.
-: Well, I would say but we certainly
have to infuse our due process analysis.
Justice Lowy: Okay.
-: Right, and so with the due process analysis,
we know papers are never delivered to Ms. Diamond.
We know they know where her residence is
but they don't leave the papers there.
We know they know where her residence is
but they don't mail her anything.
And you know, the Mullane case
from the Supreme Court said,
no, it's about are you desirous of conveying notice.
-: We've gotta find- -: She ducked them.
They called her, and she ducked them.
Her husband said, "No, get away.
"We're not gonna accept these papers."
-: Well, they asked her if she would meet,
the record says, "Will you meet us?"
And she said she wouldn't meet them.
But then they don't go-
-: The deputy sheriff has a telephone
conversation with her, correct?
-: [Counsel Valicenti] Correct.
-: It's clear, I mean, you can argue
whatever you want, but she's clearly ducking service.
-: That the lower court didn't find
that she was ducking service.
They found no evasion,
but they found notice.
But they found notice based on the fact
that the Israeli law firm
had been sending letters,
and the fact that then she got
this call from the sheriff,
which those two things were eight months apart.
Right, I mean, and there were other
creditors that were out there.
There was no meaningful information
from the sheriff on this record
about what the suit was about, by who,
where it was, or any of that information.
-: She knew what it was about.
They had sent her emails saying,
"Here are the bills.
"You promised to pay the bills.
"You haven't paid the bills."
They sent her notice that they wanted
to enforce the arbitration clause,
all to the same lines of communication
that they had throughout this transaction.
No response, no response, no response.
I mean, can you really argue
that she had no idea what this law firm
was looking to talk to her about?
-: I would not argue that she didn't know
that this law firm was interested in pursuing her
as where there are many other creditors
with $1.6 million of debt
that came out of this venture.
But that last communication
is on August, the 5th of 2014.
It isn't until eight months later,
that there was a call from the sheriff.
There are lots of creditors.
And the sheriff calls and says,
"I'm trying to serve you."
And she says, "Look, I'm not
"gonna meet you to serve."
I think the lower court improperly
puts those two things together,
and then says, "Well, she knew
"about the Israeli lawsuit."
I don't think those things go together.
I agree that she knew that this creditor
and probably many others were interested
in recovering money from her.
But the point is was she given notice
in a way to notify her of dependency of this action?
Did she have the quality of information?
On this record, she did not.
She did not.
And to deal with the issue
of how the judge decides,
"Oh, well, you knew about the Israeli lawsuit."
I mean, he only really takes that
from her answer to the cross-examination question of,
"Well, at some point, you knew of it."
She didn't know.
She couldn't say when.
At some point, you knew about it.
And when she received the package
of documents in the Massachusetts action,
that's on 385 of the record,
that's when she said,
"Yes, when I got this lawsuit in Massachusetts,
"I obviously knew that there was something
"going on in Israel."
-: So are you, is that finding
that she knew about the Israeli lawsuit?
Is that a factual finding
to which we defer to the judge
who saw her, assessed her credibility?
Or are you suggesting that's something
that we review de novo?
-: I look at this as a situation
where the wrong standard was applied,
and that the court can review a finding
under the Recognition Act as a question of law.
But I would suggest even
if it is a factual finding,
that it is error.
That if you look at all these facts,
that the judge went too far
and took too big a leap
in saying that you've got a phone call
and that that's enough.
And it relied on the Olivo case
to suggest that, oh, well, that's inquiry notice,
is where we're going with due process
that you got a phone call,
and so now, you need to go find out
information about that.
That that is a leap too far.
Right, that's not of what Olivo stands for.
I don't think.
And it certainly, I don't believe,
where the law should be on due process.
-: Okay, I'm gonna see if anyone
has any further questions.
Justice Lowy: No, thank you, chief.
-: Thank you so much.
-: [Counsel Valicenti] Thank you.
-: Attorney Richmond.
We can't hear you.
Justice Georges: You're muted, counsel, thank you.
-: Thank you very much.
Good morning, Chief Justice Budd,
and may it please the court.
I appreciate you allowing me
to come in by Zoom today.
I come back to a quotation or a paraphrase
in our brief from an old Judge Cardozo case,
and I was tortured with Judge Cardozo cases in law school,
where he talks about the fact that
we're not so provincial here in our country
or in our location to think that
somebody in a foreign country
or another place does it wrong
just because we would have done it differently.
And I think what I'd like to focus on
is the fact that for the Amy Diamond's arguments
and my brother has worked very hard,
but Amy Diamond's arguments are for the most part
just contesting, or debating,
or criticizing Judge Agostini's findings of fact,
which have to be given tremendous,
great and tremendous deference.
This was a case, believe it or not,
where the parties originally found, right,
filed cross-motions for summary judgment
on many of these issues, which were denied,
and we had a trial on the merits.
We had witnesses.
A witness come in from Tel Aviv.
Amy Diamond testified,
and the judge heard all of the witnesses,
and he made factual findings.
And at the end of the day,
I mean, it's very clear,
and it resonates in his lengthy
decision in many places
where he believed and found,
as a matter of fact,
that Amy Diamond knew of the Israeli lawsuit.
She knew of the arbitration,
and she made the decision
not to go to Israel to defend it.
And at one point, he even said-
-: Did he make, in his fact findings,
did he find that she ducked service of process?
I can't remember how Judge Agostini
decided on that point. -: You know what, your honor?
It's a good question.
I don't really remember.
But what I do remember is that
he made a factual finding
that it was important to the Israeli judge
who entered the default judgment that,
and who had made a finding
that she had evaded service, and-
-: So he piggybacked on the Israeli
judge's finding on that point?
-: That's correct, because these were all
factual findings because Shmulik Cassouto
when he testified at trial,
he told the judge the entire story
from beginning to end,
which included a complete description
of all the procedural steps
that his law firm took
to get to this particular point.
-: Well, counsel, can I ask you
a question about that part?
-: [Counsel Richmond] Sure.
-: To Justice Kafker's question
about piggybacking off of the finding
of the Israeli court, was that error?
Because isn't it true that the way
that the Israeli court said to effect service
they never did it in...
They didn't comport with that.
-: I don't think that was error, judge,
because there's a fee agreement between the parties
which states that the relationship
between the parties is governed by Israeli law,
that Amy Diamond consents to that,
that Amy Diamond consented to the exclusion-
-: Sure, I'm getting to the specifics
about the service though.
When the law firm said to the Israeli tribunal
or magistrate that, "We can't serve her."
And they said, "Okay, well then,
"you can serve her in this way,"
and they didn't serve her in that way.
So if the Israeli tribunal makes a finding
or that the judge here relies upon,
that she had notice,
is it error when he relies upon that,
and there was never service in the way
the Israeli tribunal said to effect service?
-: I do not think that's error
because I think under these,
I think under the law and under the act,
I think that the judge was to give deference
to the finding of the Israeli judge.
Plus it was never, plus it was...
I'm sorry, I'm tripping over my words, judge.
Give me one second to try to figure out
how to phrase this.
At the same time, your honor
asked a very good question.
Judge Agostini also made findings
that she knew about the Israeli lawsuit.
So even if the Israeli judge states
that she was evading service of process
under Israeli law, under the Israeli rule,
under our act, we met the requirement
according to Judge Agostini, factually,
to notify her of the proceeding.
So the burden really was on Amy Diamond
to go to Israel.
And while this might be,
as my father used to say, more interesting,
she had ample opportunities,
keep in mind, that Judge Agostini found
because she got bill,
she got emails requesting payments,
she got notice of the arbitration,
and she ignored all of it.
-: Can I ask you, do you think
the act requires service of process?
I understand the act doesn't require
service of process consistent with Massachusetts law
but does the act require service of process
consistent with Israeli law
or is it just a notice?
-: I think it's notice, judge,
and a good portion of my practice,
your honor, consists of construction litigation,
and I'm constantly running into the Bloom South case,
which is a mechanics wean matter
but that talks about you have to...
When you have a statute,
you read the statute,
and we follow the rules of the statute.
And all the statute says is that
she be given notice such that
she has time to defend the claim, so.
-: Just a little weird to think
notice without service.
I mean, it may be right.
-: Yeah. -: But it's just odd
in our law to not require some sort
of service of process compliance, yeah.
-: You know what, judge?
And I think, I'm gonna be candid with you,
constitutional law is not my bailiwick,
I'm not a constitutional-
-: It is today.
-: It is today, it is today, right, exactly.
But I can tell you that my brother,
and my brother, as hard as he worked,
and wrote a great brief,
they don't cite one case that says
that under other states,
which have adopted versions of this act,
that it requires service of process
under the local rules of civil procedure.
And there are cases that we cited in our brief
where judges, I think it's-
-: Can I shift you, Mr. Richmond?
'Cause I'm actually more concerned
by the second issue than the first.
I'm not sure it's concerning,
but these are big boys and girls,
and we're breaching corporate form here.
And I understand your argument
to be essentially, Israel has its own way
of breaching corporate form.
It may be different, but it's good enough,
and it was breached here.
But it's just that makes me a little nervous.
So tell me why we should allow your,
this suit against this woman in, as an individual,
as opposed to as a representative of the corporation.
-: So I just wanna make sure I understand
the question, Justice Kafker.
Are you asking about
the finding of personal liability?
Is that what you're asking me about?
-: There's a whole issue.
Yeah, we're bring whatever,
we're lifting the corporate veil here,
and in a case of international business,
that's a big deal.
If other countries aren't respecting our corporate law,
that can become more problematic.
Particularly, these are all sophisticated people.
We're not dealing with individuals
who don't know the business world.
So go ahead.
Tell me why we should respect
that part of the decision.
-: So I think it's...
I don't think there's any dispute
as to the manner and way in which
my client's fee engagement letter was signed.
However, there was testimony at trial
by Shmulik Cassouto, who the court found
was a seasoned Israeli lawyer,
who explained the fact that in Israel,
the law of guarantee is such that
it does not require a writing
like it does here in Massachusetts.
And Judge Agostini found on multiple occasions
and even says that he gives credibility
to Shmulik Cassouto's testimony
that Amy Diamond promised to be responsible
for these debts personally.
-: But isn't that, I thought this wasn't
a personal guarantee decision,
it was a, again, lifting of the corporate veil.
-: I think it's both, judge.
I think when I read the decision,
I read it both ways, but at the same time,
how do I explain this?
At the trial, the issue of her personally,
when you read through the testimony of the trial,
there was a lot of testimony about the fact
that she had promised to be responsible.
And that's one of the things
that Judge Agostini hits on.
But at the same time,
I think he very carefully, in his decision,
goes through, makes a number of factual findings,
I think, to give comfort that number one,
Israel treats lifting the corporate veil very seriously.
As a matter of fact, one of the things
Judge Agostini find in the trial,
and I think it's in his findings,
it was in the trial,
it's in the trial transcript,
is that Shmulik Cassouto explained
how before they could even get to the point
of serving Amy Diamond with papers outside of Israel,
they had to explain to the judge
why they were making a claim against her personally.
But Judge Agostini recognized that we do not
have the Corporate Shield Doctrine in Massachusetts.
He pointed to a whole bunch of factual instances
and made factual findings of her
undertaking certain activities
and business in Israel.
And interestingly, he came up,
actually, I don't even think
this was argued at trial,
but he came up with this argument in his brief,
it's a good, great point,
which is that her efforts were entrepreneurial,
and that under the law of the Commonwealth,
certain entrepreneurial efforts
can establish personal liability.
And especially-
-: By the way, is there any support for that?
I mean, it's creative,
and I understand he references Magellan,
but is that, I mean, business is entrepreneurial.
I'm just not sure I understand that distinction.
-: I think what the judge found of import
is the fact that there was testimony in the trial that
but for the right, but for the ownership
of these exploration, I'm gonna find,
for purposes of this hearing,
these exploration rights,
these options to look for energy in the Med,
these companies had no assets,
they had absolutely nothing.
And in fact, as a footnote,
Amy Diamond had testified that
it was her quote, "Intent to pay them
"if the exploration was successful."
Putting all that together,
the fact that she was entering
as an experienced person,
she was entering into a field of business,
which is very, very risk-heavy.
That he looked at that as being entrepreneurial.
But I think that we have-
-: Then again, are there cases that adopt that
'cause that's why you have corporate form
to protect your personal liability
and risky business ventures.
So are there cases that I should look at
that support that entrepreneurial idea?
-: Judge, I believe there are cases that support that,
I think that they're cited in Judge Agostini's decision.
I do not have those in case citations handy.
-: Counsel, are these Massachusetts corporations?
-: No, they are not.
They were foreign corporations, your honor.
I think they may have been Texas.
I'm sorry, judge.
-: Counsel, any interests that Massachusetts
may have in protecting its corporate rules
as regard to piercing the corporate veil
would be inapplicable here
if these are Israeli corporations, right?
They're formed under Israeli law,
and Israeli law would govern them.
So I don't see a matter of public policy
for Massachusetts to enforce
its corporate veil piercing rules
to Israeli corporations.
Do you agree with that?
-: I agree, but just, and I'm not,
I don't mean to correct you, your honor, justice,
but I believe that what we called
the Bandel Entities, who we're after,
they were called the Bandel Group,
but the Bandel Entities, I believe,
were foreign corporations.
I'm gonna get, I'm gonna remember,
and if my brother wants to correct me,
I think it was from the State of Texas
because in the record, I think Judge Agostini
makes reference to the fact that
there was a bankruptcy proceeding
that was filed subsequent
to the exploration not being successful,
and that bankruptcy took place in the State of Texas.
But I think your honor is right
that we are not looking to protect
Massachusetts corporations in this particular case.
This is purely-
-: Nonetheless, we can look at
this issue under the repugnancy clause
cognizant that Judge Agostini made a finding
that Ms. Diamond agreed
that she would pay the bill
but we can still consider
the whole corporate veil
under the repugnancy clause, can't we?
-: I think that that's the argument
that my brother makes, and I don't think
there's anything preventing the court
from using that analysis.
I mean, that's what we look to the court for
to make that determination.
We don't think it was repugnant
because of the fact that
Amy Diamond agreed in the fee.
The fee agreement is clear
that the relationship is governed
by the laws of the State of Israel,
as opposed to any other forum.
And I believe that Judge Agostini decided
that she was bound by that determination.
So I don't think Judge Agostini was inclined
to sort of trample on Israel's law.
And I think he also was impressed by the fact.
When I say impressed,
I use that with a lower case i.
I think that he was satisfied by the fact
that Israel takes the idea of piercing
the corporate veil seriously,
that it wasn't just rightly done.
And I think that was based
on the testimony of Shmulik Cassouto.
Keep in mind that there was no expert testimony
or any other testimony.
Nobody brought in any contrary evidence
at trial on this particular point,
on these factual findings.
And I think that that's a factual finding.
It could be a legal finding,
but I think for purposes of this,
it's a factual finding
where he made the determination
that Israel takes the law
of piercing the corporate veil seriously.
I mean, sophisticated legal system
that they have over there.
This wasn't done arbitrarily or on a whim.
Justice Budd: Are there any other questions?
Justice Georges: No, thank you, chief.
Justice Budd: Okay, thank you so much.
-: Thank you.
Justice Georges: Thank you, counsel.