-: SJC- 13041,
Robert LeSage v Massachusetts Treatment Center.
-: Attorney Marie, good morning.
-: Good morning, Madam chief justice.
And may it please the court, first of all
thank you for allowing me to appear in person.
It's a pleasure to be back in court.
-: You're welcome.
-: Thank you.
This court said in its COVID orders
that the pandemic constitutes a compelling reason
to postpone trials and that it's in the interest
of justice to do so.
The pandemic is the sole reason for the delay
of the case at bar, it's the sole reason for the delay.
-: Co-counsel, with that in mind,
with that in mind, how does the LeSage case
or LeSage case affect your claim?
-: The Commonwealth answers that by saying,
LeSage applies with even greater force here
because the individuals in LeSage were held pretrial
on a finding of clear and convincing evidence
or probable cause to believe that they had committed
a new crime.
Here, the petitioner, as all sexually dangerous persons
are held on a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
And in Mr. LeSage's case,
there have been four findings beyond a reasonable doubt.
-: Counsel, do you agree that the standard here
is strict scrutiny?
-: No, the Commonwealth's viewpoint here
is that the pandemic, the statute has been found to meet him
pass constitutional muster.
The statute has been found to be narrowly drawn
for compelling reasons.
-: I guess I'm not asking whether or not you win or lose
under strict scrutiny.
I'm asking whether strict scrutiny applies here.
-: Not to the question of whether a jury trial
is appropriate.
-: Okay, and so what standard would you posit appliance?
-: The standard that the Commonwealth says
is whether there's been a substantive due process
violation here is not yet happened.
And that's because the statute is narrowly drawn.
And counsel-
-: (laughs) It seems to me you're answering the question
under strict scrutiny, 'cause you're asking me
to apply whether it's narrowly drawn
to a compelling government interest
Is that what you're saying?
-: It is narrowly drawn, yes.
So even if we apply a strict scrutiny standard
that the statute passes.
-: So the government doesn't have a position
as to which standards should apply.
-: No.
-: It should be under strict scrutiny
even if we apply that standard, you're saying it passes.
-: It does, because-
-: So, what is the compelling government interest here?
-: The compelling government interest
is as this court has said,
protecting the vulnerable members of the public.
And as the legislature has said from a risk of sexual harm
from people who have been found beyond a reasonable doubt
to have a condition-
-: How is the public at risk here?
If we go forward with a Zoom trial?
-: A Zoom trial-
-: Bench trial?
-: Okay, I'll take them in turn.
The Commonwealth's position and the legislature's position
is that is in preference of a jury trial,
but either party so requested.
And that's because the statute says we need a party served
requested it shall proceed as a jury trial.
-: It depend with the a statutory right, correct?
-: That's correct.
-: The government has, don't you have a problem
that the constitutionality of the statute,
as we've said many times depends upon the time
and the right to review a current right to review
for sexual dangerousness?
And here, the petitioner has a right to review every year
and he may have been denied four times
but now he's 80 years old and things change
and he has the ability to go forward under the statute.
So how does the statutory right that the government has
to insist upon a jury trial, trump his constitutional rights
to timely review?
-: Well, first the statute does not provide
for an annual trial.
The statute specifically provides
for the annual filing of a petition.
The statute is silent as to when
how long the timeframe is for that.
-: I'm quite aware as you know of what the statute says,
but haven't had a few trials with you.
But the issue is the statutory scheme requires
a periodic review.
That's the only way this is constitutional
'cause this is a classic year to a day.
And he has a right to his timely review.
So how does that trump again your right
to insist upon a jury trial?
-: First of all, the delay at issue here
solely pandemic related, as we all can agree.
No caused by the Commonwealth.
The delay here is so far, far less
than this court has for decades evaluated
and found not to violate speedy trial rights.
-: Can I just ask you to specify the delay here.
Are you talking about the delay from July, 2020
when he filed his motion to go forward to date?
-: If we only looked at that period of time.
-: To that six months about?
-: About, and that's far less than the delays
that this court has considered
in DiBella, in nap, in tremor, in a series of cases.
-: So before you jump over the six months issue,
why don't we go back to July, 2015
when he filed his position?
Why isn't that the metric from 2015 and to date?
Why is it from July to date?
-: For several reasons.
First of all, number one,
he had a trial in July, excuse me, in August of 2018.
And is this court set in GF a different circumstance
where there had been these trials
at a pretrial, a pro initial commitment case
the mistrial restarts any speedy trial clock.
Number two, Mr. LeSage did not at any time contest
either the first trial date
or the second trial date for the retrial.
And so there was no objection to those timeframes.
And when we look at the record, it's clear, Mr. LeSage
was not prepared to go forward
at any point before those dates.
Because Mr. LeSage sought funds for his experts
for the first time in May of 2018,
shortly before the August trial date
those reports were due under the standard scheduling order
six weeks in advance of trial.
And then for the second date,
judge Pennoni issued a trial order
in March of 2019 for March of 2020.
There was no objection and counsel for Mr. LeSage
moved for funds in January of 2020 as you see
on the docket sheet, which begins at page six
in our first record appendix volume.
So the petitioner was at no point ready to go forward
to trial earlier than the two trial dates.
This court continued all trials
under its general superintendents power until July.
And there has not actually been a judge
in the section nine session, since the end of the June term
which was the first few days of July
and the first expected arrival of the judge.
So far as we are aware was April.
There's no judge signed for the first quarter-
-: Yes, Miss Marie, over here, there is a point in time
where we have a substantive due process issue.
We're just trying to find out where that point in time
is in Justice Gaziano TF case, we discuss that
and former chief justice Diaz
when he addressed LeSage pointed out that
we have to see what's going to happen.
I think he made a comment in that case.
Well, and things seem to be getting better.
And in jury trials are scheduled to start again
in September that didn't come to fruition.
So there is a point in time when this happens.
And my question is this,
when we're trying to gauge when that point in time is
do we have to look at whether or not you can have a fair
and impartial bench trial?
Is that a factor in trying to determine what that day is
with substantive due process correct?
-: No, the Commonwealth's position at this point
is that we have not yet reached the point
and we are guided in fact by this courts order
from September the fourth COVID order
which found that all of the time through phase one
and phase two, is excludable time for Commonwealth cases.
If it's excludable time in those cases,
then it cannot reasonably be argued that it's not excludable
time under any speedy trial (indistinct) here.
-: I completely appreciate that point.
And the preface to justice Gaziano of question
we're talking about constitutional issues.
My question is really specific.
It's, when we are trying to gauge this line
of substantive due process, do we have to take into account
whether or not the Commonwealth can have a fair trial
and an impartial trial with a bench trial,
despite what the statute says?
Does that factor in to the substantive due process analysis?
-: No, this court has said that it will only override
the legislative directives
when there's a compelling constitutional basis to do so.
And we have not reached that point yet.
The Commonwealth is prepared to proceed with a jury trial.
We said that in our papers, we said it at the hearing
before Judge Pennoni in September
and I'm saying it to this court today.
-: Can you tell me when we'll reach that line?
If it's not today?
-: The Commonwealth hope and expectation
is will be, and invites the court
to exercise its superintendents powers
to have these cases brought forward included in the session,
which will obviously determine-
-: Right, but you say right now
that there's no constitutional violation,
not at this point, I'm asking when in your view,
would there be one?
-: Not this year. -: Ever?
-: What?
-: Not this year, no. -: Not this year, next year?
-: Not this year, possibly next year.
And we would have to revisit it
but in Commonwealth viewpoint these cases
could reasonably be started for trial
in the spring, depending on the availability of a court.
-: This is a variant of justice LeSage question.
Could you articulate for us the governmental interest
in a jury trial, as opposed to jury waive trial?
-: Yes
It is because the citizens of the Commonwealth
bear the consequences when people are released
from civil commitment and they should have
through their jury service, the opportunity to be heard.
The legislature amended the statute, in 1994
the very day after this court
said there was no constitutional right to a jury trial
in an STP discharge proceeding.
-: So it seems to me that an answer to my question originally
what is the compelling government interest?
It's not the safety of the public so much of it is as it is.
It's exercising of the statutory prerogative
to insist on a jury trial.
Well, that's the compelling interest.
-: Justice Wendlandt, the one fosters the other,
having the voice of the community,
which the courts have held for centuries.
The jury as the voice of the community,
the conscience of the community
fosters the protection of the public.
-: So if that is the compelling government interest
in answer to Justice Lori's question, I was puzzled
that you did not say that the ability
to conduct a jury waive trial
is something that would factor into the second part
of the strict scrutiny test.
That is whether or not that government compelling
interest is narrowly tailored.
This insistence on going forward on a live jury trial
is the only thing that will serve
that compelling government interest
-: In the Commonwealth viewpoint it is.
-: And I guess I'm puzzled by that because just in December
the Commonwealth was arguing that going forward
in a criminal trial was required via Zoom.
And now you're saying it's not good enough
because we have the statutory jury trial right?
-: Well, first the argument in Vascus Diaz,
which I had the privilege of watching
and reading the brace was at a preliminary stage
of a criminal proceeding, but I share the concerns
of what virtual proceedings do, and we have opposed that-
-: I know, 'cause it was interesting reading your brief
in this case was almost as if you had copied
and pasted the defendant's problems with going forward
on Zoom and a motion to suppress in Vascus Diaz.
-: Actually, I didn't, but I-
-: I'm not suggesting that you did.
I'm saying that they read very similarly.
-: And because they raised similar concerns
evaluating credibility, who will be the decision maker.
Now, when a motion to suppress, of course,
the judge is the decision maker.
That is a different issue than here.
And in a criminal case, the Commonwealth
does not have a right to compel a jury trial
when there is a statute in a rule that we actually know.
-: We have two separate issues.
One is the jury waive trial
and the second is how it's gonna be done.
You could have a jury where the trial is done in person
as well. -: Right.
And especially in an STP proceeding
where it's posted it's experts
-: And the credibility of the experts is key
and judging credibility is best done in person
as this court has said in several cases
because of things the camera cannot capture.
And for all of those things, the behavior (indistinct).
-: I guess this gets us back.
This is kinda the Zoom trial was a nice issue
but more importantly as a jury, we have trial issue
because we can do those in person tomorrow.
-: The jury waive trial in the Commonwealth's view
there is no compelling constitutional basis
at this time to proceed.
And speed is just one
of the important issues with the trial.
-: Does anyone ever...
Is there ever a case that formulates
the Commonwealth's right to a jury trial the way you do?
Normally the right to a jury trial is,
the defendant has a right to be tried
by a fair cross section of the community.
You're arguing that the Commonwealth
has this public safety interest.
Does any court ever done this, ever articulated this way?
This your interest, 'cause I've never seen it ever before.
-: The only case that challenged the Commonwealth's
that led to a published opinion was ready.
Which was the 2005 published opinion
if the appeals court cited in our papers
the petitioner argue he was entitled
to supersede the Commonwealth jury demand
and the ready court rejected that
in a published opinion in 2005
-: Again, we're trying to identify, I still can't see it.
I see it as an interest,
I don't know if it's a compelling interest
and that may matter.
-: When you talk of a jury trial
being protective of the community,
is that based upon what you believe
the purpose of the legislature was?
Or is that something we've said?
-: Well, the court has recognized the jury
as the conscience of the community
from the United States Supreme Court to this court
cited in the Jury Management Advisory Committee's report,
and the countless other cases.
However, in the legislature acting governor Saluki
proposal legislation to change the law
after a release of STPs
murders committed by STPs, who had been released
by judges and did it in governor Saluki's words
to better promote the public safety (indistinct).
-: And with respect to a great governor that doesn't bind us.
So what you're basically saying is
judges won't take public safety
in consideration only the jury will be able to do that.
-: The legislature has made a policy decision in favor of it.
And this (indistinct)
-: Okay, if it's a legislature, we've never said this
as justice Cyphers that has asked you
-: I have not seen it in the context of a specific STP case
but the court has said it
and countless other section settings
and it would not differ for that reason.
-: You keep saying that, but again,
I've never seen it articulate.
So we have set it, when we go back and read the cases
that the Commonwealth's interest in a jury trial
is connected to the voice of the community
speaking on public safety matters.
We're gonna find language to that effect in cases
-: In Humphrey V Katie,
the court talked about
the jury serving as the conscience of the community
for who requires commitment,
a different form of mental health commitment,
but they talked about that.
Courts have talked about the jury serving
as the conscience of community and in several cases
some of which we cite in our papers.
-: So every time the Commonwealth agrees to a bench trial
they're disrespecting the conscious of the community
in protecting public safety?
It's about a billion cases we've just said that
that's a disrespect for the voice of the community.
Is that right?
-: I didn't say that, but the legislature has said
that when (indistinct).
-: When you say the legislature has said,
when we look at the legislative history for this provision
we're gonna find something that supports that?
-: Governor Saluji submitted language to the legislature
with an enacted verbatim.
This court digs looking at a similar instance
of changing legislation adopting virtually verbatim
the governor's proposed language
and the governor's rationale.
This court drew from it, drew from that
to constrict the legislation history.
-: I just want to make sure I understand.
So this was legislation proposed by the governor
at that time and adopted by the legislature
as proposed by the governor, is that right?
-: Verbatim.
-: Verbatim?
-: Verbatim, with the cover letter
from the governor the transmittal letter
saying it was to better promote promote among other things,
the safety of the public
by enacting a right for a jury trial.
And this court has said
it will only override a legislative mandate
because it's not the court's policy decision to make.
It's a legislatures that it will only override
the legislative mandate
when there's a compelling constitutional basis.
-: And we said that in GF to allow for bail
for initial proceedings, correct?
-: Right, and that was somebody held
on a probable cause standard for seven years
on a preliminary finding not beyond a reasonable doubt
and no judge, no court and two have been asked
have ever found that GF would extend as broad
to somebody who's been found beyond a reasonable doubt
to be sexually dangerous.
Gaziano: As far as a pretrial determination?
-: As far as a pretrial release.
Two judges have been asked it's in the papers
in volume two of our record appendix, and they have not.
And when the court...
if I may just close up when the court has found...
the petitioner here has not yet alleged any prejudice
to his case from the delay that has occurred so far.
And that is the only time when the court has considered
dismissing or overriding a legislative mandate,
that has not happened here.
And for those reasons,
and unless the court has any other questions
the Commonwealth will rest on it's brief.
-: Budd, Thank you.
-: Thank you.
-: Okay, attorney Day.
-: Good morning, thank you.
I represent Robert LeSage in this matter.
And just as an initial matter, neither Mr. LeSage
nor I deny the fact that the Commonwealth does
when the face of the statute section nine,
have a right to ask for a jury trial.
But our position is that in this particular case as applied
the Commonwealth's what we perceive to be a procedure
tactical interest and asking for a jury trial cannot trump.
Mr. LeSage has a right to a (indistinct)
-: Counsel, can I ask you why does a six month delay so far
shock the conscience?
Given that that was the same delay that justice Gaziano
referring to LeSage?
-: Well, your honor, I think as an initial matter
I know that the Commonwealth,
LeSage is the controlling case here.
I would suggest that it's not for at least four reasons.
The first one would be that LeSage, excuse me
LeSage came along in June 22nd,
at the time there were no trials at all available
before it's bench trial.
At that point, it was not gonna happen until July 1st
and of course, jury trial, not until September 8th.
So LeSage was at a different phase of these proceedings
in which nobody had a right to
if you had a trial at the time
as justice Gaziano said a moment ago.
In this case, now we can have a bench trial tomorrow.
I think tomorrow might be a bit...
I think he was, there was some hyperbole.
Then we could have a bench trial very soon
as soon as we've got the doctor's reports ready to go
in this case.
Secondly, LeSage doesn't really apply
to this case because it involved
a relatively contemporaneous finding of danger
with regard to the two individuals who are being
held on 58A petitions and a contemporaneous violation
of a release condition for the individual who is being held
on a 58 violation.
Conversely-
-: (indistinct) there and ask you
why this isn't a relatively contemporary news finding
of sexually dangerous person?
Given that as I understand the timeline,
petition number two was the jury found in May, 2015
that your client was in STP beyond a reasonable doubt.
And in this petition was filed two months later?
-: That's correct your honor.
We filed this petition in July of 2015
which is about 67 months ago.
-: Yeah, but few months after he was found
beyond a reasonable doubt to be an STP.
-: That's correct, right.
And then as the trial judge noted in her decision
that allowed our request for a bench trial
we didn't get a trial on that 2015 petition
to do the court congestion until 2018.
And then-
-: There're also time periods when you were trying
to refresh your expert witness, right?
So you were assented to much periods
of delay in order to get your person examined
and try to get his psychological profile updated,
correct?
-: Yes, your honor.
But I think that does require a respectfully
a little bit of qualification.
And the reason I say that is,
as I'm sure the court's aware the process
for the section nine proceedings is somewhat
I don't wanna say rigid
but there's a process in place where petitions are filed
and then trials are assigned.
In this case, Mr. LeSage filed a petition in July of 2015
he wasn't given a trial date until August of 2018.
And that was in the normal course because of the congestion.
-: There're always two of us on this bench right now
that presided over this session.
So we know the timeline and then one year would be fabulous,
but that never happens.
They've filed immediately and then there's long periods
and oftentimes the petitioner assents to the delay
because it's better for the petitioner.
-: Well, your honor, that's the point
that I respectfully withdraw a little bit
of a qualification to win that.
I don't think it's fair to say that Mr. LeSage
(clears throat) excuse me wasn't prepared to go to trial
because he didn't seek funding motions
till a couple of months before trial,
either in 2018 or at last in 2020.
And the reason I say that is we don't know
we being Mr. LeSage and I didn't know
if we were even going to need doctors
until we got the QE reports,
the quantified examiner reports.
So we really weren't in a position to ask for money
to hire doctors until we knew whether or not
the two qualified examiners were going to clear
Mr. LeSage or not.
And in this particular case
I think that carries even a little bit more weight
because again, Mr. LeSage is now 80 years old in both 2018
and in 2020, one of the two quantified examiners
found that he's not sexually dangerous.
So I understand the court's question
but I would respectfully suggest
that it wasn't as if we were just waiting tactically.
We were-
-: I know.
Could you clarify for me, I'm sorry, I should know this.
As far as the pending petition have the QE's weighed in
as far as wherever he is?
I know he's one has to, but it has another one?
-: No, your honor.
The most recent QE reports we have
are from January of 2020, in which case they were split.
One said yes and one said, no (indistinct).
-: My question was split.
-: I can represent to the court.
And I do this with great caution,
but as there's a Commonwealth note that in its brief
last year, when there was a community access board review
and that was in November of 2019, it was unanimous.
All five people found that Mr. LeSage
remained sexually dangerous.
And again, I say this, I think it's relevant
but I received a phone call on Wednesday
that said the most recent community access report,
which was last month had a split decision.
Two out of the five said he was not sexually dangerous
but I haven't seen-
-: No, we don't have that in our record though, right?
-: It's not in your record, no, your honor.
I just thought I should bring it up
because we were asked about whether there's been any update
to the qualified examiner or expert opinions.
So-
-: Mr. Day, could I ask you the first degree murder cases
can't be jury waived as you know
-: Right.
So is there a point in time
where the defendant constitutionally
could request a bench trial on a first degree murder case?
I would think there probably would be
at some point, your honor.
And what I would draw from that
is the first circuits dicta and doodle
which I cite in my brief, which says at some point
with regard to one of these cases as applied delay
even if a fact, even on the face of statute
is constitutional, a delay beyond a period
of a reasonable delay
would trigger the constitutional problem.
I would suggest that to answer your question
the answer would be that yes, at some point
that for what reasons beyond the defendant's control
he just cannot get a jury trial.
Then he would be entitled to a bench trial
to determine whether or not (indistinct).
-: And I know this might be small solace to this case
is marked first case out for the resumption of jury trials?
-: Yes, your honor.
And as we all are, I'm aware of this court's guidance,
as well as the superior courts
ordering a standing order 9-20.
And while I want to be careful how I phrase this
but there is an old saying that I learned
before I became a lawyer that, "No plan survives contact."
And the reason I say that, your honor,
is in this particular context,
we still have a long way to go.
I think even the government, if you want them to go
couldn't give us (indistinct).
-: A plan until the punch in the mouth, that's Mike Tyson.
-: (laughs)Yes, your honor, exactly.
But to answer the question a little more deeply,
the superior court standing order says that these types
of proceedings, I guess the presumption
would be a 12 person jury trial,
STP trials would be weighed with criminal trials
with regard to priority of things
as far as scheduling and that sort of thing.
That's going to create an addition
to the constitutional concerns.
I think about continued delay,
when as you noted a moment ago we could have a bench trial
much sooner than a jury trial.
We're going to run into pragmatic on the ground problems
with bringing people in for jury trials.
When we also have, I anticipate that
Suffolk Superior Lockup is gonna be a very busy place.
Once we get back to any semblance of normalcy.
-: Have you finished Justice Gaziano?
Gaziano: I am, thank you.
Counsel, can you answer two things for me?
One is, do you foresee any situation in which
a six person jury trial would be permissible?
-: Your honor, my response to that
is that the superior court in the standing order
seems or saw a preference for a 12 person jury trial,
unless all parties agree to a six person,
I would feel, I think from my perspective
I feel more comfortable if I had to go with a jury trial
with going with 12 jurors as opposed to six.
But again, I think our position,
my position is that there's no compelling reason
why we can't put this before a superior court judge.
-: Okay, one more question then, can you articulate
for me what the balancing test would be
when weighing your client's rights to a speedy resolution
with the statutory interest that the Commonwealth has?
How should that be articulated?
-: Your honor, again, I would respectfully note
that the Commonwealth statutory interest,
which I perceive as really more tactical than anything else
must yield to the compelling interests that Mr. LeSage
liberty is being deprived at this very moment.
-: So when would the line be drawn in your mind?
Because the statute has to have some meaning.
We have to say that the common, it says demand.
They may demand a jury trial
but you're saying it yields two compelling interests.
The defendant will always have a compelling interest.
Won't he?
-: The defendant will, your honor but under-
-: The petitioner.
-: Right, under petitioners, sure.
But under these circumstances, the government
I would suggest has no compelling interest
and going forward with a jury trial,
when we have these continuing delays
we really have no sense of knowing
when they are going to end.
So the answer to your question is
I would suggest that right now
the line has already been crossed
because the trial judge issued her decision in October 5th.
Now, granted sheets stated so that the Commonwealth,
the followups-
-: It's a question of the amount of time
that we can get into this?
-: Well, yes, your honor.
But I think that that time has now passed.
-: I understand.
I'm just looking for language that would express
the balance here.
-: I think the other way that I consider
the balance your honor, is that again
the Commonwealth is going to suffer no real prejudice.
If we try this case before a judge,
and the Commonwealth has an argument that it will.
But Mr. LeSage-
-: Well, it is interesting if you read the legislation
filed by the governor which is
I take it adopted word for word, right?
-: From what I understand, yes, your honor.
-: And the signing message with the governor
signed message did point out that they felt
like people were being released improperly by judges
at the time and that's why they made this change to a jury.
Whether we can associate the governor's message
with the legislature, they do adopt this in its entirety.
And it's in response to a particular crisis
that happened in 1993 where people are being released
and I guess being hurt, right?
Somebody who's being heard at that time.
By exact defendants, yeah.
-: It goes back to the release of Michael Kelly.
Doesn't it?
1992.
-: That's my understanding, your honor,
but my response is-
-: And that feeds through the whole legislative history
that you can actually go right back to that release
and murder, but your point is
no matter what the legislative intent is
and however strong it might be,
I assume your position different
from a mean scenario is that we have to factor into
calibrating when due process is realized the Commonwealth
and the availability of a bench trial.
-: Yes, your honor, that is my position.
And with regard to the statute
the legislature had honestly believe that
there could be no justice or no community interests
without the jury trial it could very well
have made the statute mandatory jury trials
like it did for first degree murder cases.
I would also, I think it's instructive.
Of all of the underlying criminal offenses
that are predicate offenses for chapter 123A,
in any one of those predicate sexual offenses,
the defendant is authorized to waive a jury
and proceed with a bench trial.
So this idea that there has to be a concrete (indistinct)
-: Articulate the petitioner's interest here
it's not directly his liberty interest, right?
Because he's already been found beyond a reasonable doubt
to be an STP.
It's really more his interest in a speedy resolution
of his third petition.
-: Yes, your honor.
Again, I think the facts here are relevant to Mr. LeSage
particularly given his age he's 80 years old,
given his multiple health concerns.
The fact that the governments or the quantified examiners
are split as to whether or not he's sexually dangerous.
So all those coupled together,
I think makes it even a more striking interest for him
to be entitled to a timely review of his petition.
So he's not held beyond
the point of sexual dangerousness
which is of course, something that we all want to avoid.
Anyone being held
if he isn't any longer, sexually dangerous.
And we already have one quantified examiner
who says he's not sexually dangerous.
We have from what I understand, potentially two
have the interest.
-: Yeah, that goes to the merits, I guess I'm wondering
I was just trying to focus
on what that the government's interest seems to be
in exercising its statutory right to a jury trial
for all the reasons that governor Saluji indicated
and your interest seems to be
in the prevention of a longer delay.
But right now it's been six months.
You wanna just go forward with a bench trial.
It's not really that you're gonna get out of jail,
or the Treatment Center,
it's really a speedy resolution
as to what the eventual outcome will be.
-: That's correct, when I put in my brief
we're not asking for a release.
We're just asking for a timely trial date.
-: Right, does anyone have any other questions?
-: No please.
-: All righty, thank you so much, counsel.
And we'll take our morning stand.