-: SJC 13158, Commonwealth vs. Joesph William Beatty.
-: Okay, Attorney Reardon, whenever you're ready.
-: Good morning Your Honors.
Theodore Reardon on behalf of defendant, Joesph Beatty.
The first issue presented is the defendant's
competency to stand trial, and more particularly
the judges failure to consider
trial counsels representations about how
his relationship was functioning with the defendant.
Now, there's no dispute that there was a substantial amount
of psychological evidence
concerning the defendant's competency,
but the competency is a legal question,
not a medical question.
And the standard under the Drope versus Missouri case
is the defendant is not competent
if he lacks capacity to understand: A,
the nature and object of the proceedings against him,
B, he's unable to consult with counsel,
or C, he's unable to assist in preparing his defense.
Throughout the trial, defense counsel was telling the judge
about how he was unable to work with the defendant.
On the first day of trial he told the judge
that the defendant did not understand
the difference between a jury trial
and a bench trial and a plea.
This case was a serious case
that had been going on for 10 years.
It was a very large amount of discovery
but the defendant thought
that it was gonna to be a one-day trial.
He told the judge that the defendant was not
processing and absorbing these strategic considerations.
-: You know, counsel, I have a question about the competency,
that's something that's usually evaluated
on a very current basis, isn't it?
So, shouldn't we be looking at the last event
regarding competency rather than,
because he had been found competent, not competent,
competent, not, I mean, moving in and out.
So what was the last evaluation on competency?
-: Well, he was evaluated during the trial.
-: So what did they conclude then?
-: Well, again, all of the clinicians did find him competent.
-: What do we do, Mr. Reardon
with the clinicians who appropriately, will get,
what he can communicate,
his capacity to communicate with counsel,
and they say A, and counsel says, "Well, wait a minute,
this is what's happening to me on the ground
and the judge has this conflicting information
it's not the judges call, or how do we assess
what happened with the counsel
versus what the clinicians say?
-: Yes, so that's the nub of the case,
and I refer you to the Crowley case where
in that case, the court considered the defendant's
defense counsels representations of about how
his relationship was functioning and-
-: Is that up to the judge Mr. Reardon?
'Cause in the Crowley case the judge in that instance said,
"I'm going with this,
essentially I wanna hear what you have to say
Mr. or Ms. defense attorney,
or is that the judges call that we hold deference to?
-: I think the judge should consider
all of the evidence beforehand.
-: But his overall decision is something we
defer to, correct?
-: Yes, there is the abusive discretion standard,
but I cite Crowley for the proposition that the judge
should be considering what the defense attorney
is saying about how his relationship is working.
And in this particular case we have evidence
that the judge did not consider that.
In particular,
on the third day of trial defense counsel said,
"He is not able to help me with his case."
and the judge responded,
"I have no evidence of that, sir,
you can't make that argument, you can't inject facts"
I'm referring to this specifically as supporting
that the judge was not considering,
again this is the third day of trial,
three days of the defense attorney talking about how
he was unable to work with the defendant.
-: This is the judge making observations
of the relationship though?
-: Yeah and that's certainly appropriate,
but I mentioned in the brief, he didn't know,
the judge referred to the defendant taking notes
and interacting with the defense counsel,
but the point is the judge didn't know the substance of that
and going to the substance of what the defendant
was writing down or what he was saying to defense counsel.
Defense counsel was telling the judge that it's gibberish
he wants to talk about raise a defense about
his thyroid medications, about whether or not
it should be long term or short term.
-: You know, the challenge, I understand your argument,
I think the challenge is sort of a derivative,
Justice Gaziano's question is that
the judge is right there making observations,
sort of like when the judge is making observations
during jury entailment of jury.
Those observations don't always
make it onto the page in a way that
actually defines what the judge is observing,
and that's a challenge with a factual determination,
legal determination of competency by the judge.
-: It is undoubtedly, but I come back to
the judge should be considering what defense counsel
is saying about how is relationship was working and we-
-: This happened a few time the trail, Mr. Reardon
this defense attorney is saying something about
competency and his inability to communicate effectively
with his client. -: Yes.
-: On those occasions, did the judge
make an explicit finding on either,
not in so many words but credibility
or how did on all those instances did the judge react
to the defense rather than characterizing?
How did the judge react to the reports
from the defense counsel?
-: He doesn't say anything, there's nothing in the record
about the judge saying well, I don't, you know,
trust your judgment about how this,
there's no question of the attorneys credibility
or his assessment or anything like that.
There's nothing on the record.
-: There's no where the judge says you know,
I know you're saying this but he's been examined
all these times and they say he's fine,
well not fine, but you know competent, I should say.
-: Well inevitably that didn't come out
that, you know, I understand what you're saying
but you I had him examined by the clinician
and they finding him competent to stand trial
so I mean yes that is there, but as far as
the attorney's credibility and his representation
there was no finding that that wasn't credible.
The second issue presented Your Honors
is the defendants request for a modification
of the Mutina instruction which instructs the jury about
the consequences of an NGI verdict.
And defense counsel specifically cited to the Chapel case
and requested that there be no references
to the time periods that the defendant would be
committed if he was found not guilty
by reason of criminal responsibility.
In particular the instruction that was given
was the model instruction which talked about
how there would be an initial six month commitment-
-: But the model in Chapel?
-: Yes.
And about how there would be a six month commitment
followed by annual reviews thereafter,
and defense counsel wanted that taken out
and to say that he would be committed
and it would be periodically reviewed.
I would suggest to you that this subsequent case and,
I don't know how to say this, Aguai its a 2021 case,
it is indictor, but the defendant in that case
was requesting that the 6th month time period would be
admitted from the instruction, and the court
seemed to agree with it,
indictor that it shouldn't be there.
So I would suggest to you that the defendant request
is appropriate and it falls with the reasoning
of the Chapel case that talks about how many references
to time standards was more compatible
with the nature of the NGI defense.
Do you Honors have no other questions?
-: That's all, sir. -: Thank you
-: Okay Attorney Alford.
-: Good morning Your Honors, Pamela Alford
for the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth ask this court
to inform the defendants conviction
of first degree murder and aggravated rape
for murder of Mary Beaton.
Here, the judge was well within his discretion
to make a finding of competency,
and ask the counsels representation.
This was not ignored at all.
In fact this was an interactive process.
Starting on day one,
the court clinician was there first thing.
Counsel had the opportunity to both talk to her
and cross examine her.
And so what I would say is that the judge's findings
are informed by the testimony of the clinician.
The counsel had the opportunity
to express his issues to her,
had the opportunity to cross examine her on these issues.
So she could testify as to whether in her
clinical evaluation the defendant understood the difference
between a bench trial and a plea,
and she explained the defendant knows what he wants to do
and could explain why he wanted to do it.
In terms of malleability,
there was a question that the defendant
just go along what you said
and the clinicians testimony was real responsive to this,
nobody was ignoring counsels.
-: Did the clinicians give an opinion
as to what the clinicians believes.
-: Yep, yes -: What happened
as the nature of all opinions,
but here we have, essentially evidence on the ground
where the defense attorney says,
"There may be an opinion that he's capable
of communicating with him, I'm telling ya, he's not."
Doesn't the judge have to address that?
-: He does and I suggest he did.
Because the test is capacity,
the test isn't whether there is good working relationship,
this was the defendants 5th counsel.
The judge had presided over much of the history of this case
including the motion to suppress,
including the prior withdrawal of counsel
on the eve of trial.
And he was entitled to infer that this was a matter
of trial tactics.
-: Did the judge make a finding of malingering?
-: The Judge made a finding as to the claim
of auditory hallucinations that there was some doubt,
that prior clinicians historically had raised
some claim about whether the defendants claims
of auditory hallucinations were accurate, were valid.
The clinicians at trial addressed the defendants claims
of what he determined to be racing thoughts
and addressed will do they interfere
with your thought process,
and the defendant could explained that he could ignore them.
So these were all issues that were fully in play
before the judge.
So it wasn't that defense counsel was being ignored
or discredited, it was that defense counsel
was making lay person claims
which were then addressed by the clinician
on a clinical basis of whether they went to in her opinion,
a deficit in the rational ability to assist counsel,
and then ultimately provided support
for the judge's legal findings,
which were based not only on the clinicians report, because,
and keep in mind, she came twice.
She came right at the beginning of trial,
then trial empanelment after that started,
the second day there were claims on
what were termed at the time
to be impairment of the attorney client relationship,
I suggest you a matter of trial tactics.
Counsel raised that he thought there some irrational things
that the defendant was saying so at the end of the day.
-: You used the word trial tactics to characterize
what the defendant was doing.
Was there a finding that this was trial tactics or antics?
-: Did you say antics, Your Honor?
-: Yeah I get what you're saying is that
some people don't want to be on trial.
-: I also-
-: And I've seen it where defendants will act up
'cause they don't want to be on trial.
But was there explicit finding that this was a tactic?
-: Yes, Your Honor I am using tactic in a different sense.
I suggest that further on in the trial
there were debate counsel,
the defendant wanted to fire counsel
because he wanted to present thyroid expert
who they had noticed, who they had an expert report.
And that counsel explained to the court,
yes we have this expert,
yes that a defense based on parasite issues
involving psychosis could be plausible,
but based on the evidence and medical records
determining the defendants calcium levels,
that the common wealth rebuttable expert,
because the Commonwealth had rebuttable expert
could make this defense a net loss.
So that's the matter of trial tactics.
The defendant wanted to testify,
and that is something that this court said that,
within the autonomy for the defendant to determine
not a matter of competency, and very notable
when the judge is trying to press out
some of these disagreements and he asked the defendant
if he had been explained the right to testify,
the defendant gives an extremely coherent,
answer and he says, "Yes,
my counsel did tell me the law on it
but he said its my right to do so
and he recommends that I don't.
So its clear that some of the disagreements,
and I'm not using the word tactics to say
malingering as not want to be on trial,
I mean tactics like it's a strategy.
Realistic based strategy that there was a real probing
about whether these were irrational claims
and whether these were disagreements between counsel.
And that's why you had the clinician come both on day one
and on day three.
So at the end of the second week of trial
where there appeared to be was a physical event,
the judge appropriately stopped trial, refused the jury,
had what turned out to be a separate clinician come back,
determined that this was likely a stress related event
after she spoke to him,
that the defendant hadn't been sleeping well,
that the racing thoughts had kept him up
and that he was now having trouble focusing.
Adjuring for the weekend at the defendants request
sent him to Bridgewater on section 18.
Looked at medical records that were unremarkable,
the Commonwealth would suggest
on the following Monday before preceding with trial.
So it's not that counsel was ignored,
it's that the judge could rely on the evidence
from the clinician from the previous history
of the defendant being reviewed for competency
at hight stress events and being found competent,
and the history of disagreements with counsel
would determine that the defendant
could rationally assist counsel
and then that it might not have been what counsel wanted
the defendant to say may not have been a particularly
agreeable relationship,
it was in fact a competent relationship
within the defendants control.
-: Ms. Alford, what can we look at in the record
to point to the judge looking at the big picture
and making factual findings and applying those facts
to a law of competency.
So its clear that the judge is adopting his view
on competency and not just taking the views
from the reports of the experts.
-: Yes, Your Honor, so I would say going to,
and I will get you a record cite Your Honor,
so clearly at the end of trial,
the judge said there's no doubt that he's competent
but on day eight, page 78,
so this would be I believe its 3/11/2019 transcript,
and the response to the defense counsels comment
about the curation of issues.
Well the court has wanted to go through this very carefully
because there was a history of incompetency
some period of time ago,
but the issue has been explored multiple times.
At this point you know that the court has engaged
clinician day one of trial.
The clinician reported there was no issue
of competency to explore.
At this juncture the court does not need to consider 18-B
at this point based on the great volume of material it has.
And then later on
day 10 on page 236-239
after the defendant testifies,
the judge notes that the defendant made the election
to testify and responded readily to each question.
No confusion or delay, fully understanding of the question
that he showed functionality through trial.
He took significant notes during the autopsy
and conferred with counsel.
Disagreement as with tactile decision.
The defendant took the stand even if counsel
felt most practicable choice,
it was the defendants choice under law.
And there is also, if I can find it
I know that the judge particularly talks,
actually going back to day eight, page 76,
the judge says, "I don't think I need to into it in detail,
but I had the opportunity to go through Dr. Carol's
report from 2015, I've gone through Dr. Kelso's report
from 2017.
I've gone through a number of records including
Mr. Tatino's motion withdrawal and the materials there,
the court does not see any difference
with what's occurring and what's consistently
been occurring all along
which show that Mr. Beaty has complained about
voice which is characterized as negative thoughts.
They have not seemed to intrude at all,
in fact Dr. Carol raised significant questions
about whether or not they are legitimate.
It appears from every thing
the court has been able to read that
there isn't differences presented when the clinicians
spoke last week to him
would not have been productive to have the clinician
return today to indicate that in conversation to the clerk.
So the judge is making these findings.
He's considering everything he has before him,
all the factors that he has sets out
as the statements the defendant makes, observations,
psyche expert testimonies, psychiatric reports,
the judge had presided
during the prior withdrawal of counsel.
He had a great history with this defendant.
And he was engaging the defendant on these issues
and while he is not required to rely
on the clinicians findings,
the clinicians findings have not been challenged.
The clinicians findings was that she took
what counsel had to say into account.
That she modified or molded some of her questions
in terms of malleability to make she she's not leading him.
She was able to respond the counsels concerns
from a clinical point of view which provides the judge
with basis to finding the defendant was competent.
As for the second issue, Your Honors,
the Commonwealth asserts the defendant's misreading Chapel,
the Chapel was concerned with two factors.
One, was the 40 day observation period,
and two, after the initial 6 month period there wasn't
expressive enough language that the period of commitment
could last indefinitely.
If you look at Chapel's provisional instruction in Chapel
at the appendix it talks about the six months
that counsel now objects to,
and this was modified by this courts
SJC model jury instructions incorporated there.
So there's just simply no internal inconsistency.
There's a difference between an observation period
which is done after trial for 40 days
and the first commitment period which is done
after a finding of reasonable doubt
that the defendant meets the standards to be committed.
Certainly the judge in following the courts
model jury instructions which I suggest
are entirely consistent with Chapel did not air in
or abuse his discretion given that jury instruction
or over ruling the defendants objection.
If there are no further questions
the Commonwealth will rest on its brief.