-: SJC-13271, Commonwealth V Miguel Jones.
-: Okay, Attorney Payne, whenever you're ready.
-: May it please the court,
Assistant District Attorney Cynthia Payne
on behalf of the Commonwealth.
I'd like to begin by providing a very brief overview
of Chapter 279, Section two in the 1996 legislation
that created the youthful offender.
Now, in 1913, the legislature enacted an act relative
to police district municipal courts
in their officials and practice.
That's a precursor to today's 279.2.
Now the language of present day 279.2
is the same as the 1913 version,
with the exception of the reformatory names.
The relevant language in all cases,
the execution of sentences to insert reformatory name
may be suspended and such suspension continued or revoked
in the same manner and with the same effect
as the execution of sentences in criminal cases.
Now, in 1996, the legislature enacted an act
to provide for the prosecution
of violent juvenile offenders.
And this was in response to societal concerns
about violent juvenile crimes,
specifically with firearms committed by juveniles.
Now, as this court has noted in many opinions,
the act made comprehensive changes
to the juvenile justice system
and was intended to eliminate certain protections
previously made available to all juveniles.
Now the act defined youthful offender.
And that's in Chapter 119, Section 52,
an individual age 14 through 18 who commits a felony
and has either been previously committed
to the Department of Youth Services,
has committed an offense involving the threat
or infliction of serious bodily harm, or as relevant, here
has committed a violation of 269.10.A.
Now, the last portion
of the youthful offender definition reads,
provided that nothing in this clause shall allow
for less than the imposition
of the mandatory commitment periods
provided for in Chapter one 119, Section 58.
Now, Chapter 119.58, among many things
sets forth three dispositions a judge may impose
when sentencing a youth law offender.
That's any sentence provided for by law,
a combination sentence, or as relevant here,
a commitment to the Department of Youth Services
until age 21.
Now this court solicited amicus briefs
on the very discreet issue
of where a defendant has been adjudicated
a youthful offender
for violating Chapter 269, Section 10A
whether a judge imposing a sentence pursuant
to Chapter 119.58.C
whether that judge has the authority pursuant
to 279 Section two to commit the defendant
to Department of Youth Services
and then suspend that commitment with probation.
The answer is no.
And that is based on the clear
and unambiguous language contained
in Chapter 119 Sections 52, 58
and Chapter 279, Section two.
I would again direct the court
to the last portion of the youthful offender definition.
Nothing in this clause shall allow
for less than the imposition
of the mandatory commitment periods provided for
in Chapter 119.58.
And I would suggest to the court that where the purpose
of the 1996 Act was to address violent crimes,
specifically firearms, committed by juveniles
where a legislature mandated a DYS commitment
on delinquencies involving firearms
where 269.10.A is the only criminal statute
contained in the youthful offender definition
and where the legislature included
in the youthful offender definition that phrase.
Nothing in this clause shall allow for less
than the imposition of the mandatory commitment periods
provided for in Chapter 119.58.
Finally, where youthful offenders
are considered more dangerous than delinquent juveniles
it defies common sense to read the availability
of a suspended commitment on a youthful offender
who has, with respect to firearm offenses.
-: Counsel, what do you make
of your opposing counsel's distinction
between what's available if you're adjudicated
as a youthful offender versus delinquency?
I mean, I know you say it defies common sense
but isn't the other statutory provision
in conflict with that.
-: Well, I think there's a way by moving on to the language
of 279.2, that there isn't a conflict.
So beyond the clear language,
what Commonwealth would suggest
is the clear language is 119.52 and 58.
The language of 279.
279.2 does not authorize
a suspended commitment with charges
which preclude a suspended sentence like 269.10.A.
The relevant language of.
Did I answer your question?
-: You did.
If I'm hearing you correctly,
you're saying you've gotta read this in harmony.
The other one can't,
the other statutory provision can't infuse into it
something that the judge would not be able to impose
unless you look at the underlying charge.
And if the 10.A says you can't give a suspended sentence
not withstanding this discrepancy, or not discrepancy,
but the delineation between delinquency
and youthful offender, it's too bad.
-: That's correct.
I would say 2.79 gives the juvenile court judge
the authority to suspend commitments
to Department of Youth services
to the same extent that adult sentences may be suspended.
And I would direct the court,
this is not in my brief,
to look at the 1913 report
of committee on legislation, page 46.
By Section two, the suspended sentence idea
is extended to orders of commitment,
not amounting to sentences,
and therefore not within the suspended sentence law.
But beyond, but even looking at the language
of Chapter 279.2, all is not superfluous.
I would suggest the phrase 'in all cases'
means in all cases, which allow for it.
-: You may be right, but just to indicate
the implications of this,
it has implications beyond mandatory minimum sentences.
As we said in the last case,
you can't have a state prison sentence suspended.
So there's gonna be a application
beyond just mandatory minimums like you have with 10.A.
-: Possibly, I would suggest, and I know my sister
has indicated that this interpretation
will absolutely decimate the juvenile justice system.
But in the realm of criminal statutes,
there are really only about 10
that overtly preclude a suspended sentence
in the manner of 269.10.A.
-: No, but let, I just wanna understand the implications
of your argument.
You very carefully went through it
and I understand your point.
But if the sentences can't be something not allowed
in a criminal case,
and if in criminal cases,
other than house of correction sentences,
there can never be a suspended sentence.
Then your argument has implications
beyond mandatory minimum sentences.
-: That may be true.
Lowy: Just trying to get the reach of the decision
if we agree with you.
-: I would go back and I would suggest,
I'm not sure if I said this,
all is modified in this respect by
in the same manner and with the same effect
as the execution of sentences and criminal cases.
Now, I would refer the court to the 1913 marginal notation
which summarized the statute.
As you would call, the 1913 version.
Same verbiage with the exception of the reformatory names.
That's acts 1913, Chapter 471, Section two
which reads the execution of certain orders
of commitment may be suspended.
I would suggest to this court
that the phrase 'certain orders'
is indicative of the legislative intent
that all means all cases that allow for it.
Now, Chapter 119, Section 53
mandates that Sections 52 through 63 be construed liberally.
And as far as practicable,
-: Counsel, can I ask you a more practical question?
This is done so often
that it has been embedded in juvenile court forms.
Right?
So, I guess I'm wondering,
have they just had this wrong all of this time
in that the folks that do this every day,
including the sign off of the chief of the department.
Did just get this wrong?
-: Well, I did walk this back a little bit
'cause here I'm saying that it depends in part
on the underlying statute,
but if we were to go down that route,
I mean, this isn't an issue
that the court has analyzed.
So just because it's on a pre-printed form,
that doesn't necessarily mean it's correct.
I mean there are model jury instructions
that this court has determined were not quite correct.
So I think especially here.
-: And so given that,
what does the rule of lenity tell us?
-: Well, I would suggest that the rule lenity does not apply
because the language of 119.52
Sections 58 and 279.2 are not ambiguous at all.
More over the
-: But in connection with your argument,
you're pointing us to a report
and notes about interpreting certain, not all cases,
in certain cases.
And so it seems embedded in your argument,
the necessity to find some sort of ambiguity
in order to reach the construction
you're asking us to impose.
And so I'm wondering, given your argument itself,
it's structure, how you're focused does here
at oral argument and in your briefing,
why doesn't the rule of laity quintessentially apply here?
-: I would suggest my direction
to look at the marginal notes.
As more of corroboration of the commonwealth's point.
I would suggest that the, certainly the intent
of the legislature in enacting the 1996
-: And when, in the cannons of construction,
when do we look at the legislative intent?
-: We look, the court looks at the verbiage.
-: The plain language of the statute
is where we start, right?
-: And we reach to the legislative intent,
the reports, the et cetera,
only in cases where there's an ambiguity
and that's where you're pointing us.
-: I would suggest though,
the Commonwealth's underlying argument
that there is no, there is no ambiguity
because the in the Commonwealth's viewpoint
the language is not ambiguous.
-: Well, the language, 279.2,
is not ambiguous but arguably it's inconsistent
with other statutes.
So does that allow for the rule of lenity?
-: Well, if it were going to,
if you were going to supersede,
if that's the route or are you talking about it
at like implied repeal, is that?
-: No, I'm saying that in the same manner as criminal cases.
There's not a lot of ambiguity there.
But, you've got other statutes
that talk about how we address juvenile cases in general.
And we've got,
I know this is not legislative interpretation,
we've got this embedded
in juvenile court best practices for sentences.
It's pretty out there.
-: I understand that this is best practices
and certainly the rehabilitative umbrella
of the juvenile court,
but I would point the court to the language.
So although 52 and through 63 have to be construed liberally
the court left in the language
as far as practicable, children brought before the court
be treated not as criminals,
but as children in need of aid, guidance, and support.
But the language as far as practicable,
which actually the Connor Court, Connor C Court,
brought to mind too, that's very important
especially in the light of the whole reason
behind the 1996 act,
which was to address violent crimes,
specifically firearms, committed by juveniles.
And I would also mention to the court
that it's very notable that 279.2
does not fall under that liberally construe mandate.
Now, again, where the legislature
set out to address gun violence where 269.10.A
is the only statute contained
in the youthful offender definition
where the legislature mandated a DYS commitment
on delinquencies involving firearms
where the legislature mandated that nothing
in the youthful offender definition clause
shall allow for a less than the imposition
of the mandatory commitment periods provided in 119.58
and where 269.A precludes a suspended sentence.
At a minimum, the Commonwealth is asking this court
to determine that as in the issue
that was solicited to the amicus
where a judge has adjudicated a defendant,
a youthful offender on a charge
of 269.10.A and a sentence
pursuant to 119.58.C
the judge does not have the authority under 279.2
to suspend that commitment.
Unless the court has any other questions
the commonwealth would rest.
-: Great, thank you.
Payne: Thank you.
-: Okay, Attorney Fratis.
-: Good morning and may it please the court,
Debbie Fratis on behalf of the youth appellee, Miguel Dones.
Here, the juvenile court had discretion
to suspend the youth's commitment
because the language of the statutes at issue
can be read harmoniously to give the judge that discretion.
And for that reason, the youth asked the court
to reaffirm the judge's discretion
to impose a DYS commitment to 21
and then suspend that commitment
as one of the sentencing options
for youthful offenders in the juvenile court.
So I think I'll begin by addressing an issue
that I think I've heard in the background here.
And that's the lack of language
allowing for suspension of DYS commitments
under Chapter 119 19, Section 58C
is not dispositive of the lack of that option here.
That's where, it's because where the legislature
has intended to prohibit the suspension of commitments
to DYS, specifically for Chapter 269.10.A,
firearm possession cases.
The legislature knows exactly how to do that.
-: But why would they do it for the more serious.
I mean for the less serious juvenile offender,
prevent suspension in that context,
but allow it in the context of a youthful offender.
It just seems backwards, right?
-: So I think it's in relation to the fact
that the legislature has provided the judge
in a youthful offender proceeding so much more discretion
and more sentencing options
than what a judge in a delinquency would have.
And so I think if it seems as though it's not making sense,
it's probably because we are comparing apples and oranges
in that we're comparing the maximum on a delinquency case.
But the more apt comparison then is the maximum
on a youthful offender case.
And that would be a sentence as provided by law.
Meaning the same sentence
that a court could sentence an adult to.
When we are comparing the maximum on a delinquency case
to what is essentially the minimum
on a youthful offender case.
It's not surprising that that would seem.
-: So when you take,
I mean when we look at the juvenile statutes altogether
and the youthful offender statutes,
we look at this one way.
But there's another way to examine this
and that's through the lens of the gun legislation
and the intent of the legislature with regard to that.
And the way that the juvenile would be treated
by the not having the probation or the suspension
would be consistent wouldn't it with the adult?
What happens to adults?
-: Well, so I do think the legislature has signaled
its intent to treat gun crimes more seriously
in that to the best of my recollection,
I believe 269.10.A is the only possessory crime
for which a youth could be indicted.
All of the other crimes requiring,
I believe, some form of violence.
Meaning the actual infliction or threat
of serious infliction of harm.
So being the only possessory crime, it is serious
although I think the legislature has provided
the appropriate sentencing option.
Certainly the judge even here could have provided
the full adult sentence to a child, essentially.
So the judge had that option.
But the individualized sentencing requirements
in the juvenile court are best suited by allowing the judge
to weigh the interest of public safety
and the need of the individual before him for rehabilitation
to decide between any of the three options.
Which includes a commitment to 21,
which thereafter can be suspended.
And it can be suspended because the legislature
has not taken away that power of the court and it
-: But counsel, what do you say to the point
that whatever the judge can mead out
is cabined by the charge.
So to the extent that it might say, generally speaking,
that the sentencing judge has these three options,
you still can't divorce that
from looking at the underlying charge.
And if the underlying charge says you've gotta do 18,
you've gotta do 18.
So even though it might say
that you can have a YO or a delinquency
and you can have these three options,
that you really don't have those three options
when you look at the underlying charge.
What do you say to that?
-: So thank you your Honor,
to that I would say that that is certainly true
if the judge had decided to sentence the youth
under 119.58.A, which allows for the sentence
as provided by law.
It is not true for the other two options
which is the adult combination sentence
or the commitment to DYS.
-: What gets, what should
what gets you out of the other two options, I guess.
Say it differently.
Fratis: I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.
-: No, please.
-: If we were to apply 269.10.A,
and how it compares to the YO sentencing statute,
I believe that 269.10.A only allows for commitment
to a house of correction or commitment to the state prison.
Although here, I believe even in the Commonwealth's brief,
they concede that at least the judge
in the YO could have committed to DYS instead.
I think that also is true for option two,
the combination sentence,
in that I believe 269.10.A precludes
a suspended sentence.
But of course, option B under Chapter 119, Section 58
specifically allows for the suspension of an adult sentence.
And so for that reason, I think it's important
that we recognize that as long as the judge
is sentencing the youth as a youth using one of the options
other than Chapter 119, Section 58.A,
the sentence is provided by law.
The judge has the opportunity
to actually treat him as a juvenile
and not consider the limitations
that would otherwise be imposed on an adult.
-: You began your presentation with
read harmoniously it gets you to.
Can you just gimme the ABCs
of how I read this harmoniously?
Given an option C and a 10.A conviction,
give me the statutory rundown
on how we get to a suspended sentence, please.
-: Yes, I'm happy to do that.
So we begin with Chapter 119.58.C
that allows for the judge to impose a commitment to 21.
The judge can thereafter suspend that
because the legislature has allowed the suspension
of commitments "in all cases"
in Chapter 279, Section two.
The judge once imposing that commitment and suspending it
may offer the youth probation conditions
under Chapter 270. Excuse me.
Judge: 76.
-: Yes, thank you, your Honor. 276 Section 87
Gaziano: One of those is pretrial
probation though, right?
-: So I believe Chapter 276, Section 87
governs both pretrial and probation
after a finding of guilt.
-: 87, you think? Freitas: Yes, your Honor.
-: Is more than pretrial probation?
Freitas: Yes, your Honor. -: Okay.
-: I believe it allows the judge to impose
probation conditions in "any case" after a finding of guilt.
-: So just to recap, the ABCs are 58.C,
279.2, and then probation with 87.
-: Yes, your Honor
-: Can you explain to me how the 279.2
allows a suspended sentence
if it has to be imposed in the same manner
with the same effect as execution of sentences
in criminal cases and the other
wouldn't be the availability of a suspended sentence?
Freitas: Yes, your Honor. -: Thank you.
-: So the Commonwealth reads the language in 279.2
as synonymous to the same extent,
but that is not the plain language of 279.2.
The plain language there is in the same manner
and with the same effect.
That language does not limit the availability
of suspended commitments,
it analogizes to
the adult criminal case system.
And that's because the 1996 amendments did a lot of things
but they didn't eviscerate the treatment of children
who violate laws that they're not criminal proceedings
not even youthful offender cases.
And so what it does is it provides an analogy
for otherwise we wouldn't,
that language wouldn't have any effect in the same manner
and in the same extent allows us to then be able
to continue or revoke cases where otherwise.
-: Can we make an argument that even if 279.2
wouldn't allow for the suspension
of criminal case,
and here we have a youthful offender
and so they couldn't be able to receive a suspended sentence
arguably, under the plain language of 279.2.
But if you go to 119.58,
in the actual statute that we're looking at,
sub paragraph B actually allows
for a suspended sentence and then therefore
we're looking at something more specific.
-: So I don't think that the fact
that the language doesn't appear in 58.C
but does in B is necessarily dispositive
of what the judge could not or could do under option C.
And that's because the legislature has demonstrated
that where they wanted to take away a judge's power
to impose a suspended DYS commitment,
it knows how to do that.
And it did so in Chapter 119, Section 58,
specifically the seventh paragraph.
There, the legislature was unambiguous about taking away
a judge's opportunity to suspend that sentence.
And this court itself in Connor C,
granted it was 20 years ago, looked at that provision
and determined it did not apply to youthful offenders.
And I believe at that time the court addressed
whether or not that would be an incongruous result
given that youthful offenders are a more serious category
of charging than delinquents.
And this court said no.
And that's because the sentence
for a youthful offender is more severe
in that a delinquency charge
and the jurisdiction of the court ends at 18.
And that is not true for a youthful offender.
That child continues to have
an enduring relationship with the court.
And so of course a suspended sentence is not a promise
that they will not be committed.
It says today you will not be.
And so the enduring relationship,
a period of three years longer
than what a delinquent would be,
a delinquent child would be exposed to.
That matters.
In fact for a child who's 18,
three years represents one sixth of their life,
that's a significant amount of time
and certainly a more severe sentencing option
than the ones that are provided to delinquent children.
And so if there are no other questions,
I'd be remiss if I didn't note
that the Commonwealth has certainly relied
on the plain language and has come
to the opposite conclusion that I have
even though I also have argued
that it is the plain language that governs here.
And the Commonwealth has also offered numerous
principles of statutory construction
in support of its view, as have I.
And so if the court,
if there's any plausible way that the statutes
can be read ambiguously,
I remind the court that the rule of lenity
requires that the court view that
as the child being entitled
to the benefit of that ambiguity.
-: Right, you know, a disagreement doesn't mean
that it's ambiguous.
-: Yes, your Honor, I do understand that.
If there are no further questions, I'll rest on my brief.