-: SJC-13394 Commonwealth v. William McDermott.
-: All righty, Attorney Barnwell.
-: Madam Chief Justice, and may it please the court,
Hayne Barnwell on behalf of William McDermott.
In Watkins, this court held
that even when a defendant has received
prior plenary review, the court doors remain open
to remedy a grave lingering injustice.
Here, the grave lingering injustice is of a piece
with the widespread fear and disgust of gay men
that prevailed in the 1980s.
As the appeals court emphasized in Baron,
homophobia prevailed not only in communal beliefs
and ignorance, but also within the legal system itself.
Here, the prosecutor wielded those prejudices
against Mr. McDermott and a corroborative defense witness
to discredit them, and thereby achieve a guilty verdict.
The egregious prosecutorial misconduct should have been
remedied long ago.
This court can now remedy it,
and with that remedy show the public and gay people,
whether they appear in court as victims, defendants,
witnesses, or advocates, that bigotry will be condemned,
no matter when or how it expresses itself.
-: What about the parole hearing?
Because everything you say is obviously true.
It echoes off the wall, disgusting,
but what about the parole hearing?
Because one might say the same thing
about the defense if it's not true.
-: The parole board statements are not relevant
to whether he had a fair trial in 1982.
Obviously, the jury would not have been aware
of those statements.
Those statements came decades later.
-: What is the standard under rule 30, though?
-: Under rule 30, it's broadly whether justice was done.
-: So isn't the question of whether justice was done impacted
by what your client said at the parole hearing in 2012,
or in fact just six days before he filed
the motion for a new trial?
-: No, because under Commonwealth versus Azar,
the substantial risk standard, and I concede that we are now
under a substantial risk standard.
We're no longer under the broad sort
of just whether justice was done.
But Azar says that we look at the errors in the context
of the trial, and the context of the trial,
of course, would not have the parole board statements.
The other issue is-
-: Did Azar not parole board statements?
Atty. Barnwell: I'm sorry?
-: Did Azar involve parole board statements?
Atty. Barnwell: They did not, but it's-
-: So this is a new issue that we need to address?
Atty. Barnwell: That is true.
-: And we also alluded to this in Pfeiffer that, you know,
this does relate to the trial, because you still,
you have to zoom out a little bit, and this is important,
because it's part of the credibility of your position.
If we were to do this understanding
what the defendant has said at the parole board hearing,
isn't there a chance that we make a mockery of our system?
That we know that there's this,
and I understand that you discredit what he says
at the parole board hearing, and all of the impetus,
and the pressure to allocute.
Assume for the sake of argument that he lied
about what he said,
and so now just think about what this looks like.
He gets a new trial based on a lie because of a concern
that he was exploiting the same prejudices
that you're telling us, that you're talking about.
It works both ways.
-: [Participating Justice] That he utilized.
That's the problem, that he utilized.
-: Well, certainly I am not the final arbiter of the truth
of these statements, and more importantly,
the Commonwealth is not the final arbiter of truth
with regard to these statements.
The way the court could write the opinion is to say
the integrity of the system is undermined
by the bigotry at this trial.
As far as the parole board statements,
those have not been vetted through.
Actually, in many ways, these things have to be vetted,
one, through a pretrial investigation by the defense.
The defense attorney will certainly zealously investigate
this, is there any substantiation for it, yes or no?
There's still trial counsel.
Does trial counsel say this happened?
I have a feeling he'll say no,
and so then we he would be put on the witness list,
then they have-
-: You want us to be duped, right?
Atty. Barnwell: I'm sorry?
-: It's okay if we are duped?
-: Well, that assumes these are reliable.
That assumes these are voluntary.
-: Well, and categorically, you say that any facts
that weren't added, were not submitted
to the jury shouldn't be considered, correct?
Atty. Barnwell: Should not be considered, correct.
-: All right, There's a kind of a heads I win,
tails I lose argument that defense is making in that.
Did you consider the case of Commonwealth versus Douds?
Commonwealth versus Douds were brain injury evidence
that were not admitted in front of the jury,
and we allowed relief to the defendant,
saying it was unfair.
He gets a new trial, or got a reduction,
I think, to a second degree because of these facts
on the interest of justice.
But those were facts that were outside the trial record,
not presented to the jury.
So why is it okay to use the evidence in Douds,
but not use a parole board hearing?
-: I am lucky that I worked on Douds a long time ago,
so I'm familiar with that case, so I think the appropriate-
J. Gaziano: I wrote it, that's why I'm asking.
-: Oh, no, I understand.
I think otherwise I wouldn't have known about Douds.
That's why I'm saying that.
So with Douds, my recollection is,
so the defense brought that up.
The defense brings that up through,
I believe that was 33-E.
J. Gaziano: Post-trial.
-: Post-trial, 33-E.
So I think a good analogy there would be
if the defense submits medical records and they are just,
they're false, they're fabricated,
obviously, the Commonwealth can come back and say,
"You can't consider that, it's fabricated."
-: Well, I get what you're saying about the,
I think it's a Kentucky case, and I read
Medwood's bar review article as well for that point,
and I think that he provides some supplemental authority
recently that says just categorically take out the parole.
So if we categorically take it out, that's not an issue,
but if we don't take it out,
I'm wondering where we are with respect to facts
not adduced to the jury.
When it's good for you, you know,
it's in the interest of justice, but it's not good for you,
it's not in the interest of justice,
so we don't consider them.
-: Well, you don't consider them for purposes
of post-conviction motion,
especially where the motion is in this case.
I have, you know, Mr. McDermott never raised
newly discovered evidence limited only to the record,
and so there's a fundamental fairness problem with that.
But also what the court could say is,
"It's just not for us to decide.
It's for a judge during pretrial to determine
are these statements reliable in the first instance,"
and any other arguments, I can think of many, by the way,
that defense attorney could make to at least try to get out
most if not all of these statements,
and then it's for the jury to decide.
He wasn't only under oath that one time.
He was under oath four times.
So does the jury believe that he told the truth
the first three times?
Does the jury believe he told the truth?
No, you know what?
I don't believe those passed
consistent with the defense statements.
I now believe what the Commonwealth urges me to believe,
which is that fourth one under oath.
The fourth one where he says,
"Okay, I did it, you're right," you know?
And the first three denials,
if you look carefully at the first three,
when he's consistent with his defense,
what do they tell him?
"We don't believe you, we don't believe you."
-: If we agree with you as far as the parole board goes,
we follow what Medwood says in Kentucky.
Well, although the Kentucky court doesn't reach it.
Atty. Barnwell: I'm sorry?
-: I'm sorry, it's probably because I'm mumbling.
The Kentucky court doesn't reach the issue ultimately.
-: And that's exactly right,
and that's exactly what this court could say.
We're not gonna reach it, that's for the jury.
-: But let me ask you, the next question is,
suppose we agree with you, all right?
And we say categorically because the motive is to mollify
the parole board, and we we exclude them,
isn't the remedy to remand it to the trial,
to the motion judge, to exclude the parole board issue,
and then decide the case anew?
-: The motion judge is that?
That is I am asking for that for alternative relief.
However, this court could also decide it on the record.
This court has all of the materials it needs
to decide the issue, so there's no special,
you know, deference to the motion judge.
This is limited to the record.
This isn't about, you know,
credibility of witnesses, for example,
at the evidentiary hearing.
-: But the motion judge did weigh in, and-
Atty. Barnwell: That's true.
-: Right.
-: And that's why I ask you for an alternative that at least,
you know, to give us a second chance at that.
The other issue in this case, of course, is that
this homophobia that began with this question
about Skippers, you know,
have you visited the Skippers bar?
And then of course, the closing argument where he calls,
he derives the corroborative defense witness
as a male prostitute.
He's proud that he's gay.
I mean, you can just, you know,
sometimes I know the court says when you read a transcript,
it's cold, you know, it's cold.
We're just reading a cold transcript.
-: But didn't those comments particularly draw
the ire of Justice Liacos, Chief Justice Liacos,
when he reduced the verdict to a second degree?
-: No, no, the verdict, are we discussing the 1984 opinion?
J. Gaziano: Right.
-: The 1984 opinion centered on the extreme atrocity
or cruelty instruction, and that had to do
with he did not instruct, over defense objection,
he did not instruct that intoxication could be considered.
-: My memory's the same as Justice Gaziano,
that the 33-E reduction did consider
the nature of the defense, that's my memory.
-: Oh, and that's true,
so it said the entire posture, you know,
we'll consider the defendant's testimony,
we'll take that under consideration that that's right,
that there was the error, but then there was
the what now what do we do with the error?
And so we'll consider the defendant's testimony as well as-
-: Well, if the homophobia was one factor,
why they reduced it to second degree, correct?
-: No, he doesn't say that there was any problem
with what the prosecutor did.
No, there there's no discussion of that.
It's more about this was the defense,
we'll sort of take consideration of the defense
that this was self-defense against another attempted rape.
That's what that was about.
When there's mention of homosexuality at all,
that's what that's about.
You know, we're gonna consider your defense, basically,
not that there was any error by the prosecutor in this case.
-: So assuming we agree with you
that the comments were unacceptable,
articulate for me your best case for a substantial risk
of a miscarriage of justice.
-: So I think there are two cases, Modi,
and I'm sorry if I mispronounce this case, Disodario.
So Modi talks about how this is essentially,
this is when there's prejudice infected in a trial,
and that was particularly talking about racial
and religious prejudice, but it certainly applies here
with anti-gay prejudice, that it has a unique ability
to undermine the right to a fair trial.
It denies constitutional due process.
-: So can you be more specific?
So again my premise is I agree with you
that the homophobic atmosphere was unacceptable,
inappropriate, and so that conduct
by the prosecutor was misconduct.
The motion judge articulates, I thought quite well,
while there's overwhelming evidence
of the defendant's guilt, including that he shot the victim,
I don't know, 11 times in two different physical locations,
requiring him to stop and reload the murder weapon,
requiring him to drag the victim to the 18th hole
and shoot him there as well.
Why is that not overwhelming evidence of guilt
that despite the homophobic atmosphere,
which again is inappropriate,
would suggest that this is an affirmance?
-: Well, I'll work backwards.
So with regard to the bullets found near the body,
there were certainly competing inferences there.
One competing inference was that Mr. Kemp shot at the trees.
He actually shot his gun, I guess to test it out,
out by the trees by the 18th hole where his body was found.
The other competing inference-
-: So let's just say that, okay,
not shot in two physical locations,
but there is the reloading of the gun, right?
There definitely must have been.
Atty. Barnwell: Yes. -: Yes, so all right,
so given that there was a shooting of the victim nine times,
reloading, and then doing it two more times,
let's say that's how it went,
why is that not overwhelming evidence
that this death was premeditated?
-: So in order to judge whether that was guilt, you know,
guilt of murder or guilt of say, manslaughter,
because manslaughter went to the jury,
the jury had to judge the credibility
of both Mr. McDermott and Mr. Werner.
And Mr. McDermott testified that he was drunk,
he was confused, he was traumatized, he was frightened.
There was no evidence about how long he was taking between,
you know, any reloading so that he could have still been
in this traumatized, frantic state, and as the jury,
unfortunately was not instructing this case,
this is one of the errors that I put in the brief,
they were not instructed about provocation really,
so there wasn't an instruction, for example,
that there has to be, I think this is Stokes,
there has to be sufficient time between the provocation
and for the passions to cool.
There was no evidence like that,
so the jury could have at the very least,
returned a manslaughter verdict if, you know,
they weren't obscured and undermined
by the homophobic invective in this trial.
-: How do you explain the fact that your client's statement
of the rape, and then the way he lays out the facts,
as Justice Wendlandt has stated,
is wholly inconsistent with the factual record?
I mean, he's way off as far as shell casings go,
and the like.
Shouldn't we take that into consideration,
that his statement is just not credible,
and a jury could find-
Atty. Barnwell: Are you credible referring
to the trial testimony?
-: Right.
-: So there are times when he, you know,
this is a 17 year old boy, you know,
testifying on the stand.
He's crying, he's traumatized.
He doesn't recall certain things,
but that's consistent with, you know, being drunk,
being disoriented, being traumatized.
So he doesn't, you know, recall reloading.
-: Yeah, but we've got him stealing the guy's stuff,
his watch, and his pockets are turned out.
I mean, it completely corroborates
the Commonwealth's theory of robbery.
-: But the jury acquitted him of robbery,
and they could have found,
they could have rejected it all together, because there was-
-: Well, there's no evidence anything was taken,
but the point is that you've got an uphill battle
on the facts as far as your client's statement
and what the physical evidence shows, correct?
-: I'm sorry, could you repeat?
-: Yeah, the facts are really wholly inconsistent
with your client's testimony.
-: I don't agree with that, no,
but as this court found in Vargas,
and in this court's opinion in 1984, this court said
that the jury could have relied on extreme atrocity
or cruelty to come to first degree murder,
and as this court found in Vargas, extreme atrocity
or cruelty shares a lot of factors with manslaughter.
So at the very least it was open to them.
It was at least plausible they could have come back
with manslaughter in this case.
-: And given that they came back with M two,
this court did in '94, was it?
Atty. Barnwell: I'm sorry?
-: This court, '84, reduced the verdict to murder two,
doesn't that suggest that this court in '82, '84,
thought there was sufficient evidence of malice?
How do we square that
with what you're asking for in terms of manslaughter?
-: Well, because this isn't a sufficiency case.
This is what the jury could have found.
-: How do we with any degree of integrity say
this is manslaughter, no malice,
when in '84, the court concluded that it was murder two.
-: Because there's no indication that this court considered
all of the errors that I'm raising here today,
and as this court said in Watkins, no one is infallible,
and that goes triple when gay citizens didn't have
equal citizenship in 1984.
And if there are no further questions.
-: Thank you.
Okay, Attorney McGee.
-: Good morning, Chief Justice Budd.
So the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court,
may it please the court,
where there was overwhelming evidence of malice
of forethought, the motion judge properly found
that there was no hypothetical path
to a manslaughter verdict, and appropriately denied
the defendant's second motion for new trial,
and where the defendant proposes no,
the defendant presented no basis
for the unprecedented relief that she asked for right now,
in the effect of a double 33-E review.
The Commonwealth is asking that this court not grant
the defendant's second motion in the trial.
-: There's no case that I saw, and you didn't set anything
that allows parole board testimony
in post-conviction proceedings, correct?
-: The motion judge handled this appropriately,
I would suggest, in the footnote in-
-: Well, the answer to that is yes, right?
Atty. McGee: That's correct.
-: You want us to be the first court to allow that.
-: That's, well, what I would suggest is
the motion judge did not err in stating that
albeit the statements were made post,
these statements made post judgment certainly take
the sting out of the defendant's claims,
it doesn't excuse-
-: What kind of standard is that, right?
Doesn't take the sting out of the defendant's claims.
What kind of standard, is it considered or not?
What's the Commonwealth's position,
should it be considered or not?
-: Well, the Commonwealth's position is that here,
the prosecutor's statements certainly represent misconduct.
The remarks during-
-: No, in terms of considering the defendant's statement
to the parole board in 2012,
what's the Commonwealth's position,
should that be considered on a rule 30 motion or not?
-: Like a 25-B2 motion,
the statements outside the record could be considered
in the context of a rule 30 motion
in the interest of justice.
They certainly go to the credibility
and the weight of the defendant's now statements,
but I would suggest on the issue of substantial risk
of a miscarriage of justice,
on that level, they don't excuse the prosecutor's conduct.
-: Have you done a multi-state review?
I know Justice Gaziano brought up Kentucky.
Have you done that or not?
Do we know if other states consider this or not?
Atty. McGee: I have not, Your Honor, but what I would-
J. Kafker: So the research hasn't been done
is what you're telling us?
-: Correct, but I would suggest that under Pfeiffer,
obviously in June, the court considered
mental health reports that weren't presented to the jury,
and the court found that if it is relevant
to the defendant's defense in the case,
that it's an appropriate consideration for the judge.
-: Yeah, there are different,
so in Douds were mental health records as well, right?
So we have psychiatric treatment,
hospital records, et cetera.
There's a certain amount of credibility attached, right?
That's why we have a statute that allows for admissibility.
Here, as the Medwood article points out
and the Kentucky court, writes,
you just don't have that credibility component
or the same motives that you have
when someone's basically trying
to find their way out of parole.
You have less of a motivation.
Someone's trying to mollify the parole board,
and say what they have to say, right?
That's what the law review article essentially says.
-: I would suggest that every case stands
on its own two feet.
The defendant here over the last 15 or so years
before three different parole boards has stated
the same exact thing, that this was a murder to rob,
and that the victim in no way touched him,
and was a nice person, so that's, I mean-
-: I think the challenge here that's sort of palpable is not,
this isn't just, oh, there was a statement,
inculpatory statement at the parole hearing.
Yes, I actually did it.
It's that we've got an issue here
of just appalling conduct, playing to attitudes,
homophobic attitudes, and the issue is whether that reaches
the level of prejudice for a new trial.
It's not a prophylactic remedy,
but whether it reaches at that level.
And the problem with the parole board statements is that
if they weren't true, and this was the defense,
that was really a disgusting appeal to homophobia as well.
And so it's sort of hard to separate,
in this particular case, although we may need to.
-: Certainly, and I'm mindful
of also Justice Cypher's concurring opinion in due
where she spoke about the integrity of the justice system.
And in addition to the denigration of homosexuals
in the prosecutor's remarks, there's also this aspect
that this defendant has essentially created
two lines of cases.
Because of his appeals of his parole board cases,
you essentially have two separate lines of appeals
relying on two separate sets of facts.
-: And so what does that, conclude that statement for me.
-: In the interest of justice, under rule 30,
I think that's something,
these secondary statements can certainly be considered
by the court, but here, the judge didn't,
and I think that was appropriate.
-: Well didn't, but how do you know that the judge didn't?
-: Because he didn't rely upon these in his findings.
But for a footnote saying that they didn't-
-: But mentioned them in the decision, right?
-: In a footnote, he actually said the opposite.
He didn't excuse the prosecutor's conduct.
I mean, these statements
that were made post-trial don't excuse
the prosecutor's conduct during the trial itself.
-: But he found a level of comfort in the fact
that they had been made.
Atty. McGee: He did not find a level of comfort.
I would suggest that he just simply said that they might-
-: No, can I go back to justice, I think Lowy's question,
parole board statements, aren't they inherently coercive?
Atty. McGee: Inherently?
-: Yeah, so making them not necessarily a reliable basis
upon which to judge whether justice has been done?
-: Perhaps nationwide, but certainly in our parole setting-
-: So you've done a nationwide survey on this?
Atty. McGee: I don't know. -: Okay.
(overlapping speech)
Massachusetts, yeah.
-: Because I'm only familiar with the parole board here,
and the defendant's given an opportunity-
-: But so is being prosecuted for murder, right?
So if if he's prepared to lie to the parole board,
maybe he's prepared to make up a defense
that has no basis as well, right?
So again, it goes both ways.
I mean, yeah, you're under pressure
to cave to the parole board,
but if you're that kind of person,
maybe you're also caving,
and you're creating a false defense.
So again, it just seems like it's difficult to analyze,
but it's more complicated than,
it's two-sided, this whole thing.
-: Yes, and there's certainly different interests at stake
at the parole board, and the trust in that individual
to be able to successfully reenter in the community
without crime, and without any sort of risk
of harm to the public.
Here, though, on the substantial risk
of a miscarriage of justice standard,
there were overwhelming facts of the defendant's guilt,
and additionally, in 1984,
the court did consider the defense,
and did rely upon that defense, and found that
under the circumstances and under 33-E review,
that this should be,
that the defendant should stand convicted
for second degree murder.
-: There's one thing we haven't talked about, though,
which when we're dealing with the substantial risk here,
and what was the extent of the prejudice,
and it's that my sense is that the judge didn't really do
a good job restraining any of this, and arguably,
may have, to some extent, augmented the concern.
What do you think of that?
-: Well, under these facts, and I would,
as far as the prejudice to the defendant,
there were very strong facts
of premeditated deliberate murder.
The defendant used the victim's gun,
was stealing from him, took his gun,
and shot him 11 times with a nine shotgun,
moved him to the 18th hole,
and there were casings found at the 18th hole.
He had emptied out his pockets,
took his wedding ring, and fled to Pennsylvania.
As far as the defense, going to the defense of this-
-: I'm confused by why it's relevant
that there are casings at the 18th hole, why is that?
-: Perhaps he was not dead,
or perhaps he shot him again and couldn't explain it.
-: It also shows he lied when he gave the first statement,
'cause he said he didn't shoot him on the golf course.
-: And the jury was free to credit that or discredit it.
And also to Your Honor's point about the defense is that
the defendant here, if we took his statement
at his testimony, said that he was raped,
and that Mr. Edmonds arrived with the meat truck,
and that he went out to the meat truck,
and he brought the meat out to it and tried to leave.
He had an opportunity, and that still despite that,
shot the defendant with his own gun,
and the jury was free to discredit that
and to find that that wasn't a proper self-defense,
and that is likely what happened here.
The court disagreed with that in some,
or credited to some extent the defendant's story here,
and actually found that
as a mitigating circumstance here under 33 review.
They considered his age, they considered
that he might have been under the influence
of alcohol or marijuana.
They also considered that he suffered from an attack,
and under those circumstances,
they already reduced this to second degree murder,
making him eligible for parole.
He would've been eligible for parole anyway,
but he's had parole hearings every five years
since 15 years out,
and that was what the SJC found back then,
and what I would ask the court under these circumstances is
certainly to find that the prosecutors' remarks
of homophobia were improper, but I would ask
that under the circumstances of the totality of the case-
-: Well, it's more than the remarks, though,
because you have him call on the other witness, you know,
say, "Well, he can't be gay,
'cause he didn't come on to me," right?
There's that witness,
and then the examination of the wife, right?
And saying he was a good red-blooded American,
he wouldn't have done this.
So it was more than just remarks.
It was the tenor of the prosecution.
J. Lowy: An unrestrained tenor,
which is the point I was making.
-: But with respect to Werner, the witness to corroborate
that the victim was in fact gay,
the prosecutor's questions to him,
or remarks about him in his closing argument
about that you shouldn't credit him because he's gay?
J. Gaziano: I'm talking about the-
J. Wendlandt: The rebuttal witness.
The rebuttal witness came on and said,
"Oh, well I'm also a, you know,
a boy who works at this club, and he didn't come on to me."
J. Gaziano: Right, that witness.
-: It's sort of, to your opposing counsel's point,
the entire trial was infected with a theme of homophobia,
and characteristics about what a homosexual would be like,
and given that, doesn't it undermine the integrity
of the entire trial,
which I think is your opposing counsel's point,
and that this has to go back for a retrial?
-: I would suggest that under the circumstances of the trial
where the defendant's case relied upon the defendant,
the victim being gay, and then calling
a corroborating witness to suggest that he's gay,
and then that it was proper rebuttal
for the Commonwealth to then call,
well, I wouldn't say proper rebuttal,
it was in the context of everything, a rebuttal of that.
But under the totality of the case,
there was just no version of these facts that would suggest
that this was reckless or wanton conduct.
This was always malice.
-: So is this case different from the cases
that your opposing counsel relies on,
where it was a racial element that infused the entire trial,
and so we had to flip it and order a new trial?
-: I would suggest to the court that there's no structural
or infection of this jury or this case that mitigated,
that in any way changed the verdict in this case.
The defendant-
-: But when I go pull the other cases,
those cases were not overwhelming evidence of guilt?
-: I'm not sure on Modi, to be honest with you.
What I would suggest in this case is that
any hypothetical reduction is impossible.
The defendant did-
-: Well, I think it's clear there's no good faith way
you can get to a manslaughter under these facts.
But the question is new trial versus manslaughter, for me.
Atty. McGee: Substantial risk
of a miscarriage of justice.
-: Right, right.
-: And what I would suggest under that again is that
the rhetoric and the comments and the remarks, if anything,
what defense is arguing is it goes
to his self-defense argument, and what I would suggest is
that self-defense argument was very weak,
and for the reasons I had just stated
about the opportunity to escape, the credibility of it,
and the credibility of the other facts,
and to the extent that it was credible,
the SJC gave him that in 1984, and reduced his verdict
to a second degree murder based upon that.
They took consideration
of the defendant's self-defense argument,
and reduced his verdict to second degree murder.
-: But the instruction itself compelled
the reduction to second degree murder, right?
In and of itself, we've got a bunch of cases
that say if you don't give the alcohol instruction,
you drop it to second degree, right?
-: The court found that there was not a substantial risk
of a miscarriage of justice, and reduced the verdict
based upon 33, based upon his age,
his maybe possibly being under the influence,
and succumbing to a rape before the murder.
That was the basis for the reduction.
-: Do you agree with your opposing counsel
that the homophobic infection was not considered in 1984?
-: It was not considered as part of the judgment.
What they considered was the defendant's defense,
and they credited it, and they reduced it based upon that.
Chief J. Budd: Okay, any other questions?
-: There aren't any further questions, I rest upon my brief.