-: SJC-13439 in the matter of Francis R. Mason.
-: Okay, Attorney Fimognari.
-: Thank you, Chief Justice Budd,
and may it please the court.
Good morning, Your Honors.
Assistant Attorney General Christine Fimognari
on behalf of the appellant,
the Massachusetts Executive Office
of Health and Human Services, MassHealth.
MassHealth asked the court to reverse the decision
of the probate court below and find the following.
First, that a lien imposed by MassHealth
on the real property of a MassHealth beneficiary
does not automatically expire upon that beneficiary's staff.
And second, that the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code,
or MUPC's three-year ultimate time limit
does not apply retroactively to bar a claim
brought against the estate of an individual
who died prior to the MUPC's effective date.
Beginning with the first issue,
the Probate Court erred in its interpretation
when it concluded that the lien expires upon death.
And in its interpretation,
the probate court failed to consider
the ordinary way in which statutory liens operate.
-: Isn't the purpose of it,
it has a specific purpose,
that you put this lien on in case the house is sold
while the person is in the facility, right?
So, it serves a distinct purpose, right?
-: That's one purpose of the lien, Your Honor, yes.
Another purpose-
-: Go ahead. -: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
Another purpose of the lien is to secure the right
of MassHealth to recover after the individual's death.
-: But they have the right to recover
after the individual's death through the estate,
and they don't need to file a lien, right?
They can collect the amount owed.
And there are all kinds of very specific rules about
when you can do it,
if there's someone living in the house,
the order of priority.
It's just a very detailed process about
what happens when you're dead,
as opposed to basically making sure
the major asset, which is the house,
is not sold while the person's in the facility, right?
Seems like there are two separate ways of going about this.
-: Yes, Your Honor, that's absolutely correct.
There are two separate mechanisms for recovery
that Congress has allowed states to pursue,
and one is a state recovery, as you laid out,
and the other is liens.
-: But if you do what you want,
aren't you basically,
the word collapsing keeps coming up every argument,
so collapsing the distinction, right?
And you're creating a lien that goes on,
particularly before 2013, for 50 years,
which will completely bollocks up the probate process.
-: No, Your Honor,
we're not collapsing the two mechanisms for recovery,
because there are instances in which MassHealth
cannot recover through
the estate recovery process. -: Why not?
That I can't figure out.
Why can't you always recover
through the estate process if you pay attention?
-: Certainly, Your Honor.
So there are situations in which
heirs of an estate will be incentivized
not to probate an estate
and just wait out the three-year statute of limitations.
-: Aren't you notified when the person dies?
Aren't you...
You've been paying for them in that facility.
Don't you get a notice saying,
"She died or he died?"
-: Not always, Your Honor.
-: [Justice Wendlandt] You just keep paying?
-: No, Your Honor,
but there's different situations
in which MassHealth may stop paying.
It could be that the individual
has been discharged from the institution and returned home.
-: But you're saying Mass Health doesn't know
when somebody dies?
-: Not always, Your Honor.
They do their best- -: Okay, but let's just say
in this case, did you know when the decedent died?
-: MassHealth knew when the decedent probate
was entered pursuant to
the notice that's required. -: So nine years
after her death you knew that she died?
-: Yes, Your Honor. -: Before then,
you were continuing to pay for her nursing care?
-: Not continuing to pay for her nursing care,
Your Honor. -: You thought she
was back home.
-: I'm not sure exactly what if it...
There's 2.3 million people in MassHealth, Your Honor,
so MassHealth. -: Right, so I would think
it would be a big deal for MassHealth to know
when to stop paying.
-: Yes, Your Honor and MassHealth does its best
to keep track of this,
but there are also instances
where MassHealth receives notice
and still does not engage in the estate recovery process.
And the reason for that is because
if probate is not initiated,
then MassHealth has the option, after one year,
to appoint a public administrator to probate the estate.
But MassHealth, as a policy matter,
will not appoint the public administrator
if there is another individual living in the home.
Because as a policy matter,
MassHealth doesn't wanna force
the individual who's living in the home out of the house.
-: Well, they can't right? -: They can't, right.
Yeah, by statute, they have to...
They can't do that.
-: Yes, they can, Your Honor.
What would happen is they would
appoint the public administrator,
the public administrator's required by law
to resolve the estate,
and if the home is the primary asset
that's needed to resolve the estate, excuse me,
the claims against the estate,
then it would be sold, and that would be used
to pay the creditors. -: But I thought there's a rule
that if there's like a surviving spouse
or somebody in the home,
you can't exercise the lien on that.
-: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct.
31B provides that if there's a surviving spouse,
a child under the age of 21, or a blind or disabled child,
that recovery cannot occur.
But I'm talking about when there's another individual
living in the house who's not protected from recovery.
If it was forced to go to the estate recovery process,
MassHealth would be forced to
push that individual outta the house.
And as a policy matter, they choose not to,
and they can continue to protect their interests
through the lien process.
Additionally, Your Honor, in the instances
that you were referencing where there
is a protected individual in the house,
MassHealth often does not appoint a public administrator,
because the public administrator,
it would be very inefficient for them to be appointed
and then to only have a claim that's deferred
until that individual dies or the property is sold.
So those are two instances in which MassHealth,
as a practical matter,
uses the lien to secure their rights to recover.
-: But can't they protect themselves in the probate process
without the TEFRA lien being in place?
I mean, I get it.
All of us are paying for this person to be taken care of.
Our tax dollars are paying.
You should be able to recover that.
I completely get that.
But I also (chuckling)
don't see why the ordinary probate process
doesn't protect you.
And also it just seems like you're,
by collapsing those two processes,
you're creating all kinds of confusion,
and the idea that you can do this for 50 years.
So, everything's going hunky dory before two...
A lot of people have wills and things from 2013,
they're in these homes,
so everything, you guys can do whatever you want
for the next 50 years in those cases?
-: If the individual died before the effective date.
-: Doesn't that seem crazy to you?
-: No, Your Honor, because the legislature provided
that period of limitations,
and so it's what the legislature thought was appropriate.
But additionally, Your Honor, another-
-: Which period of limitations, the 50?
-: Yes, Your Honor, that was the line placed before 2012
with the- -: Well, let me ask you
about MassHealth's own manual,
which I think one of the judges below relied on
in interpreting the lien as expiring after,
upon the death of the beneficiary and/or the family members.
-: Yes, Your Honor, so I believe you're referring to
the State Medicaid Manual's reference to-
-: Yeah, which says, "Recoveries must be made
"from the individual's estate after death
"or from the proceeds of the sale of the property
"on which the lien has been placed."
-: Yes, Your Honor, and- -: Isn't that a clear statement
of interpreting the language that you want us to interpret
a different way, consistent with the way the judge here,
Judge Ordonez, interpreted it?
-: Because it requires too many inferences, Your Honor.
The ordinary rule for statutory liens such as this,
is that they only expire upon a condition
that is explicitly set out in the authorizing statute.
Here, section 34 of Chapter 118E is the authorizing statute
for MassHealth to impose these liens.
That section provides that MassHealth
is permitted to impose liens
which are allowed by the Federal Secretary.
Those liens are laid out in Section 42 USC 1396p.
That federal section only provides one condition
upon which these liens dissolve,
and that's discharge from the institution and return home.
If- -: Well, don't those provisions
refer to during the life of?
Or they have this language that's cross-referencing
the person being alive, right?
-: No, Your Honor, the federal statute 42 USC 1396p
just says that you can impose the lien,
and the only condition upon which the lien dissolves
is if the individual returns home.
The reference to an individual's-
-: It doesn't say only.
-: No, Your Honor, it says unless.
-: Well, it says it shall dissolve
when the person returns home.
-: That's correct. -: Okay.
So there may be other situations where the lien dissolves.
-: Yes, Your Honor. -: It's just
that this is the one that's listed,
and I guess your argument is having listed this one,
silence as to the others means that those other ways
of dissolving the lien does not exist.
-: Yes, Your Honor.
Because you would have to read a condition
into the statute that's not there.
-: Does any- -: Well, you're
reading an only.
I'm just, you know...
So, shame on you (laughing) but,
I take your argument meaning that the silence
as to the other dissolution mechanisms
means that this is the only one.
-: Yes, Your Honor and-
-: Does either,
any of the federal or state statutes
say that TEFRA liens survive death?
'Cause that's...
You would think that...
'Cause we've got various precise limitations on recovery.
Does anything ever say it survives death?
-: No, Your Honor,
but you wouldn't expect it to say that it survives death,
because the ordinary way that real estate
and statutory liens operate,
as outlined in real estate treatises
and recognized by the Supreme Court,
is that they continue until they're paid,
discharged, or a condition occurs.
And that's because the interest attaches to the property.
It's not attached to the individual.
It's attached to the property.
So the death ordinarily does not affect a lien.
-: But you don't also have a separate way of recovering.
Here we have a pre-death and a post-death way of recovering.
So I understand normal liens,
that's how you wanna preserve your rights,
but here you have a whole separate way of
protecting with all kinds of particular rules, right?
-: Yes, Your Honor, but we know that the federal government,
Congress, when it enacted the law
to allow states to recover under these TEFRA liens,
did not intend to limit it to just pre-death recovery,
because we know that other states
engage in post-death recovery.
-: Although the Feds have written a guidance
saying that we do the exact opposite.
We we don't do that.
We have...
Right, you've got that policy brief from DD, whatever the-
-: Yes, Your Honor,
I believe you're referring to policy brief number five.
We would argue that that policy brief
is a federal interpretation of state law
with no citations to any authority,
and so it should not be found to have
any persuasive value here.
It's contrary to MassHealth's interpretation of the law.
-: But certainly not contrary to the way MassHealth's,
in its manual, used to describe it.
-: I believe it is, Your Honor,
because MassHealth's manual just says
the estate after death.
It doesn't indicate that the recovery from the lien
is limited to an individual's life.
There's no such express statement of that,
and you would have to infer
that the use of the term after death in estate
would be meant to limit the lien recovery
that's also referenced.
I don't believe that that's the best interpretation
of the language, Your Honor.
But even if it were,
the court should not rely on that language,
which only has persuasive authority.
They should look to the text of Section 31D,
which provides that
the division is also authorized
during an individual's lifetime
to recover all assistance correctly provided
on or after April 1st, 1995,
a property against which the division has a lien is sold.
But the language at the probate court,
and no other court which has considered this,
this issue in section 31D is at the end of the section.
It says, "This subsection shall not limit
"the division's ability to recover
"from the individual's estate under subsection A or B,
"or as otherwise provided under any general or special law."
So the probate court below read a section,
which says that you are also authorized
during an individual's lifetime to recover.
They read that to mean that the lien expires upon death,
even though there's an express statement
that it's not supposed to limit other recovery provided
under other laws, such as section 34.
So Your Honor, the probate court read out that section,
and it also ignored some other statutory sections
such as Chapter 118E section 32J.
That section was enacted at the same time as 31D,
and it provides that a personal representative
can discharge a lien against the estate
through certain mechanisms.
I see my time has expired. -: Ask you, I'm sorry.
Chief, can I ask one more question?
There is a second part to your argument
that you haven't yet gotten to.
Can I ask you? -: Yes, Your Honor.
-: Why Judge Ordonez's interpretation of that statute
of repose applying to claims against the estate is wrong.
I don't really quite understand your argument.
You're just saying that...
Kendall was about a date of death that happened
after the MUPC was already in place, and our,
excuse me, beneficiary died before then.
And so we're under the old regime of 50 years.
-: Yes, Your Honor, as this court has recognized,
the ordinary approach is that
where there is no express legislative directive,
the court applies the rule of interpretation
that statutes operate prospectively, not retroactively,
but additionally, Your Honors,
the session laws which enacted the MUPC here
expressly provide that "if a right is acquired,
"extinguished, or barred upon the expiration
"of a prescribed period that has commenced to run
"under any other statute
"before the effective date of this act,
"that statute shall continue to apply to the right,
"even if it has been superseded."
So the right to recover under the pre-MUPC statute
would be what's described in that section,
and it's indicated that it's not.
-: Is there an argument that only applies to trusts?
-: No, Your Honor, because that section refers to the act,
and the act that is at issue is an act
that amended both the MUPC and the Uniform Trust Code.
-: It doesn't...
The provision you're reading from
just refers to trusts, right?
-: No, Your Honor,
actually there's a part A and a part B of that provision.
Part A refers to trusts,
and Part B is the part that I'm referring to.
-: But Part B also doesn't expressly refer to
the act you want it to refer to, right?
It just uses the word acts, generally?
-: Yes, Your Honor, it uses the general word act,
which we argue applies to the entire act,
which includes the MUPC.
-: Just going back to the first issue for just a second,
what is it that MassHealth loses if we interpret it the way
your opposing counsel wants us to interpret?
Given the fact that there is another way to get the money?
-: Well, Your Honor, there were the examples
where a personal administrator,
it's not practical or good as a policy matter
to appoint one, which I addressed with Judge Justice Kafker.
But additionally, MassHealth loses the security on
its ability to recover post-death
that it otherwise would have as a secured creditor.
So if there's an instance where-
-: Meaning if it falls asleep
and forgets to use the probate process for eight years,
we can resurrect the lien, right?
-: No, Your Honor, Section 32I
requires MassHealth to wait one year before it can,
post-death, before it can appoint a public administrator.
So during that one-year period,
if the lien dissolves upon death,
then MassHealth is not recognized as a creditor,
and they're not being notified
if the house goes into foreclosure
because it's fallen behind on taxes,
if there's a mortgage foreclosure,
if there's a reverse mortgage foreclosure.
MassHealth would lose its status as creditor
during that one year. -: Wait, I don't understand
why it would lose its status as creditor.
Maybe it would lose a priority that the lien gives it,
but why would it not be a creditor,
having given the benefits to the decedent?
-: Because, Your Honor, if the lien dissolves upon death,
MassHealth is not considered to be a creditor
until it files its notice of claim in the probate court.
We know this because if they don't file the notice of claim,
they can't collect.
They cannot file the notice of claim until probate begins.
If an individual does not begin probate
during that one-year period,
MassHealth is prohibited
from appointing a public administrator
for a whole year after the death.
-: But after that year, they're completely protected, right?
What could happen that would screw MassHealth
out of the money during that year?
I'm trying to understand that.
-: Certainly, Your Honor.
It could be the case that the property
is subject to tax liens
that then are collected and the estate is foreclosed upon.
And MassHealth not only doesn't have priority,
sometimes they're not even noticed.
It could also be something like a reverse mortgage
that's collected upon.
-: So, you've got...
Again, 'cause we'll ask your opposing counsel
this very question.
So what's gonna happen?
So there's a tax foreclosure on that property
and MassHealth would somehow lose out.
Is that what you're saying?
That there's that possibility?
-: Yes, Your Honor, because if MassHealth is not,
if the lien is not in place, MassHealth is not a creditor,
the tax foreclosure occurs, they're not notified,
and the assets from the estate are distributed.
The home assets are distributed.
And so by the time it gets to a state recovery,
there might be nothing left for MassHealth to collect upon.
Thank you very much, Your Honor, as we ask you to reverse.
-: Okay, thank you.
All right, Attorney Dupuy.
-: And don't forget that one,
'cause I'd like the answer to that.
-: Maybe you can start with that.
-: Yeah.
-: Good morning, Chief Justice Budd,
and other justices, Matthew Dupuy for the appellee.
MassHealth does not have a problem during that one year.
Think about what the situation is.
The house is in the name of Francis Mason.
It's in her name.
Okay?
The heirs can't do anything with it because
it has to be probated.
They can't sell it.
She passed away.
So if the property is in her estate,
it's just gonna sit there.
-: Well, she's saying the town of Newton
wants to foreclose on the house.
Is that possible that they can foreclose
without that lien that MassHealth is left holding the bag?
Meaning you and me and the rest of us taxpayers
are left holding the bag?
Or how does that prevent it?
-: First of all, we're talking real estate taxes,
whether it's five or even 10,000 a year,
in a situation like this,
the person has passed away in the nursing home.
I don't know what the situation is with the real estate,
but,
it's not enough to come close to the value of the property.
So MassHealth is not in danger.
So they are protected.
So MassHealth, that first year,
can sit back and, if no one files an estate,
then they can come in in month 13.
They're totally protected.
It's a red herring, my sister's argument.
-: Can I ask you one thing that does bother me directly?
It's the language of 32.
So they reference 32J,
they reference the personal representative
and they reference a lien.
Is this just a drafting error?
Why does 32J, if there's no liens allowed,
if liens dissolve on death,
what is 32J talking about?
-: I don't know.
Is it referencing the MassHealth lien?
Or is it referencing all liens?
-: Well, it's referencing liens in general,
but I think it also makes a reference
to MassHealth in that section.
Do you have 32J handy?
-: I...
Not real handy, Your Honor. -: Okay.
Matthew: Sorry about that.
-: All right, I'll dig up the provision.
We can talk about it more expressly,
but it seems like, to me, that if you're right,
that all liens, these TEFRA liens are gone,
there would be no discussion of liens in 32J
and MassHealth in relation to those liens,
rendering this sort of a drafting error, in your view.
'Cause otherwise it would make sense
to have the liens stay alive,
'cause that would be what it's referring to.
-: Well, the states have the option.
Mass has opted not to keep it alive.
-: Well, 32J is a Massachusetts statute, right?
-: Well, but the MUPC,
it essentially overruled that,
because they want it handled in the estate,
and they want it handled within three years,
and this court wants it handled within three years,
which is the way it should be handled.
-: Well, that's a separate...
Don't jump around yet,
'cause we will get there, but I'm just trying to...
It would be really helpful if you could give us
an interpretation that makes sense of this,
unless it's just a drafting error.
If it's a drafting error, that's okay,
but it just seems nonsensical to reference it.
-: Yeah, I'm sorry, I can't answer that, Your Honor.
I would like to talk about- -: Let me just
read it to you for a second.
-: Sure, go ahead. -: "If the
"personal representative wishes to sell or transfer
"any real property
"against which the division has filed a lien."
So again, the division has filed a lien or a claim.
"Not yet enforceable,
"because circumstances or conditions
"specified in Section 31 continue to exist
"the division shall release the lien or claim
"if the personal representative agrees to blankety blank."
But, isn't this all unnecessary if a lien,
if MassHealth's lien automatically dissolved on death?
-: Now I understand, Your Honor.
I don't know when that statute was enacted, but liens...
In the real estate world, if there's a lien there,
it's gonna have to be dealt with.
And the dissolution of the lien is only-
-: It's the division, in which the division has filed a lien.
-: Division of MassHealth. -: Yeah.
-: Right. -: So but you say
all liens of MassHealth dissolve on death.
If that's the case, this makes no sense, right?
-: Well, because my statement is 2023,
and it wasn't until 2012
when we first started to look at this issue.
And then, Kendall, we started to look at it more closely.
So it's a difference of timing.
But there are liens out there today, and there's no-
-: But no, no, Kendall doesn't deal with TEFRA liens.
TEFRA liens have been around for a long, long time.
I mean, I understand all of your argument,
that the TEFRA liens are designed for the sale of the house
while the person's in the institution,
and there's a whole separate process
to use the probate process and you don't need a lien there.
My problem is that 32J kind of makes this mushy and messy,
but you're not really helping me out of
telling me what 32J is talkin' about yet.
-: That's correct, Your Honor. -: Okay.
-: So on the...
On why the lien dissolves,
we look at the Wells Fargo case,
which talks about the federal statute
and that it's primarily for...
To resolve the situation if the person
leaves the facility,
and the lien is going to be discharged at that time,
or the lien's gonna be paid off if the house is sold.
And- -: Again, all that makes,
I completely understand the pre-death process.
You don't want people in these institutions
and then the family selling the home
and then the Commonwealth's left holding the bag.
But, why don't you...
Why couldn't the liens survive and
have it just survive and then
it goes into the probate process?
-: It could, but Mass has elected not to do that.
And many states have,
but Mass has made the choice
that they'd rather have the estate deal with it.
-: And what is the evidence of that statement?
-: It's the state- -: 'Cause the property
goes into the estate, so- -: Correct.
-: Having the lien attached to the property
going into the estate
still requires MassHealth to go to the estate.
I guess I don't understand your argument that the lien must,
that Mass decided and chose not to have the lien
continue after the beneficiary died.
-: That's correct, and- -: But what is
the evidence of that?
What are you relying on?
-: Well, the federal statute,
which- -: So that wouldn't tell me
what Massachusetts decided. -: Okay.
The State Medicaid Manual states that it dissolves.
-: Where does it say that? -: Where does it say that?
-: It's discussed in the Wells Fargo case.
-: [Justice Wendlandt] Okay.
-: Wells Fargo found that a plain text reading
of the statutory code properly dispose of the liens
upon the death of a member.
And further- -: Which language
does it rely on to do that?
-: It relies on, first it relied on the federal statute.
-: But the federal statute, I think you both agree,
under the federal statute,
you could keep the liens alive, right?
They don't preclude you from keeping alive.
A lot of states do.
We just don't, you argue? -: Correct.
So the federal statute gives the option to the state,
and then the State Medicaid Manual,
their policy was to go by way of the estate recovery
and not use the lien. -: Can you tell us...
It would be useful if you tell us the provision
in that Medicaid Manual, 'cause I'm not aware of it.
I'm aware of the federal policy brief
that says we don't do that.
But I didn't know that we actually said it
in a Medicaid Manual.
-: It's not only in the State Medicaid Manual,
but it's been the MassHealth practice.
And what's kind of ironic- -: I know you answered
the first question before you move to practice.
Where in the Medicaid Manual does it say that?
'Cause that would be really useful for you.
-: All right.
That would be
in the Wells Fargo case.
-: Yeah, but,
the Wells Fargo case may be just interpreting something.
But again, I'll look for...
You've attached the Wells Fargo case here,
have you? -: That's correct.
-: Okay, and,
is the Medicaid Manual attached somewhere in here?
'Cause- -: Yes, I believe so.
-: Okay, so it would be useful if...
I would ask the chief if we could have a 16L letter
that references the particular provision
in the Medicaid Manual that's supposedly in this record,
so that we don't have to dig it up,
that you're talking about.
-: Sure. -: Sure.
-: Yep.
And what did you describe that as?
A what?
-: I'm just quoting you.
You said the Medicaid Manual says that,
I guess that these things do not,
that the TEFRA liens do not survive death.
That would be a...
I know that the federal policy brief
says that exact same thing,
but your sister just argued that that's wrong.
But if the State Medicaid Manual
says exactly what the federal policy brief says,
that's a very helpful piece for you,
and I would like to look at it, and I haven't seen it.
-: Okay, do you want me to do that now, Your Honor?
Or you want me to- -: No, no, no.
16L, afterwards. -: Afterwards.
-: 16? -: It's called a 16L letter.
You send us a letter
after or. -: Yes, mm-hm.
Be happy to, Your Honor.
So, the Wells Fargo case,
they follow the federal statute,
State Medicaid Manual, and it also talks about
the MassHealth practice.
And then Chapter 118 section 34 is,
that's also relevant,
in that it discusses
"The division is authorized during an individual's lifetime
"to recover all assistance correctly provided.
"If the property against which the division
"has a lien or a conference under section 34 is sold."
There's no mention that it survives death.
The second issue-
-: But it seems, again, it seems ambiguous, right?
It doesn't say it survives death,
nor does it say it does not survive death.
It's kind of...
We have to figure that out ourselves, right?
-: That's correct.
-: Right, and so I guess my question for you,
following on the heels of that is,
given that the default is liens usually follow property.
They don't dissolve.
They're not in personam, right?
They're in rem.
Why, given that default,
would we read section 34 to expire,
to require the lien to expire
upon the death of the beneficiary?
-: Because the way Mass handles it.
The second the person dies,
now we have an estate,
and that's where the estate provisions come in,
and MassHealth is protected.
And that's the way that this state chooses to do it.
And it's interesting
that my sister. -: Are you saying that
allowing MassHealth to continue to have a lien
on property that's now part of the estate,
would somehow, I don't...
Finish my sentence.
What are you saying?
Couldn't the property go to the estate?
MassHealth continues to have a lien on it,
so that when the property is sold
as part of the distribution of assets of the estate,
MassHealth has priority because of the lien.
-: Well, they wouldn't have priority,
based upon the statutory,
the seven or eight enumerated items,
post-death expenses, burial.
-: But couldn't they- -: They could live
in the same universe. -: Right.
-: You could still have a lien in a probate.
-: Yes, they could. Right?
-: It still could have a lien. -: And it could
follow the statute and be the fifth one in priority.
-: Right.
-: Right? -: I don't know if they,
it'd be the fifth one.
It might be further down the line.
-: But regardless- -: Right.
-: [Justice Wendlandt] It's up there.
-: Correct.
But there's no need...
When the legislature made the statute,
and when they...
And then the federal statute which gave them
the authority to do what they can do,
and they have to be compliant with that,
and then they have the situation where the...
They want the...
They want their fiduciary to handle it.
They want the personal rep.
And it's somewhat
ironic, if you will, that my sister was,
MassHealth has this reluctance to evict someone.
Well,
they don't have to evict someone.
They can reach an agreement with a person
staying in the home that,
all right, you can pay us in three or four years.
They can essentially draft a new contract
in a new lien, if they want to.
So it's ironic that they're arguing
that their lien is still there,
and yet they don't wanna use it.
So I don't...
So MassHealth is basically protected.
And in terms of the, my sister mentioned the incentivized,
there is so many costs associated with keeping a house,
that really is another red herring argument.
So,
essentially
MassHealth is protected,
and I wanna talk about the retroactivity.
Second point. -: Oh dear, okay.
So we're a little bit over.
Does anyone have any questions about the retroactivity?
-: Thank you, Chief. -: Is it in your brief, sir?
-: Yes.