-: SJC-13510, Fannie Mae v. Anthony Michael Branch.
-: Okay, Mr. Branch,
-: Good morning, Your Honors.
And if it pleases the Court,
I wanna begin my argument
around the off-record assignment
that appears on the record in my appendix
in the appellate brief.
On August 7th of 2009,
Pentagon Federal Credit Union sent me a notification
that Fannie Mae had purchased both my note,
excuse me, both my note and my mortgage.
I relied on that representation from them.
PenFed remained the servicer of my account.
Excuse me.
This document, undocumented foreclosures,
were rejected under the Ebenezer case law.
What I'm suggesting to this court today
is that the wrong party foreclosed,
that Fannie Mae actually remained owner
of both the mortgage and note since 2009.
In fact, Fannie Mae, when responding to my discovery request
and the interrogatories indicated
that they, in fact, had owned it since the inception,
excuse me, the inception of the loan.
And I believe you can find
that a record Appendix 125 at seven.
-: I'm confused.
How could Fannie Mae have the loan?
I thought you borrowed from Pentagon, right,
or whatever they're called. -: Yes.
-: So at the inception of the loan,
it must have been the other.
It must have Pentagon at the inception loan, right?
-: Thank you, Justice.
Justice, that's my point.
They, on August 7th, Fannie Mae,
purchased both my note and my mortgage.
They sent me notification of that.
So, I see them as the party
that should have brought this foreclosure,
PenFed took payments, et cetera,
but they were not the mortgage and note holder,
which contradicts their presentation in the record.
-: Mr. Branch, can you please identify the best...
This obviously a really big record
with many years of litigation.
Could you identify your best record references
for the point that you just made
that at the time of the foreclosure
PenFed was not the note holder?
-: Yes, Justice, thank you for that.
I'm referencing record of Appendix 125, note at seven.
And I also have within my appendix,
whereas the vice president of Fannie Mae,
another case indicated that it is their public policy
that the note and the mortgage are always,
that they purchase them in unity,
and they are never separated.
And that has been my concern from the offset
that the wrong party actually foreclosed.
I considered it-
-: Sorry, sorry, sorry. -: I apologize.
-: Can we just go back?
I appreciate the additional references,
but focusing on your case and your mortgage.
-: Yes. -: So I just wanna...
I've turned to the page of your record that you referenced.
I think it's really important.
So it goes to the heart of one of your arguments.
So I'd just like to go over it.
Mr. Branch: Thank you.
-: So you've referenced an interrogatory answer.
Mr. Branch: Mhm, yes.
-: And I'm just looking at this, just this one page,
but I take it, these are interrogatory answers
from Fannie Mae or from whom?
-: From what I sent to Fannie Mae as my discovery.
From Fannie Mae.
-: So whose answer is this
when it says answer number, interrogatory number seven,
and then answer number seven?
Whose answer is it?
-: It would be Fannie Mae's answer.
-: Fannie, that's okay, thank you.
I just wanted to confirm that.
So Fannie Mae is saying in this interrogatory answer
Fannie Mae was the investor on the loan since its inception
and became the owner of the property
following an assignment of Pentagon's high bid.
So that was years later. -: Correct.
-: Fannie Mae further refers to
and incorporates the copy of the original note,
the mortgage, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
Fannie Mae objects the balance of this interrogatory,
and there's a bunch of objections
and then some cases about the objections.
So what do you interpret in this answer number seven
as saying that Fannie Mae was the note holder?
-: Thank you, Justice.
What Fannie Mae said in that particular...
Excuse me, what Fannie Mae said
in that particular interrogatory is consistent
with the notification that they sent me,
that they were in fact the owner of the mortgage in note.
I requested that letter during discovery
and was unable to get it.
So for me, that's consistent
with what I've been saying all along.
-: So the best evidence that you're aware of,
although it's not in our record, is a letter to you saying
that Fannie Mae was now the note holder,
but that letter is not in the record before this court.
-: You are absolutely correct. -: Okay.
Thank you for clarifying.
I really appreciate it. -: Thank you.
Again, my position in response to that,
my affidavit in response to the summary process action
was in fact that I received that notification
and that at the offset of this case
that the foreclosed, excuse me,
that the foreclosure, again, was by the wrong party.
And then we get to the-
-: Can I ask you a consequence of the Appeals Court?
The Appeals Court decision says the case is moot.
What happens then?
Are you paying use and occupancy at that point
and then it stops?
What happens at the Appeals Court?
I don't understand how the case can be moot,
but the Appeals Court says it's moot.
What happens then?
Do you stop doing something,
or were you paying use and occupancy at that point?
What happens when they do that?
-: They vacated the use and occupancy pending Mr. Cardoso.
-: Before the Appeals Court issues this decision,
you're paying use and occupancy?
-: I am, sir. -: You're supposed to pay it.
-: Yes, sir. -: And you were paying it?
-: Yes, sir.
-: And then when they issued the decision,
you stopped paying it? -: Yes, sir.
-: Okay, 'cause I'm gonna ask the same question
to both of those parties
'cause my own sense is that's...
I have no understanding how this could be moot.
Mr. Branch: Yes.
-: But I also wanna understand the consequences of it
'cause it seems to me,
particularly if that's exactly the consequence
that use and occupancy stops being paid,
it seems like its case is clearly not moot.
-: So, Justice, if I can address that for one minute or two,
so the use and occupancy order was actually vacated
by the Appeals Court at the request of Fannie Mae.
My position has always been that if the order was vacated,
there's nothing in law that allowed Cardoso
to resurrect that without his own summary process case.
So I've always taken the issue
that if the plaintiff has vacated that order
for whatever reason they did it,
nonetheless, it's an order of the Court
that has been vacated.
I understand that the Appeals Court had dissented,
had suggested after Mr. Cardoso made the argument
that they can revisit that issue in the Housing Court,
but I highly objected to that,
again, because I couldn't figure out
how you can resurrect something that's vacated.
So if he's standing in the shoes of the plaintiff,
the plaintiff has already made a legal decision.
-: Maybe why the Appeals Court decision is wrong,
that they shouldn't have said its moot,
which results in the vacating of that
and forcing him to have to go get a use and occupancy.
That's why it's not moot.
-: Right, so, Justice, this was the first panel.
Excuse me, yes.
This was a single justice in the Appeals Court
that had initially vacated the use and occupancy order,
but let me-
-: But that's two single justices, right?
Then there's a subsequent single justice, right,
that imposes a use and occupancy,
just lowers it to $500, right?
-: Correct, right.
And then Fannie Mae comes back in and vacates the $500, so-
-: Was there ever a use and occupancy order
in favor of Mr. Cardoso?
-: No. -: No, okay.
And going back to your first argument, is it Pentagon,
Pentagon did the foreclosure sale,
and at that time, according to Fannie Mae,
it was the owner of both the note and the mortgage
and so the sole authority to foreclose
would've been with Fannie Mae?
Mr. Branch: Yes, Your Honor.
-: Can you address the argument
that Pentagon was an agent of Fannie Mae at the time?
I think that that's the response.
-: Right, that's their response, Your Honor.
But again, well, not again 'cause I'm saying it now,
that gets me back to the deceptive practice.
What they're doing here in the Commonwealth
is that basically Fannie Mae is hiding
that they actually own both the mortgage and note,
and that could be for various reasons,
They're a very large semi-private corporation,
but, nonetheless, it is in the record
that this is their policy.
Yes, I see that a couple of attorneys
have sworn to some affidavits,
but that also brings us back
to the issue of genuine material facts
where I'm coming in with an affidavit saying,
"Hey, I had this notice here telling me
"that you guys don't own the mortgage and the note,"
and they're coming as members
of the bar saying, "He's wrong."
So I think there's an inherent conflict
in what has occurred here causing me
to, you know, putting these objections
and suggesting that a jury should have made the decisions.
-: Excuse me, Mr. Branch, can we just go backwards
in time a moment 'cause I'm not sure if you misspoke?
I just wanted to make sure we're all clear.
So attached to your brief is an order
of the Housing Court starting at in your addendum
you have the decisions below appropriately attached.
And addendum page 121, there's an order
that came after the order,
well, that is disputed about the joinder
and intervention of Mr. Cardoso.
And starting at addendum page 121,
there's an order where it appears
that the Court actually did order use and occupancy
to Mr. Cardoso in the amount of $1,000.
Am I misunderstanding that?
-: Yes, I apologize.
I got confused.
I got confused, and I- -: Totally understandable.
-: There is a lot going on in this case.
Yes, that's what I'm talking about
whereas the plaintiff, Fannie Mae, vacated the $500.
So for me, with respect to the record, that's extinguished,
then the Appeals Court panel,
when hearing the balance of the five questions,
they sent the case back down
because Mr. Cardoso made the argument
that he's the new owner of the property,
and he's entitled to use and occupancy,
and that's what I oppose,
but to your point, yes, he was granted that $1,000.
-: And so today, as we stand here, has anything happened
with that order, or that order's still in effect
that you're supposed to pay $1,000
to Mr. Cardoso as the current owner?
-: The panel vacated that
and has said that that would be a part of him getting it
on a new case because he lacked possessory rights.
-: So since the Appeals Court's decision,
that has no longer been in effect,
but it was in effect
until the most recent Appeals Court decision?
-: Absolutely, yes. -: Okay.
Thank you for that absolute clarity.
-: So really your position is that Mr. Cardoso needs
to start his own summary process?
-: That is my position.
And he actually, when the motions went
before the Housing Court,
in my reply brief identified the steps that he actually knew
that he needed to go back to the Housing Courts
because he initially had
his own right summary process complaint.
And I had asked for discovery in that.
We had went past the discovery deadlines.
So there was actually admissions that are probably binding.
And he said that, "Hey, I want it dismissed
"without prejudice 'cause I probably
"are gonna have to come back."
-: So the current status of this is you're in the house,
but there's no use and occupancy?
-: Correct. -: And right.
And the last time, okay, that's the current status
of where we are. -: Correct.
-: And there's not been a subsequent Housing Court proceeding
imposing use and occupancy in favor of Mr. Cardoso?
-: No, he has presented this is we're here
for further appellate review,
and I assume that this court will be dealing with that.
-: Why isn't it that when Mr. Cardoso was joined
in the original action, why isn't it
that he became the proper plaintiff, the plaintiff?
-: Well, he intervened and-
-: Well, no, he didn't just intervene.
He became a party, right?
He joined
-: A party, right.
-: Right. -: Right, I would agree
that he became a party.
And the reason why I'm gonna agree with that
because by becoming a party,
he remains with the litigation as it was.
But when looking at case law across the Commonwealth,
I've seen nothing where he could do anything,
but to bring his own summary process action
to get possession.
As a matter of fact, I think the Housing Court,
in their ruling, kind of indicated that
that we are gonna preserve Mr. Branch's rights.
Reverend Branch's rights are preserved
in order for him to come back
to challenge Mr. Cardoso seeking possession.
-: Well, what the Court did was
because the Court wouldn't let Fannie Mae out of the case,
the Court preserved your claims against Fannie Mae, right,
because you had filed claims against Fannie Mae,
or, sorry, yes, against Fannie Mae, correct,
or you had filed counterclaims, correct?
-: I did, but I think the order
with respect to Cardoso's intervention
and the use of occupancy was really specific
that Reverend Branch would be allowed
to challenge Mr. Cardoso's possession.
And this is why it gets a little muddy and a bit confusing.
-: And that's what we have in front of us, right?
Though we have those issues in front of us, right,
because your arguments with respect to Mr....
Well, here's a question for you.
Are your arguments about possession
with respect to Mr. Branch really any different
than, sorry, with respect to Mr. Cardoso
really any different than your arguments
with possession against in the case earlier?
Because it's all about whether the foreclosure,
which happened years ago, was lawful, right?
-: Correct. -: So in other words,
on those issues, Mr. Cardoso is really stepping
into the shoes of the prior owner, correct?
-: I would have to say yes.
-: And so, and the Court under Rule 25,
the Court didn't just allow intervention under Rule 24,
but also allowed joinder and substitution under Rule 25,
and we have a little bit of a fight about that.
Do you wanna comment on whether you see a difference
between the Court merely allowing Mr. Cardoso to join
versus allowing Mr. Cardoso to be substituted under Rule 25?
-: My familiarity with Rule 25 is at minimum,
but I would say this.
When I look at the distinction between the two,
I think that Mr. Cardoso trying to collapse 'em into one,
it looked to be very concerning,
but more importantly to that, there was a specific motion
that asked for the amendment of the order
of possession of judgment.
So Cardoso never returned back
at the Housing Court justice
and said, "Justice Sheridan, you know,
"we missed something here.
"You didn't amend this, so I'll be able to get a judgment."
So that was his specific choice not to do that.
In addition to that, let me also say,
so this case not only
has some significant procedural issues,
but there was an appeal to the single justice
when the initial motions to join and substitute,
when the Judge Sheridan initially denied him,
he did go to the single justice of Appeals Court,
and the single justice of Appeals Court said,
"This is not the avenue.
"This is a part of of you filing a full appeal."
He didn't do that.
My concern with the panel, when they made the decision
to allow him to go back, that somehow got missed.
So procedurally, it looked like he was barred
from doing anything else, but somehow he got back without
because that was not on the record.
(bell rings)
-: Sorry. -: Is that this?
-: That's me. -: Oh, oh.
No, Justice, that's fine.
Mine goes off for my diabetes.
So I'm sorry about that too.
(justices laugh)
So because he did not appeal it from the Appeals Court,
I thought that it would be a bar from him to continue on.
And this is what happens.
There was not enough information
before the panel that said, okay,
I'm gonna send this back down to the Housing Court
to see if you're able to get use
and occupancy intervention and substitution,
but it got back down to the Housing Court.
Then you have that motion before the Housing Court.
Cardoso makes the argument with respect to the FRA
that, well, you know, the justice of the Appeal Courts
is saying, "You didn't get the specific order
"that gives you possessory rights."
And that is absolutely true.
The Housing Court justice never amended the judgment.
Now with respect to-
-: Sorry. -: Yes?
-: Let me just because you're three minutes over,
I'm just gonna make sure that we don't have any...
No, I mean, this happens.
It goes by like that. -: Okay.
-: So does anybody have any other questions for Mr. Branch?
I assume everything else is in your brief.
-: Yes, it is.
-: Okay. -: I'm done. (laughs)
-: Thank you very much. -: Thank you, Your Honors.
I'll rely on my brief, thank you.
-: Yep, okay, Attorney Stammen.
-: Good morning.
May it please the Court
I represent Roberto Pina Cardoso who intervened
and was substituted as plaintiff in this action,
the Housing Court, upon the direction of the Appeals Court
after he had intervened in an appeal
that Mr. Branch had filed relative
to use and occupancy payments.
The docket admittedly in the Housing Court
does not specifically make an entry
where Mr. Cardoso is substituted as plaintiff.
However, his motion to be substituted as plaintiff,
because he is the current owner
of the property, was allowed.
The fact that Mr. Cardoso appropriately steps
into the shoes of Fannie Mae was then affirmed
by the Housing Court when the Housing Court
awarded Mr. Cardoso use and occupancy payments
of $1,000 a month.
And that affirmation was affirmed
by a single justice of the Appeals Court.
-: Does Mr. Cardoso step into the shoes of Fannie Mae
for all purposes including the counterclaims,
or those stay with Fannie Mae?
-: Those stay with Fannie Mae.
Mr. Cardoso was not involved in the events
that led to the counterclaims.
Mr. Cardoso steps into Fannie Mae's shoes
because the judgment entered for possession
for in favor of Fannie Mae,
and Fannie Mae subsequently transferred its interest
in the real estate to Cardoso.
So on the issue of possession-
-: So that's the order of events.
There was a judgment for possession
in favor of Fannie Mae,
then your client purchases the property?
-: That's correct. -: Okay, thank you.
-: And then filed a motion to (indistinct)
-: Happens after.
The Appeals Court decides this is moot.
What happens?
You have a use and occupancy order in place at this point,
and then when it's declared moot, that disappears?
Is that what happens?
-: That's correct.
That's what happened.
-: And and they still just...
Someone tries to tell that to the Appeals Court
that afterwards you file any kind of-
-: I filed a motion to reconsider,
which was denied summarily.
-: Is that in our record too?
-: That is in the record, yes. -: It seems I'm mystified
of how this can be moot.
-: I was somewhat stunned myself when I was presented
with that issue at oral argument.
That was the first thing
that Justice Ditkoff raised with me.
And I said, "Of course, it's not moot.
"We're litigating the issue of the appeal
"of the judgment for possession."
-: So essentially they do this.
They've cut you off from use and occupancy.
You have to start over,
and also, you've got a pending.
You're appealing their decision
so it makes it problematic
to proceed in Housing Court as well, right?
-: That's right, well, I would suggest
that Mr. Cardoso could not proceed in Housing Court
until Mr. Branch's appeal of the judgment
that ended in favor of Fannie Mae was resolved
because there'd be a pending action relating
to whether the foreclosure that Fannie Mae,
well, or Pentagon-
-: Right now is not in the house, has no use and occupancy.
Appeals Court declared the case moot.
-: And he's been paying the taxes and water
and all of that since 2018.
-: And you filed a motion for reconsideration
with the Appeals Court on the mootness point
and they still ignored it. -: Yes.
So, I can get into the issues associated
with the foreclosure.
Mr. Branch suggests that there is something untoward
about the fact that Pentagon brought this foreclosure
under Eaton that's clearly permissible.
The appropriate affidavits were filed under-
-: I understand you're not
in the Pinti strict compliance era.
The notice that was sent
satisfies the substantial compliance.
How does that-
-: There there were three notices sent.
Two of them satisfied the strict compliance.
-: And, again, this is not an area
where I remember these cases
unless I read them over and over again.
If you send a subsequent notice
that is strictly in compliance,
you've satisfied even Pinti or-
-: There was 150 day notice to cures
sent under 244.35a,
which it isn't subject to Pinti analysis.
After that, two notices of default,
which Pinti applies to, were sent,
which strictly comply
towards Pinti -: Excuse me, I think-
-: Not that they would have to.
Counsel wasn't the order actually the opposite
so there were two notices of default sent,
and I think I'm gonna mash up the years,
but in 2013, I believe, and-
-: That's correct.
I apologize, right. -: And there are
two default notices and at least one of them, I think,
that Mr. Branch argues that one of them
was strictly complied with Pinti and the other one does not.
One of them strictly complied with Pinti he even concedes,
but then a year later, they send another notice,
which I think, it's fair to say, has some of the defects
identified in Pinti that it doesn't say
that he has to positively initiate litigation
in order to fight the disclosure was because of the way
that our system is here in Massachusetts.
Can you address, is there a problem with the fact
that even though there was a Pinti,
assuming that Pinti applies,
which does not apply retroactively under our case law,
if you've argued that in any case it's fine.
So can you address the subsequent notice
that I think you're not even now trying
to claim is Pinti-compliant?
Can you address whether that's a problem, and that-
-: What notice is a notice of right to cure
under the provisions of 244.35a.
It's not a notice of default.
They're different notices.
They said that it's- -: But it talks to the person
who receives the notice about their options,
correct, to avoid foreclosure?
-: I think it gives them a right to cure
of 150 days, nothing more.
-: The final- -: It's not a notice
of default toward foreclosure.
-: Well, let's look- -: It's a statutory notice.
-: Totally understood that it's a statutory notice.
Hold on, I'm trying to pull up the notice
because I think it's a little important potentially.
All right, I think it's that RA,
Mr. Branch's record appendix starting at RA55
is the June 30th, 2014 notice
that I think you haven't contended complies with Pinti.
Mr. Stammen: Yeah, I have it here in front of me.
-: And then on RA57, the final page of the notice,
says, you know, please consider
you can contact the Home Ownership Preservation People.
You can con contact the Division of Banks.
You can still avoid foreclosure
by paying the total before a sale.
Depending on the terms,
there can be other ways to avoid foreclosure
such as selling your property, refinancing,
or voluntarily transferring ownership.
And then there's a big bold paragraph.
If you do not pay the total past due amount
and any additional payments,
you may be evicted from your home after a foreclosure sale.
Sorry, you get the general idea.
-: Yes, I do.
There's nothing in this notice
that negates what was in the prior notice as the default,
Those are Pinti-compliant.
They didn't have to be, but they were.
And this notice is a notice served under statute
that doesn't negate anything that was in the prior notices.
-: And you would concede
that this is not substantially compliant,
even if strict compliance is not required with?
-: This does not comply with Pinti,
but it's not a default notice,
and Pinti applies to default notices.
-: And, all right, could you just elucidate
what the difference between a default notice
and a right to cure notice is
where the third page here contains a lot of the information
that is in a default notice?
-: Well, a default notice is a notice that has to be served
to notify the mortgagee that they're in default.
-: Well, but the page...
I'm genuinely asking like out of my own ignorance,
to be honest.
I'm not trying to take issue with what you're saying,
but page 55 and page 56 are a lengthy list
of all the times he's not paid.
Right, it's listing all of the reasons why he's in default.
And I totally understand.
And the title of it is 150 day right to cure
your mortgage default.
So what I'm understanding you to say
is that this is only about the right to cure,
and it's not about the nature of the default.
Is that- -: Right.
This is a notice that's required under 244.35a.
-: I understand. -: The default notices
are something different than that.
-: So even though they overlap-
-: And Pinti applies to default notices.
-: And understood.
And so even though this overlaps in content a lot
with a notice of default, it's not subject
to the same standard in your view?
-: That's correct. -: It's subject
to the substantial compliance standard though, right?
-: Oh yeah, it's not.
It's not a notice of default.
-: No, yeah, the 150 day notice to quit is just,
by the way, you defaulted twice, we've told you,
and now you have 150 days
to get out, right? -: Right, right.
It's a window that this legislation..
-: There's a totally different statutory function.
-: Right, right, its only serves
a statutory function, correct.
-: And it doesn't have any...
Has no sort of substantive requirements at all
except for just to tell you this is your chance to cure.
Is that how it works?
-: It's to notify them with what they owe,
and has to give 'em 150 days to cure.
Unless you have any other questions, I think my time's up.
-: Okay. -: Thank you very much.
-: Yeah.
-: Okay, Attorney Santolucito.
-: That's correct, your Honor, yes.
And oh, sorry.
Good morning, Your Honors,
and may it please the Court, Thomas Santolucito
for Federal National Mortgage Association,
better known as Fannie Mae.
Fannie Mae participates in this appeal
for the sole purpose of requesting
that the Court affirm the Housing Court's decision
dismissing Reverend Branch's counterclaims against it.
-: Before you go there, though, that you're affected
by this mootness order.
Tell me why.
Is the mootness order...
Is the case moot or regarding to you,
or it's not even moot in regards to you, right?
-: I don't, not at this stage, Your Honor.
Obviously we have these counterclaims
still pending against my client.
That's my client's sole reason
for participating in the case.
Had the counterclaims not been present,
it would've been sub-
-: When the Appeals Court declares the case moot,
what do you do?
Do you say it's not moot, or what do you do?
-: My argument, Your Honor, has been that
that the possession issue is moot as to Fannie Mae.
Fannie Mae doesn't own this property anymore
and doesn't have the right to seek possession.
So as to Fannie Mae specifically,
the issue of whether it is entitled to possession,
it's moot.
It's not entitled to possession.
-: But the case is like sort of-
-: Correct, the case is still lingering,
-: Lingering the counterclaims against you
or are still present although they dismissed them
at the same time Mr. Cardoso
can't collect any use and occupancy?
When he filed a motion to reconsider,
did you weigh in on this at all too?
-: No, Your Honor, no, no. -: At that point,
you had won, right? -: Yes.
The Appeals Court had affirmed-
-: At some point, you know, you gotta stop winning.
(both laugh) -: Yeah.
-: So that's why you didn't reconsider.
So if the Appeals Court decision stayed as is
for Fannie Mae's purposes, you're fine, right,
because it affirmed the dismissal of the counterclaims.
-: Absolutely, Your Honor, correct.
-: Can I ask a question that admittedly may verge
beyond the record somewhat?
But there's a fight.
There's a discussion about the lack of a judgment
specifically naming Mr. Cardoso, right?
The Rule 25 motion was granted, but-
-: That's correct, Your Honor.
The rule 25 motion and the sale of the property
happened post-judgment. -: Understood.
-: So after the Housing Court had awarded possession
and dismissed the counterclaims,
Fannie Mae then sold the property to Mr. Cardoso
who looked to intervene at that point.
So your your analysis is correct.
-: So is there significance
where a Rule 25 motion has been granted?
Is there significance to whether
or not the underlying judgment
that already existed names the new person
with respect to whom the Rule 25 motion was granted?
-: I'm not sure, Your Honor.
Obviously the Housing Court did not substitute Mr. Cardoso.
He's not named in the judgment itself,
but the case had been on appeal at that time.
So Mr. Cardoso had intervened, had been substituted
as essentially a co-plaintiff in the case,
even though my client
was no longer seeking possession at that point.
And again, back to my original statement,
Fannie Mae's sole purpose,
sole interest in the litigation is these counterclaims.
Once these counterclaims have been resolved,
assuming they're resolved in my client's favor,
then that facilitates its exit from the litigation,
and the parties can continue
to argue the issue of possession,
assuming that there's still any issue
to be litigated at that time.
-: Can I ask you what the significance is
of the quitclaim deed that your client signed
to Mr. Cardoso?
Isn't that, as I understand it, what Fannie Mae is doing
is saying whatever rights we have in this property,
we now bequeath to you Mr. Cardoso?
-: Absolutely, Your Honor. -: And one of those rights
that Fannie Mae had in this property
was the right to possession.
Isn't that correct
at that time? -: Absolutely, yes.
Yes, your Honor. -: Okay.
-: So I am quickly running out of time,
but to address the counterclaims as briefly as I can,
most of Reverend Branch's counterclaims
against Fannie Mae arise from this agreement
that arose in the context of the Bankruptcy Court.
Page 52 of the record appendix shows an order
from the Bankruptcy Court indicating
that there had been an agreement reached
on the record between Mr. Branch
and the bankruptcy trustee
by which the trustee had agreed to abandon the property,
which would allow Reverend Branch to sell it.
Pentagon, the holder of the mortgage at the time,
agreed merely to withdraw its motion for relief from stay.
There's nothing in the summary judgment record
that could cause or could have caused the Court
to conclude that any agreement had been made
to forebear from foreclosing
once that bankruptcy case had been dismissed
and once the automatic stay had been removed.
-: Nothing in record which talks about this
is subject to his divorce action.
-: That's correct, Your Honor.
My client filed an affidavit stating
that its understanding of that agreement
was that the property would be marketed
for sale immediately.
Reverend Branch filed an affidavit stating
that his understanding was that he was unable to sell it
due to a pending divorce.
Irrespective of the timing, there was never an agreement
by which Pentagon agreed to not foreclose the mortgage
once that bankruptcy impediment,
once that automatic stay had been resolved
and had been vacated.
I see my time is running down,
so I welcome any other questions the Court may have.
Otherwise, I'm happy to rest on my brief.
(buzzer beeps)